

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS

AND

THE STRUGGLE OF PROTESTANTISM FOR EXISTENCE

BY

C. R. L. FLETCHER, M.A.

LATE FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE, OXFORD

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
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A large, ornate decorative flourish made of stylized leaves and vines. It starts at the top left, curves over the word 'PREFACE', and then loops down and around the large initial 'T' of the first paragraph.

PREFACE

THE following account of the life of King Gustavus Adolphus, the national hero of Sweden, demands little preface. It makes no pretensions to be based upon original research, and I cannot claim to have read even all the modern authorities on the subject. My knowledge of the Swedish language is by no means independent of the assistance of a dictionary, nor can I hope to have escaped that tendency to partiality for which the natural fascination of such a subject is the only excuse. The work was undertaken, and the material partly gathered, before I was aware that it was to have the honour of forming one of a series of biographies. The difficulty of accommodating its proportions to that object has not been inconsiderable. I am on the one hand debarred from giving the references which in many places I should have desired to give, and on the other hand obliged to include accounts of many things of which I had made no special study. The military history of the Thirty Years' War is in itself a case in point. No satisfactory monograph on the subject exists, and I have often been obliged

to confess myself at fault in grasping the exact meaning of military terms, and the exact effect of manœuvres, in an art of which even in its modern shape I know nothing. Every one in the seventeenth century was a bit of a soldier, and the books which were written at the time presuppose in their readers a considerable knowledge of the practice of arms. In the library of the immortal Captain Miles Standish, the *Swedish Intelligencer* stood side by side with the Bible. But the times have so far changed, that I am able to plead that I am probably not much more ignorant of the art of war than the majority of my readers are likely to be.

The contemporary literature of the Thirty Years' War was very voluminous and is still very undigested. Every variety of dates, figures, and numbers, every variety of judgment upon the principal characters engaged, makes a little task like mine extremely bewildering. No great history of the period as a whole has as yet been written. Professor Anton Gindely's larger work treats, so far as it has at present gone, only of the very early years of the struggle. He has indeed published a smaller school-book on the whole subject, which has been translated into English, but this is avowedly only tentative, and he confesses that he has not explored the archives of Stockholm. But in those archives, if anywhere, it is probable that the true Gustavus Adolphus is to be found.

On the other hand, almost every separate character and every separate incident in the war has had one, if not many historians. For instance, I

have come across, in one place and another, seventeen different accounts of the Battle of Lützen. The subject of the present biography has been particularly fortunate, or unfortunate, in this respect. Gustavus Adolphus has been attacked and defended any time these two hundred and fifty-eight years. His character has undergone, in the so-called impartial verdict of history, even more transformation than that of Oliver Cromwell: he has been deified as a hero; with no less warmth he has been denounced as a hypocrite. To the school of Gfrörer, to Förster and the biographers of Wallenstein, he came into Germany as a robber. What claim have I to say that the later German historians, such as Droysen, are justified in their vindication of his character, even though Ranke has lent his great name to the view that the life-work of the King was essentially the defence of the German Protestants and the restraint of the ambition of the House of Hapsburg, as the only real safeguard for the national independence of Sweden? The only answer I can make to this question is that, in the present state of historical knowledge, a man who has no pretensions to be a student of archives can but study the result of the researches made by others and form his conclusions accordingly. I am quite aware that this is not a perfectly safe guide, for I believe that one can prove almost anything from a judicious use of original documents, and that in a subject which possesses such a completely European interest as the Thirty Years' War, documents may at any moment turn up

which may falsify all the conclusions of previous writers. Every Court in Europe probably possesses some archives which have reference to it, and the field of research has been by no means exploited.

I must therefore at once avow that my main guides have been G. Droysen's "Gustav Adolf" (Leipzig, 1869), and Geijer's "Sveriges Historia," the classic work upon the subject, which has been translated into German. Geijer is especially valuable, because so large a portion of his history of the German campaigns is made up of letters from Gustavus himself, taken from the Swedish archives, which, in many places, he quotes *in extenso*. He, as it were, lets the King tell his own tale. A large proportion of these letters were written to John Casimir, the Regent of Sweden, who had married the King's sister Catherine, and who became the father of King Charles X., and ancestor of the later Vasa Kings. Next in importance comes a volume of letters of the King to his Marshal, General Kniphausen, written during the campaign of 1630-1-2, and published at Gröningen, in Holland, by H. O. Feith, in 1860. Of this same description is a little volume of the King's miscellaneous letters and writings (including the correspondence of Gustavus with his first sweetheart, Ebba Brahe), published at Stockholm, in 1861, under the title of "Konung Gustav Adolfs Skrifter."

I have found little difficulty in the use of the above-mentioned books, but it is quite another matter with the mass of contemporary pamphlets, broadsheets, pictures, caricatures, and letters, to

which the King's extraordinary success in Germany gave rise. Some part of the ground is cleared by the fact that Professor Droysen has proved conclusively that the three most important contemporary accounts, the "*Arma Suecica*" of Arlanibæus (Frankfort, 1631), the "*Inventarium Sueciæ*" of Godofredus (Frankfort, 1632), and the "*Theatrum Europæum*" of Abelinus, which did not appear in its final shape until 1679, were substantially the work of the same hand, namely, of Abelinus himself. The latter was evidently intended to be the life-work of the author; it is a wonderful monument of research and industry, and is enriched with numerous plates, two of which adorn the present volume. Next in order, of the same class, comes the "*Swedish Intelligencer*," printed for a London bookseller in successive instalments from the year 1632 to 1637. It professes to be, and one sees no reason to doubt the fact, compiled from a series of letters written by several persons from the actual theatre of the conflict—that is to say, it may be called entirely first-hand evidence, although probably not derived from any persons who would be likely to be in the interior secrets of the diplomatic and military movements. It is enriched with numerous plates. Of the value of the work of Colonel Robert Monro, an officer who served in the Scotch Brigade of Gustavus's army, I have spoken in the text. In England also was brought out "*Swedish Discipline, Religious, Civil, and Military*," a very interesting tract (1632), of ninety pages, which includes the famous articles of war and a pay-list of the Swedish army.

As first-hand evidence, too, may be reckoned the work of Gualdo Priorato, a Venetian gentleman who had served under Maurice of Nassau, then under Gustavus, Wallenstein, Horn, and Bernard, respectively. He may at least be considered as having seen both sides of the struggle, but with the accuracy for which his nation was famous, he gives no account of anything which he did not actually see, and the disappointing thing about his book is that he seems to have seen very little. As a foreigner and a soldier of fortune, he was not perhaps admitted to much of the secrets of either side. This is the book, however, in which Frederick the Great probably read up his Thirty Years' War campaigns, for it was translated into French by one Francheville, and published at Berlin in 1772, the new edition being enriched with movable plans of the principal battles, "compiled on the spot by an engineer officer in the Prussian service."

Every campaign, however, and every event in each campaign, has, as I have said, a special literature of its own. Much of this is known to me only by name, though the names of many of the tracts are extremely expressive, as, for instance, the "Hansische Wecker," "Nun geht's mit Gott ins Bayern," etc. I have, however, endeavoured to read all of those, on which I could lay hands either in the British Museum or the Bodleian Library, which have reference to the two great battle-fields of Breitenfeld and Lützen, although without arriving at any very clear notions of the disposition of this second battle.

Of modern works besides those already referred to, I have derived considerable help, with regard to the thorny subject of military history, from a little Belgian book edited by MM. Merzbach and Falk, and entitled "*Campagnes de Gustave Adolphe*" (Brussels, 1887), one of a series of sketches of European warfare now in progress. The old German General von Bülow's "*Gustav Adolf's Feldzug in Deutschland*," 1808, is written rather from the point of view of a military theorist than of an historian. For the negotiations between the King and Wallenstein, and those between the King and the Protestant princes in the winter of 1631-2, the thirty-fifth volume of the "*Preussische Staatsarchiv*," contributes valuable material which I have done my best to use carefully. Harte's "*Life of Gustavus Adolphus*" (London, 1759) is a ponderous and painstaking work of the Robertsonian school, and contains a valuable diary or diurnal of the King's campaigns. The works of the Rev. B. Chapman (London, 1856) and Consul Stevens (London, 1885) are spirited and picturesque biographies, especially the former, though it has the disadvantage of having appeared prior to Droysen's researches. I cannot, however, claim to have made much use of the three last-mentioned works. To the very voluminous modern Swedish life of Gustavus, by Abraham Cronholm, I have made frequent reference, but only upon doubtful points. I cannot claim to have read it through. Herr Weibull's, the latest Swedish life (Stockholm, 1884), I have studied carefully, and have derived much valuable

side information therefrom, as well as the right, by the extreme courtesy of its editor, Herr Bukowski, to make use of some of the illustrations to that work.

I have unfortunately not had the opportunity of travelling over all the ground, even of the German campaign, with this special object in view, and the Prussian and Polish "terrain" is completely unknown to me. I have, however, seen at one time or another most of the places described in the German and some of those in the Swedish part of the book; and about two years ago I was able to make some special study of the Pomeranian campaign on the spot.

With regard to the spelling of the proper names, I am aware that I shall be severely taken to task for "arbitrariness," but it is a choice between arbitrariness and pedantry, and I prefer to be found guilty on the former charge. There are historians who write Lorraine Lothringen, and who would shiver at the very name of Charlemagne; there is everything to be said for their view, but do they always write Roma and Firenze? There is another school, which professes to adopt universally the French spelling wherever there is no English equivalent, but which is in practice equally illogical. I am not likely to find favour with either of these, for the only rule, by which I have thought myself at liberty to be bound, is the rule of common practice among educated Englishmen. Thus I maintain that Alsace has become an English word to express the country lying between the Vosges and the Rhine; Cologne, to express the city of "four and

seventy stenchs"; and that to use these terms does not in the least stamp a man as an upholder of any anti-nationalist theories with regard to the Rhine frontier. But I cannot give up Mainz and Trier for Mayence and Treves. While refusing to call my hero Gustav Adolf, Gothenburg Göteborg, Munich München, or Vienna Wien, I hold myself quite free to speak of Regensburg, Speyer, and Kalmar.

The dates of the days of the month in this book are given in the old style, but it has been thought convenient to give the years according to the new style. Ten days must, therefore, it is almost needless to say, be added to each date to bring it into accord with modern chronology.

My thanks for assistance in my little work are due first to my father, who most carefully corrected the whole, and pointed out numerous faults of English; to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, of Balliol College, for many valuable hints; and to my most kind friend, Mr. Alexander Titz, of Stockholm, for his assistance with the illustrations, and for his unceasing attentions during my stay in Sweden. Lastly, to the Rev. Arthur Johnson, of All Souls, and Mr. Richard Lodge, of Brasenose College, to whose advice, though not directly in connection with this book, I owe whatever interest in History I may possess.

OXFORD, January, 1890.



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
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
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
GUSTAVUS I.

1523-1560



PEDIGREE OF THE HOUSE OF VASA IN THE 16th AND 17th CENTURIES.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.



CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE period of the Reformation had produced two great changes in the history of Europe. It had revolutionised religion and it had revolutionised commerce. Both changes were the result of a previous revolution in thought. It was not so much that men had not dared to think in the Middle Ages—many of them had, like Abelard and Wiclif, dared to attack the prevalent system—but it was rather that men, as a whole, had not taken the trouble to think, and few indeed were the incentives to such trouble. With the invention of printing it had, however, become a great deal easier to think. Thought was, so to speak, forced upon people, who at first would gladly have avoided the trouble of it, but who soon found

it a pleasure, an excitement, a moral necessity, and then, as Ulrich von Hütten said: "Men began to awake and live."

The result of their awakening was that they began to desire to provide better for their bodies and better for their souls. It is rather characteristic of the end of the Middle Ages that they should have thought first of their bodies. It was all very well for Erasmus to say: "First I shall buy Greek books, and then clothes"; but, in the first place, the majority of men were not as Erasmus; and, in the second place, Erasmus did not mean what he said. But before any serious attack had been made upon the dominant form of Christianity, serious attacks had been made upon the dominant system of trade and commerce. That there was an open-sea route to the Indies had long been an idea of the Portuguese navigators, who crept stealthily along the coast of Africa year after year, in search of the Cape of *Good Hope*. Columbus undertook his western voyage with the same idea, and called the naked Hispaniolans, upon whom he lighted, Indians. But what he went to seek he found not. The prize fell to the Portuguese, although it was not until many wars had been fought with the natives on the coasts of Malabar that they began to reap the fruit of their adventures. About the year 1503, merchants from Lisbon began to appear in the markets at Antwerp and Bruges, offering for sale cargoes of sea-borne spices at about one tenth of the price at which the same commodity, land-borne by the old Venetian trade route from the East, had previously been offered.

And why, it may be said, should a fall in spices affect the history of the world in general, and of Sweden in particular? Because spice was a prime necessary of life in the days when there were no green vegetables. And because the spice trade had become oceanic, all commerce became oceanic too. And the nations that lived upon the ocean would be the inheritors of the riches of the world. The old trade routes would be and were destroyed. The mighty organisation, which had brought the East and the West and the North, however feebly and expensively, together, whose pivot had been the Flemish towns, and whose two wings had stretched up the Mediterranean to Venice and Alexandria, and up the Baltic to Dantzic and Novgorod;—that was to fall. And not merely to fall, but to tumble down in sudden collapse. Venice, and Bruges the Venice of the North,—*on hantoient toutes les nations étrangères*,—soon retained but shadows of their former importance. The haughty spirit of the former, and her wars against the Turks, enabled her to disguise the fact for three centuries. But these centuries were a lingering agony.

And the Northern wing of this great European machine, the Hanseatic League, decayed as rapidly. It is with this wing that we are more immediately concerned. The great German cities ranged along the Baltic coast, or in the Northern Interior of Germany, had elaborated a system of territorial as well as commercial dominion over the Baltic, which had absolutely precluded for a time the normal development of the Scandinavian kingdoms. Their business

had been that of the carriers of northern Europe ; the Scandinavian kingdoms lay directly across their path. The temporary union of those three kingdoms, under Queen Margaret of Denmark, at the end of the fourteenth century, had been the first blow to the Baltic supremacy of the Hansa. The rupture of this union by Gustavus Vasa seemed for a moment to put the game in their hands again. But it was too late. The date of that rupture was the third decade of the sixteenth century, and the change had already begun. The Hansa was out of the race before Sweden entered it. Yet the Baltic commerce was worth having, and the new Swedish dynasty was well aware of the fact. That "*Dominium Maris Baltici*," about which we read so much in all contemporary records, was a prize worth struggling for ; it meant the dominion over the *coasts* of the Baltic as well as its commerce. Now the first point we have to bear in mind is, that the period of Sweden's greatness is precisely the period in which this question of the "*Dominium Maris Baltici*" is *the* question of Northern politics. I shall hope to shew that if this was not the mainspring of the life-work of Gustavus Adolphus, it was eclipsed, and eclipsed *pro hac vice* only, by his duty to the Protestant faith.

The Protestant faith ; that was the other conquest of the age. That was the conquest which England and Sweden in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were called upon to defend against a wave of reaction. We may make what fine distinctions, theological and other, that we will ; we may ac-

cuse and with justice, Protestant persecutors of being very nearly as bad as Catholic, and with far less excuse than they ; but to go back to what Macchiavelli called the "effectual truth of things," the fact remains that the spirit which animated Philip II. and Alva, Ferdinand II. and Maximilian of Bavaria, was but little different from the spirit which animated the persecutors of our own Puritan forefathers ; whereas the spirit of the Pilgrim Fathers was essentially one with the spirit of Gustavus and of Cromwell. And on that side was Freedom ; not as fully known as now ; the Goddess had hardly yet

" Stepped down through town and field
To mingle with the human race,"

but had only partly

" To men revealed
The brightness of her face."

Yet she was the same in essentials as she is to-day.

It would be interesting to speculate whether there is or is not anything in the fact that Spain and Portugal, the two nations who were first in the race of the new commerce and discovery, were by that fact in any way blinded to the contemporary revolution in Thought. They rejected the Reformation from the beginning, but they had perhaps their hands too full to allow them to consider it. The Northern nations, on the other hand, less occupied at first with the commercial question, seem to have owed their subsequent commercial success to the spirit which the Reformation awoke in them.

Now it is remarkable that Sweden and England, who were to be the two champions of Protestantism, had both accepted that form of faith more as a matter of political necessity or convenience than anything else. Gustavus Vasa, the founder of his dynasty, was not a very religious man. He had determined to make Sweden a Lutheran country for two main reasons: first, because he wanted the lands of the Church, both in order to enrich the crown and also to attach the nobles to his cause; secondly, because, as he said, the "priests were all unionists in Sweden"—that is, they all wished to maintain the union of the three Scandinavian kingdoms which he had broken, and they were, therefore, irreconcilably hostile to his dynasty.

Three other great services were rendered to Sweden by Gustavus I.: (1) at the Diet of Westerås, in 1544, the hereditary character of the monarchy was definitely declared. This was a great victory over the nobles, who in nearly all the Northern and Eastern Kingdoms of Europe—and in Sweden itself at a later time—succeeded in erecting an oligarchy, which oppressed the peasants and crippled the activity of the State. (2) Again, by his consistent favouring of the middle classes, and his conclusion of commercial treaties with Russia, France, and the Netherlands, he became the founder of Swedish commerce, and dealt a serious blow at the Baltic supremacy of the Hanseatic League. (3) And lastly, he appears as the founder of that policy of territorial aggression (toward the South and East), which, however we may judge of its morality in this

age of peace, was certainly looked upon then as the prime duty of all Kings, and which in the case of Sweden was the direct path toward the great part which she was destined to play in the seventeenth century.

His first enemy was Russia, a recently consolidated State, already bordering on the half-Polish province of Livonia and the Swedish province of Finland; already extending her flanks to the Caucasus and the Don on the south and to the White Sea on the north.* The English Captain Chancellor, attempting the N. E. passage in 1553, was astonished to find himself on Russian ground at Arkhangel; a somewhat close commercial connection between England and Russia followed upon his adventure, and soon afterwards Elizabeth founded her "Muscovy Company." Thus Russia had *her* interest in oceanic commerce, and it looked at one time as if she might become successor to the Hansa in the Baltic. But the wars of Ivan the Terrible (1534-84) for Finland and Livonia were unsuccessful.

* When I say that Russia was "extending" herself, it must always be borne in mind that, in pursuing this policy, she was only reasserting her claim to the territories over which her half mythical hero St. Vladimir had ruled in the Middle Ages. Poland had partitioned and Sweden afterwards began partitioning Russia with infinitely less regard to nationality than Russia herself shewed in the eighteenth century under the Great Peter and the Great Catherine. Catherine in 1772 was but rescuing Russians from a tyranny of five hundred years; Peter in 1721 but reclaimed provinces from Sweden which, according to the strict theory of nationality, ought never to have belonged to her, and which never had, in fact, submitted kindly to her rule. But few theories in practical politics have proved more provocative of present war and future illusion than the theory of nationalities.

ful, and the chief interest which they possess for us is that in 1561, the year after the death of Gustavus I., his son Eric acquired for Sweden the province of Esthonia, which appears to have previously fluctuated between dependence on Denmark and on Russia. This was the first of the so-called "Baltic provinces" of Sweden; herewith began the exclusion of Russia from the "*Dominium Maris Baltici*." But this possession brought Eric face to face with Poland, a country which was disputing with Russia the possession of Livonia.

Poland, under the last of the great Jaghellon line, was already displaying the fatal tendency to anarchy which at last devoured her. It must always be remembered that the huge, unwieldy carcase, which bears the name of Poland on any sixteenth-century map, was in reality a conglomeration of conquered provinces of at least as many different nationalities as the Austrian Empire of our own day.

Poland turned for help to the King of Denmark, in whom Eric, with keen insight, recognised the most dangerous foe for Sweden. In 1563 Eric concluded peace with Russia, and the nations of the North began to assume their natural relation to each other. The Baltic question rapidly became an European one. English sympathies were with Sweden and Russia; Spain and the Emperor as naturally took the other side, and suggested to the King of Denmark, Frederick II. (1559-1588), that he should ask for the hand of Mary Stuart; to counteract which King Eric indulged in an elaborate flirtation with Elizabeth. The powers of North Germany took

sides in the war (1565), but the war itself produced but little result. The able Eric displayed symptoms of insanity and was extremely unpopular with the Swedish nobles, and Denmark was as yet too powerful an enemy for Sweden to overthrow. In 1567 Eric was deposed by a revolution, the fruit of which was reaped by his brother John.

When the great Gustavus I. was dying, and could no longer speak, he made a sign that he wished to write, and wrote half a sentence of warning to his people: "Rather die a hundred times than abandon the Gospel. . . ." Then his hand failed, and he dropped back dead. He was not, I have said, a particularly religious man, but he marked out the true path for Sweden. Now in 1567 a certain reaction set in: many of the nobles, who had felt the yoke of Gustavus heavy and of Eric heavier, seemed ready to drift back to Catholicism, and John's reign (1567-1590) was one of reaction in many ways. John never openly went over to Catholicism, but he cast off all the Lutheranism that he dared to cast off. He made peace with Denmark and war with Russia; thereby he allowed the former country to develop her trade and foreign relations enormously and rapidly, and made the task of his successors doubly hard. Above all, he originated, by his marriage with Catherine Jaghellon, the disastrous connexion with Poland. That unhappy country, "the fatal byword for all years to come" of genuine anarchy, had just closed its period of prosperity. The last of the Jaghellon Kings died in 1572, and the elected King, Stephen Bathori, died in 1586. Ivan the Ter-

rible sought the crown of Poland. Perhaps it would not have been a bad thing for the Poles if he had obtained it; on the ground of nationality his claim was overwhelmingly better than that of his rivals; but it would have brought Russian barbarism two centuries nearer to Europe. John of Sweden, on the other hand, saw an opening for the House of Vasa. His son Sigismund was, by dint of bribes and intrigue, elected King of Poland. *But he had to become a Catholic.* Poland was the one conquest of the Latin Church in the East, and the one honourable thing in the subsequent history of Poland is the way she adhered to her Catholicism. But the union of Sweden with Poland, which would necessarily follow, if Sigismund succeeded his father on the Swedish throne, would be almost certainly a Catholic union, and would mean a complete change in the Northern balance of power, which had been already so far settled that a hard fight would probably be made by those interests which were threatened.

And the first of these interests was Swedish Protestantism. Sweden was still a free country, in the sense of being governed in a parliamentary way with the consent of the *four* estates, Nobles, Clergy, Citizens, and Peasants. Whatever the Riddarhus might think upon the subject, the three non-noble estates were red-hot Protestants and would have no Catholic king. Even the nobles were only induced to consent to Sigismund becoming King of Poland without forfeiting his right to succeed in Sweden, by the grant of extravagant privileges, practically so great,

had they been observed, as to emasculate the Vasa monarchy. Luckily the people had a deliverer at hand. Charles, Duke of Sudermania, the youngest of the sons of Gustavus I., lived wholly in the best traditions of his father's policy. He might be relied upon to head an insurrection, if necessary.

Even before John's death in 1590 murmurs began to be heard that he had been an usurper—was his son necessarily the heir? These murmurs increased, when in 1593, after waiting three years, Sigismund came home to claim his kingdom, with a present of twenty thousand crowns from the Pope in his pocket, "to defray the cost of the restoration of Catholicism in Sweden." Duke Charles had already prepared his plans when the King arrived; there seems little doubt that he was playing a game, and for the crown. We are not concerned with his motives, it is sufficient to know that they corresponded with the interests of his country. In 1593, just before Sigismund had landed, Charles had been chosen Regent and President of the Council of State, which had sworn "to obey him in everything which he should think fit to do for the maintenance of the Confession of Augsburg." These were ominous words for King Sigismund, who, however, being a thorough believer in the doctrine of the Jesuits, by whom he was guided, that all means are lawful for a good end, agreed in 1594 to accept the "decrees of Upsala," *i. e.*, the decision of the Council in the previous year, which confirmed Lutheranism as the one religion of Sweden. Thereupon he was crowned. It was afterward remembered that in that part of

the coronation ceremony where the King had to hold his right hand aloft for some minutes, he let it fall, either through impatience or weariness, and that Duke Charles had to remind him to keep it upright. Sigismund's coronation-oath included a promise to "preserve the Swedish Church," which promise on his return to Stockholm he immediately broke. He made a Catholic noble governor of that city; he began to found Catholic churches and schools; worse than this, he began to rule Sweden through Polish ministers, and to treat it as a conquered province or a dependency of Poland.

We must remember what a period it was, that last decade of the sixteenth century, and we must put ourselves in the position, as far as possible, of the men of that day. The great fact in European politics that presented itself to all eyes was the success of the Catholic reaction. It is not always easy for a man standing upon the seashore to perceive the exact moment when the tide begins to ebb. Some few great waves may even dash up beyond high-water mark when the flow has already ceased for many minutes. In this case the tide had turned, but men had hardly perceived it. It was but a few years since Philip II., master of the New World, of Spain, of Naples, of Milan, of Franche Comté, had swallowed Portugal and annexed her colonies; had apparently crushed the insurgent Netherlands; and had seemed on the point of crushing the heretic Elizabeth and the heretic Henry of Navarre. Now, it was true, the Armada had come and failed; Parma, the greatest of Philip's captains, was dead (1592);

the age of the great aggressive Popes was over. Yet all this had made as yet but faint impression; Henry IV. could hardly yet be called King of France, and if Spain had received one or two serious checks, she was still far and away the mightiest power in the world. By the close alliance of the two branches of the House of Hapsburg, she aspired to the dominion in Europe, and King Sigismund seemed a tool ready made to her hands, to assure to her the neutrality, if not the obedience, of the North;—a share in, if not the dominion over, the commerce of the Baltic. Sigismund's two marriages with Austrian archduchesses had further cemented the union, and Denmark seems at this time, and for long after, to have been always ready to pass into the hands of Spain.

At the risk of repetition it seems worth while to remind the reader of the essential *connexion* of all the great European questions in the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century. After that period it is possible to trace a Northern, a Western, and a Southern set of policies, which by no means hang upon the same, or even upon similar, considerations. But the period before us is one, in which if you touch one nerve of the European body-politic, the shock will vibrate and revibrate throughout the whole frame.


And one branch of the great European struggle now centred in the contest between Sigismund Vasa and his people. But, though unperceived, the tide *had* turned, and that contest could have but one end. Its details have little interest for us. When

Sigismund went back to Poland at the end of the year 1594, he could not prevent Charles being chosen to administer the kingdom in his absence, and Diet after Diet subsequently confirmed the power of the Regent. The peasants of Dalecarlia, the great province of the centre, which had first come forward to the support of Gustavus I. in 1520, sent up a petition to the effect that there ought to be only one king in Sweden, and that Sigismund had forfeited the crown. Charles himself had been unwilling to lead a revolution, until it became apparent that Sigismund was massing troops and raising money in Poland for an attack upon his native land. In 1597 the civil war may be said to have begun; in the following year Sigismund landed (with only five thousand Polish troops) and was utterly defeated near Linköping (on September 25, 1598). On the next day a treaty was concluded by which Sigismund was acknowledged as King, but promised to send away his foreign troops and maintain Protestantism. It was obviously a mere effort to gain time, and in the following year on failing to keep the condition, which he never had the remotest intention of keeping, he was formally deposed (July, 1599).

The contest, however, was by no means over, and it led to that perpetual hostility between Sweden and Poland which played such an important part in the history of Northern Europe in the seventeenth century. On the whole, Spain, Austria, and Denmark ranged themselves on the side of Poland, while England under James I., who was the brother-

in-law of King Christian IV. of Denmark (1588-1648), hesitated between the two parties. The failure of the elder branch of the Vasas to assert their rights was very considerably due to the unwillingness of the Poles to fight for a foreign crown to be placed on the head of their King. On the other hand, Sigismund and his descendants became more and more thoroughly Polish, more and more imbued with the spirit of the Catholic reaction, and therefore any chance they might have had of return to the crown of Sweden rapidly vanished. In 1604 Charles was solemnly crowned King; that was the second birthday of the Vasa monarchy; the crown was entailed upon his eldest son, Gustavus Adolphus, and his descendants, *being Protestants*, and the descendants of Sigismund were forever excluded. "Every prince who should deviate from the Confession of Augsburg should *ipso facto* lose the crown. Anyone who should attempt to effect any change of religion should be declared an enemy and a traitor. Sweden should never be united with another kingdom under one crown; the King must live in Sweden."






CHAPTER II.

THE BEGINNINGS OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

IN the year in which Sigismund was first conditionally recognised as King of Sweden, 1594, on the 9th of December, Gustavus Adolphus was born in the Palace in Stockholm. Duke Charles, as he still was, had by his first wife (a daughter of the Elector Palatine) only one daughter who survived infancy ; she was called Catherine, and became in after years her half-brother's most trusted friend and adviser. By his second wife, Christina * of Sleswick Holstein, he had two sons and one daughter. The eldest was our hero ; the second, Charles Philip, became at one time a claimant for the crown of the Czar, but died childless in 1622. The daughter, Mary Elizabeth, married her cousin John, the only one of Sigismund's brothers who took the Swedish side in the succession wars, and who honourably refused himself to trouble the existing entail of the crown.

* She was the granddaughter of Luther's friend Philip the Magnanimous of Hesse, and thus Gustavus's hereditary Vasa-Protestantism may be said to have been reinforced from the maternal side.




VAXHOLM.

When the grandfather of the new-born Crown Prince had seized the throne, Sweden was a barbarous country. Gustavus I. used to complain that his people understood civilisation so little, that they invariably robbed the merchants who came to trade with them. Their culture was perhaps about on a level with that of Poland and Russia. With the lapse of eighty years all this was changed. Sweden was a civilised country, if not to the extent of the England of Elizabeth or the France of the days before the League wars, yet so far that it might at least compare favourably with the neighbouring German and Scandinavian states. We know what an impetus to literature and especially to theological study was given by the Lutheran Reformation in Germany; Lutheranism was essentially in its early days a scholarly faith, and when engrafted upon the rugged Swedish stock it did produce very rich, if not very enduring, fruit. That there is something in "national character" is a doctrine which will probably survive the destructive efforts of modern historians. And the character of the Swedish people seems to have been actually new-created by the Reformation. The same was the case in Scotland, but one difference is readily perceptible: Scotland became Calvinist and learnt only the sterner lessons of Protestantism; Sweden took in all that was brilliant, attractive, and progressive from her Lutheranism, while her fresh Northern blood prevented her from relapsing, as the German Lutherans so easily did, into an indolent fatalism. By the end of the sixteenth century the Swedish nobles were by far the most cultivated aristocracy of the North.

The traveller of to-day who approaches Stockholm by the Mälär Lake, and sees the houses spreading out upon the numerous islands and up the heights of the Södermalm, is looking upon a very different city from that in which Gustavus was born. Yet, as in the case of London, the integral kernel of Stockholm is still called "the city" (Staden), and with the adjacent island of the Riddarholm presents an aspect not altogether modern, though, in consequence of the only recently abandoned Scandinavian habit of building all houses, even in the cities, of wood alone, few ancient buildings remain, and the palace itself is an eighteenth-century erection. The palace of "Birger Jarl," a huge mediæval pile, went the way of all Swedish buildings in the conflagration of 1697, but it stood upon the same site as the present "Slots." Before the birth of our hero, the Norrmalm, which is now the fashionable quarter of the city, had been at least partially invaded by buildings, although these were not incorporated in the city until 1635. The true old capital of Sweden had been, in fact, not Stockholm at all, but Upsala, which long continued to be the crowning-place of the kings, as well as the seat of the Metropolitan, but which the Vasas by this time had pretty well abandoned as a place of permanent residence.

The other chief towns of importance in the country at the time of Gustavus's birth were Westerås, Örebro, and Kalmar. Gothenburg was only founded during his boyhood; Malmö, Lund, and Helsingborg were still Danish possessions. Any one who



HELSINGBORG

wishes to know what the conditions of life in the country were, could hardly do better than study Whitelocke's journal of his embassy to Queen Christina in the year 1654. Whitelocke was, it is true, only a passing visitor, but he performed the journey across Sweden from Gothenburg to Stockholm in the rigours of a northern winter, and he records his experiences with great intelligence and some humour. Great allowance must be made in reading his account for the corruption of morals and manners, which had been produced by the later years of the long war, and the great influx of previously unknown luxuries upon a poor and hardy people. It is, however, probable that this corruption had not largely affected the peasant class, into whose habits Whitelocke diligently enquired, and with whom he came during his journey into frequent contact, and, therefore, it is quite permissible to regard him as a valuable first-hand authority for any one who wishes for a peep into the life of Sweden at the period of our story. The one practice which struck our traveller with uniform disgust was, that he was very frequently asked to dine off the flesh of animals which had died a natural death, a practice which he attributes not so much to the poverty as to the thriftiness of the "primæval peasantry," who had won so many victories for the cause of Protestantism.

Of the manner of life of the Court and aristocracy Whitelocke's book has less to say, and what he says concerns us very little, as there can be no doubt that a complete revolution had been effected in these in

consequence of the spoils of Germany, which the Swedish commanders brought home between 1632 and 1648. But we may perhaps picture the Brahes and De la Gardies, and all the best of the Swedish aristocracy, old and new, at the end of the sixteenth century, as, if we put aside the different conditions of climate, leading a life in time of peace not essentially different from the Pembrokes and the Arundels, the courtiers of Kings James and Charles, of whom Clarendon has left us such a vivid picture. They were undoubtedly rich from the spoils of the Church, and they were undoubtedly cultivated and lettered men.

But nothing is more remarkable than the way in which the Royal Family of Vasa towered above their people and their contemporaries in this last respect. Gustavus I., though previously a comparatively uneducated man, developed when on the throne a passion for literature, art, and music, which amazed his somewhat jealous Court. Theology—to many non-religious minds (such as our own Elizabeth's) the engrossing study of the age—was his greatest delight. Eric based his claim to the admiration of posterity no less upon his foreign policy than upon his proficiency as a painter, a musician, a mathematician, an astronomer, an orator, and a writer on military tactics. Poor man, he had much need of these arts to console him in later life, for he spent seventeen years in prison between his deposition and his murder. In him also first appeared that taint of madness which sometimes accompanies great genius, and which has reappeared

from time to time in the Vasa race down to their latest descendants. John, the fratricide and would-be apostate, was a man of almost greater ability than Eric, and Sigismund was hardly behind them. Charles was the least naturally able and the worst educated of Gustavus's sons; but his second wife, the mother of Gustavus Adolphus, was a great patroness of literature, and he himself was a considerable composer of hymns, prayers, and catechisms. The great point about him, however, was, that he was a more practical man than any of his brothers. War and the Gospel were undoubtedly the true business of a King of Sweden, and Charles understood both thoroughly. He endeavoured steadily throughout his reign to bring the whole resources of Sweden into a condition to contribute liberally to the defence of the kingdom, and to organise that defence upon the most practical method. Thus, without being a great or original genius, he prepared the way for his son.

And to him that son owed the priceless boon of an excellent education. The boy was a Vasa from head to foot, and the father knew it. "Ille faciet," said the dying King looking at him lovingly, when his counsellors stood round, pulling long faces about "the state of the nation, should any unforeseen accident to your Majesty deprive us," etc., etc. And the next day when they told him of the loss of some fortress or other at the hands of the Danes, he replied calmly: "The concerns of this world trouble me no more; I leave all in better hands than mine." They were not Court ladies, to whom the

early years of the Lion of the North were entrusted. Charles deliberately took the advice of his Estates as to the choice of a tutor, and the person selected was John Skytte. Skytte drew up a plan of education, "such as a prince should have." He was a Swede who had passed ten years in travel to most places in Europe which were worth seeing. A German, Von Mörner, also a travelled man, was to assist Skytte, and the Count de la Gardie, a Swedish noble of French origin, took care of the military side of the Prince's education. The seed fell on good ground; Gustavus, when he arrived at man's estate, knew a good deal of seven languages, and could converse fluently in four besides his own. His letters, like those of many of his contemporaries, are the strangest mixture of Latin, German, French, and Swedish; they read as if the languages were all in his head and he used the shortest and readiest word in each case to explain his thoughts, quite indifferent to which tongue it belonged. It must be remembered that Latin was the universal language of diplomacy of the day, and that German, owing, no doubt, to the wide-spread influence of the Hanseatic merchants, was the *Lingua Franca* of the Baltic nations. But Gustavus's knowledge of Greek was a rarer accomplishment, and enabled him to read Xenophon in the original, and to pronounce him the greatest ancient writer on the military art. Even when in camp he always carried in his pocket a copy of Grotius's treatise "*De Jure Belli et Pacis*." *

* This passion for history bore fruit in the fragment of a "History of the House of Vasa," which he left behind him. There is a copy



JOHN SKYTTE.

The stories which gathered round the infancy of Gustavus are of the usual slight merit, and demand but little recognition here. Of course his horoscope was cast for him, and of course a glorious career and a violent death were easily discoverable therein. It was not unsafe to predict either of these things of a Vasa and a Protestant King in that age. Nay, the old books are full of the "marvellous discovery," by Tycho Brahe* ten years before our Hero's birth, of a new star in the constellation of Cassiopeia, which clearly could have no other meaning than that "a Protestant prince should arise in the North, who should procure great advantages to those of the Protestant faith." (Is it not written that Louis XIII. was born under the sign of Libra, and was therefore called "Louis the Just"?) How natural, too, that in the name Gustavus—a good honest family name—which was given to him, men should discover the anagram of Augustus; a play upon words, of which his admirers knew how to make good use, when he afterwards restored the Reformed faith in the city of Augsburg (Augusta).

Of the usual child stories, however, I am inclined to like two, which were narrated of our infant Hero. One is that, when he was five years old, his father took him down to Kalmar to see a fleet which was preparing to pay a visit of observation to the

of this fragment in the British Museum, printed at Stockholm in 1759. The memorable opening sentence may perhaps be worth extracting: "God grant me so to live, that I may ever live with Christ, and on earth may never blush for my own deeds."

*See a very rare tract, entitled "The New Star of the North Shining on the Victorious King of Sweden." London, 1632.

Hanseatic city of Lübeck, which had threatened to behave unpleasantly to Sweden. "Which of the ships does your Highness like best?" said an officer of distinction to the boy. "That one."—"Why?"—"Because she has more guns on board than the others." Guns were to be the essentials of his trade. The other story is equally characteristic: "You must not go into that wood, my dear," said his nurse to him one day, when they were walking in the country near Linköping; "there are huge serpents in that wood." "Give me a big stick then," said the boy; "I'll soon kill them."

From his earliest years the young Prince was systematically "accustomed to affairs." His father lost no opportunity of bringing him forward in the Council, and, at the audiences given to foreign ambassadors, sometimes made the child of ten years old reply on behalf of the Crown of Sweden. The period was a deeply interesting one at the Court of Stockholm, for as the Spaniards began to slacken in their efforts against Holland after the death of Philip II. (1598), a large number of adventurers—Germans, English, French, and above all Scotch officers—came to Sweden to put their swords and their somewhat cosmopolitan Protestantism at the service of a King who was engaged in a struggle with Catholic Poland, which might easily develop into a struggle with Catholic Europe. One great reason that King Charles had for thus calling attention to his brilliant son was the uncertainty of the succession. In spite of the settlement of 1604, a revolution in favour of the elder line might easily

follow upon his death, for Gustavus's cousin John was five years older than he, and was "much seen of all men." It was in no jealous or narrow spirit that the old monarch resolved to extend to John as much of his favour as possible. By bringing up the boys together, and treating his nephew almost as a son, he seemed to be leaving to his people the choice between them. Yet he lost no opportunity of secretly directing that choice, and before his death could have had no doubt where it would fall.

"Before all things, fear God," writes Charles to Gustavus, "honour thy father and mother, be tender to thy sisters, love those who have served me faithfully, reward them according to their deserts, be gracious to thy subjects, punish the evil, trust all men fairly, but only entirely when thou hast learnt to know them. Be no respecter of persons before the law; invade no man's just privileges, provided they clash not with the law; diminish not thy regal possessions in favour of any man, except thou art sure that he will recognise the benefit and do thee good service in return." This last sentence was a wise bit of instruction in a country where the crown subsisted entirely upon domains, and where the nobles, provided they served in the field, were free from the burdens of taxation.

The father needed to give no instruction in regard to his son's duty as a soldier, for Gustavus stole hours from his books and his sleep to listen to the tales of the great Prince Maurice, and his heroic deeds against the Spaniards, told by the immigrant officers who had made a campaign or two in the


Low Countries. So early was his passion for soldiering developed, that he was profoundly hurt at being forbidden to serve in the Russian campaign of 1610, when he was between sixteen and seventeen, and proportionally elated when, in April, 1611, Christian of Denmark having declared war on Sweden, he was solemnly knighted, and sent to collect troops in West Gothland for the relief of Kalmar, then the most important Swedish port, which Christian had besieged, and which he shortly afterwards took. His first successes were the destruction of the towns of Christianopol in the province of Schonen, and the reconquest of the isle of Öland in the same year. Here, as elsewhere, Gustavus began to prove true the saying of a contemporary historian concerning the Swedish troops: "They don't defend their men with walls, but their walls with men." The sword in the boy's hand woke in him the Viking spirit of his race; a spirit which, it must always be remembered, is not merely one of sheer fighting, but of adventure as well; not merely one of conquest, but also of colonisation, but which on more than one occasion in the history of the Vasa family (*e.g.*, in Eric) degenerated into mere "Berserkir" passion. Even the sober Charles once challenged his "dear adversary of Denmark" to decide the war by a single combat; and his son's one great fault as a general—and it was a serious one—was that, in the moment of victory, and sometimes, as in the last fatal field of Lützen, too soon for life if not for victory, he would throw prudence to the winds, and charge like any Crusader. But, on the other hand, his swift

and dashing courage was precisely what was wanted in an age of Spanish captains, slow movements, and heavy battalions; and when off the battlefield, his higher qualities—his ready habit of command over a temper naturally fiery, his knowledge of the occasional necessity of silence and reserve, above all his deep and unaffected piety—almost invariably got the better of his Viking blood.

Here, with his maiden sword in his hand, we must leave the young Hero for a few moments, in order to recapitulate briefly the events of his father's reign, and to consider the state of Europe at the date of his own accession to the crown. We have got to clear the stage for the main actors, and the main act in the drama; we have to dispose of Denmark, Russia, and Poland, before we can send a soldier to Pomerania. The main questions in this period have their roots some distance back and do not appear at first sight directly connected with the Thirty Years' War. Shall the Baltic be a Danish lake? Shall Sweden have the keys of the province of Livonia, which again is the key of Poland? Lastly, the long-standing dynastic quarrel between the Polish and Swedish branches of the House of Vasa has to be cleared out of the way. If these questions seem to the reader to be unimportant, I must beg leave to put him in mind of one of the sayings of Gustavus himself: "All wars in Europe hang together."

How European these Baltic questions were becoming, we may learn at a glance from the number of Powers which interested themselves more or less directly in these early wars of Sweden.

In the first place, there is Denmark. She was perhaps then at the height of her power; she had recently founded on either side of the Sound the two strong fortresses of Kronborg (or Elsinore) and Helsingborg, thus giving herself command of the only practicable passage from the Baltic to the North Sea, which Sweden could possibly have disputed. And Sweden could not at present dispute it, for the very good reason that her three Southern provinces (those provinces that have been called, from the shape of the Scandinavian peninsula, the "bear's paws")—Halland, Schonen, and Blekingen—were then, and until some time after Gustavus's death, in the hands of the Danes. It was just this part of his country which Gustavus I. had been unable to liberate. Sweden, therefore, if she wished for any share in extra-Baltic commerce, was compelled to seek it from the only point at which she touched the open sea. This was at the mouth of the river Göta, where, in addition to the already existing strong fortress of Elfsborg, Charles IX. was now founding Gothenburg, in modern times the most important commercial city in Sweden. The central point of the strife between Sweden and Denmark at this time will therefore be found to be round these two fortresses, over against which the Danes had recently rebuilt and strengthened the fortifications of Bohus. But we must not wholly divert our eyes from the Sound, where the tolls levied, and often arbitrarily raised, by the Danes were a second great cause of strife; and Denmark had recently put forward the monstrous demand,



THE BASIN OF THE BALTIC IN THE 17TH CENTURY.

that no commerce should pass round the North Cape to Arkhangel, under pretence that this would be an evasion of the tolls of the Sound. One other burning grievance was the claim of the Danes to free commercial access to the Swedish possessions in Esthonia and (as soon as Sweden got hold of the province) in Livonia. During the seven years of Charles IX.'s rule Denmark had kept herself fairly quiet, but when King Christian perceived that his rival was growing feeble, and that there might possibly be on his death a dispute for the Swedish succession, a succession to which he, too, might lay claim (for Denmark had never given up the idea of reuniting the three Scandinavian crowns), he declared war at the beginning of 1611, and took with little trouble Kalmar and Elfsborg. A war with Denmark meant more to Sweden than a war with any other country, for their frontiers converged everywhere; and along the long Norwegian boundary there was seldom any real peace at all. In estimating the position of the Danish monarch *vis-à-vis* with the Swedish, it must not be forgotten that the former was by no means so completely master of his own kingdom as the latter. Charles IX. was harassed by a rival claimant to the crown, but the Swedish nobility were almost to a man loyal to the decision of the Estates; whereas Christian had constant troubles with the Danish nobility. He himself always affected—and perhaps it was not altogether affectation—the manners and feelings of a bourgeois, and endeavoured to rely upon the bourgeoisie for support against the aristocracy; but the

course of Danish history during the previous hundred years had by no means resulted in the establishment of a popular monarchy, in the sense in which the Vasa monarchy could claim that title; and over and over again Christian was compelled to desist from some enterprise which he had begun, owing to murmurs and even threats of deposition which became audible among his nobles. It was only in 1660 that the Kings of Denmark, finding themselves called by the popular voice to undertake the defence of their country against Charles X. of Sweden, were able to overthrow for a time the dominion of the aristocracy.

Closely involved with the Danish troubles, the burden of which Gustavus thus inherited, came the relation of Sweden to the Dutch Republic. Holland was, perhaps more than any other Power, stepping into the position in Baltic commerce formerly occupied by the Hanseatic League. By the middle of the seventeenth century it is said that she drew a third of her revenue from this source, and even at the end of the sixteenth her understanding with England enabled her to make sufficiently good terms with Denmark as to the right of entering the Sound. All the offers of Charles failed to draw her away into a league with Sweden against the Danish claim to control that passage. With all her greatness, Holland often displayed an intense and narrow commercial selfishness, which rendered her oblivious of the interests of European freedom. So long as she, for the time being, could get in upon good terms, she cared not that she was contributing

to aggrandise the jealous guardian of the mouth of the Baltic; and when her twelve years' truce with Spain was concluded in 1609, she made rapid commercial strides towards the north-east of Europe. Charles was not powerful enough to refuse her that which he determined to refuse to the Danes, namely, free access to the Swedish ports in Esthonia; he was, moreover, always hoping for an alliance against Christian, or at least an armed mediation on the part of Holland between himself and that monarch. But Holland's cue was strict neutrality; that Sweden, Denmark, and Poland should just about balance each other, and be so occupied with snarling at each other's bones that she would stand in the end a fair chance of clearing the plates of all three, is no unfair representation of Holland's view of the Baltic question.

I have already pointed out the beginnings of Swedish aggression against Russia, another of the Powers deeply interested in the points in dispute. A fresh opportunity was offered for interference there, when the direct line of Rurik came to an end in 1598 with the death of Czar Feodor. The volatile Sigismund of Poland at once seized upon the idea of getting himself chosen Czar, and thus indemnifying himself for his loss of Sweden. But his Catholicism stood hopelessly in the way. Sixteen years of anarchy and disputed succession followed in Russia. It is needless for us to specify the Borisese, and Demetriuses, and Wassilis, who laid claim to, and occasionally occupied, the throne of Moscow. The only points for us to notice are that Charles

and Sigismund steadily supported rival candidates, and finally, more or less leaving the combatants to fight the original matter out, settled down into a hearty struggle for the possession of Livonia, once a debatable land between Russia and Poland; while Sweden, being geographically in a better position to carry out the design, overran the Russian provinces of Ingria and Carelia at the end of the Gulf of Finland, and even, in 1611, penetrated as far as Novgorod. It was not until Gustavus had been some time upon the throne that there arose in Russia a really national Czar, in the person of Michael, ancestor of the present reigning House of Romanoff. In the course of these quarrels the Swedish General de la Gardie at one time proposed to put on the Russian throne Charles Philip, the youngest brother of Gustavus; but the latter, just after his accession to the Swedish crown, wisely decided against permitting the aggressive policy. The kings of Sweden have been much blamed by modern writers for this wanton attack upon the territories of their neighbour, the Czar; but, apart from the fact that most of the attacking was done while there was no proper Czar at all, and largely to prevent the King of Poland from becoming Czar, I must be allowed to protest, however mildly, against the application of principles which have by no means gained universal acceptance in the nineteenth century to the events of the first two decades of the seventeenth. In saying this, I am not following that great master of human motives, Macchiavelli, but merely putting the question upon the

ground of the interests of Sweden. The Florentine would have looked at the matter thus: "If Charles was strong enough to conquer Russia, he ought to have done it; not being so, the next best thing he could do was to take what he could get of it; before all things he ought not to have allowed Sigismund to get a footing there, and he did not." *Ought not*—that is to say, in the interests of his own country, which were the only things that a seventeenth-century king ever regarded—perhaps the only things that any king in any century ought to regard.

For Livonia the struggle between Poland and Sweden was long; and this brings us directly to the subject of the mutual relations of these two countries during this period. Ever since Sigismund had retired from Sweden in 1599, he had found it more and more impossible to interest his new country in his dynastic quarrel. He had therefore been reduced to the resource of keeping up relations with such disaffected people as he could hear of in Sweden itself, in Finland and in Esthonia. On his own brother John, he attempted to work, but in vain; but there were some few Catholic nobles in Sweden who were not unwilling to pocket a little Polish gold occasionally, though they made practically no return for it. Meanwhile the only theatres on which Sigismund and Charles could meet were Livonia, and the Russian succession wars. That in the former Charles was nearly always successful (which was by no means the case where native Russian troops had to be encountered), proves that Poland had already entered upon her rapid career

of decline; and, a little before the death of the Swedish King, Sigismund was obliged to conclude an armistice which partially left the former in temporary possession of the coveted province.

One other prince who has as yet played no part at all in these questions, but who is destined to give us a great deal of trouble, and to play a very prominent if not a very dignified part later on, is the Elector of Brandenburg. The House of Hohenzollern had as yet done little to shew that it was one day to rule over Germany. Its main possession, Brandenburg, was cut off from the sea by Pomerania. Its chief outlying possession, Prussia, was a Polish fief and surrounded on all sides with Polish territory. The "wings of the Prussian Eagle," Silesia and West Prussia (the latter, now a Polish province, pure and simple, had been torn from the Teutonic knights in the fifteenth century) awaited Frederic, the redeemer or the robber. Not a foot had yet been planted upon the Rhine, of which Prussia was one day to be the guardian. Only two great rivers passed through its territory, the Oder and the Vistula, and the mouths of both were in the hands of other Powers.

Shut out from commerce, sheltered behind the broad back of the Elector of Saxony from the aggressive Catholic reaction of the south, Brandenburg remained utterly indifferent to, or oblivious of, that flowing tide. Even when partially awakened to what was going on, the two contemporary Electors showed an extraordinary apathy, and even cowardice, for which one searches in vain in the previous or subsequent history of their family.

Carlyle has well characterised one of them, with whom we shall make a somewhat nearer acquaintance later on, as "*Que faire,*" because the story goes that he once said when asked why he did not resist Gustavus, "*Que faire? ils ont des canons.*" Yet this sleepy Elector and his father are all-important to our story. Sigismund knew that fact well, and during the Russian disputes, and still more during the armistice, did his utmost to conciliate his ponderous vassal. Though Dantzic was a free city and Königsberg practically independent of Prussia, there were several points (notably Pillau) on the coast of that duchy from which the Elector could easily hold out a hand to a possibly invading Swede. Once the Swede was in Prussia, he had a "*sedes belli,*" to use the language of the day, of the most favourable nature, for an attack upon Poland itself. What if the Elector should try and shake off Polish suzerainty? Who could be a more favourable ally for this purpose than the King of Sweden? And even more than this. Were not Brandenburg and Saxony almost equally entitled to claim the leadership of North German Protestantism? If the general conflagration should come—nay, *when* it should come, for we may be sure that Sigismund foresaw what every thinking man in Europe foresaw—was not an alliance between Brandenburg and Sweden, in the interests of Protestantism, the most natural thing in the world? Therefore, since, if my readers will allow me again to quote Macchiavelli, "men must either be caressed or destroyed," and since Sigismund was not powerful enough to destroy the Elector, he determined to caress him. And he did

it so effectually that it was just Brandenburg that proved an almost greater obstacle to Gustavus's later plans, than all the soldiers which Catholicism could put in the field.


I have thus briefly sketched out the relation to each other of the various Powers who were interested in the Baltic question. It will perhaps be of assistance to the reader if I am allowed to recapitulate their objects in a tabular form.

- (1) *Holland* : her object was—freedom from tolls in the Sound, free commerce over the whole Baltic, to maintain the *statu quo* among other Powers.
- (2) *Denmark* : To maintain her Swedish provinces and her mastery of the Sound ; to oppose Sweden in every possible way, if necessary by an alliance with Poland.
- (3) *Poland* : To recover the Crown of Sweden, to conciliate Brandenburg and all other possible allies of Sweden, to recover Livonia.
- (4) *Russia* : To get back her Baltic provinces if possible.
- (5) *Brandenburg* : To keep Prussia and to be allowed to go to sleep.
- (6) *Sweden* : To win territory on the eastern shores of the Baltic, to be friendly with Denmark if possible, to keep Elfsborg and Gothenburg (and thus her communication with the North Sea,) not at present to attempt the recovery of her southern provinces ; *to resist all attempts of Poland, whether on Sweden itself, or on her eastern possessions.*

I have put this last object in italics because it was just this which led on to the later implication of Sweden in the struggle of Protestantism for existence. Let my readers never lose sight of the fact that at the back of Sigismund were all the wishes, and might be all the armies, of Catholic Europe, and perhaps they will pardon me for dwelling so long on the introductory part of my subject.



RIKSTALER.—1613.




CHAPTER III.

OPENING YEARS OF THE REIGN OF GUSTAVUS.

HARLES IX. died at Nyköping, in the arms of his eldest son, on the 30th of October, 1611. We have seen to what difficulties that son was left heir.

Few Kings have indeed ever inherited a kingdom in a more critical condition. But the lad of seventeen was not unequal to the task. We have an interesting glimpse of his personal appearance about this time, from an account left by some Dutch Ambassadors, who visited Sweden shortly after his accession: "His Majesty," they write, "stood before his throne to receive us with head uncovered, dressed in satin trimmed with black fur, and with a black silk cloak on his shoulder (for he was in mourning for his uncle, the late Duke of Holstein). There was a canopy over his head; on his right hand the regalia of Sweden on a marble table with silver feet; he is slender of figure, well set up, with rather a pale complexion, a long-shaped face, fair hair, and a pointed beard, which here and there runs into a tawny colour;



REVAL.

and, according to all reports, he is a man of high courage, though not revengeful; keen of intellect, watchful, active; an excellent speaker, and courteous in his intercourse with all men; from a youth of such promise great things are to be expected."

And another contemporary says: "He seems more occupied in ruling his kingdom than with the ordinary pleasures of youth."

Little time indeed was left him, from the moment of his accession, for the cultivation of the ordinary pleasures of youth; yet he had one considerable love affair before his marriage. There was a beautiful Court lady, called Ebba Brahe, sprung from one of the proudest families in Sweden, with whom he deliberately intended to share his throne. At Skokloster, in Sweden, is preserved a fragment of their correspondence, including some passionate love-letters from the young King. While engaged in the campaign against Russia in 1616, he sends her in a letter an actual flower, "which the Germans call Forget-me-not." He wrote sonnets to her while away, and when at home played duets with her on the flute. For some time his mother, who was a lady of very decided character, watched the progress of their passion with great anxiety. Then she finally exacted from her son a promise that he would see the lady no more for three years. Those were years of war and of tribulation for Sweden, too severe and too absorbing to allow the King's constancy to stand the trial, and, at the end of the period, the Queen Dowager triumphantly married the dangerous maiden to James de la Gardie. Nor is the young King

absolutely clear from less creditable connexions, for he had, by a Dutch lady, a natural son, Gustaf Gustafson, born in 1616; the boy won his spurs on the field where his father met his death. It should be mentioned that this instance is the sole record against Gustavus in an age of almost universally lax morality on such matters. Few indeed are the trustworthy details respecting his personality that remain to us; and, were they more, I should be less inclined to dwell upon them than upon his services to his country and to the Protestant cause. Here and there a touch comes out in his correspondence or intercourse with his Chancellor, Axel Oxenstiern (which for the most part consists of diplomatic and military counsel given and received by both parties with the most outspoken freedom); as when the King says to his Chancellor: "You are so cold in your proceedings that you act perpetually as a drag on my activity"; to which the latter replies: "If I did not perpetually throw cold water on you, you would catch fire and blaze up once for all." And the same Chancellor makes use of the words "*Impetus ingenii*," in reference to the hastiness with which, as the German war developed, the King changed his plans, ever ready to meet or even to provoke a new combination of foes. Most of the correspondence between the King and his Chancellor was published by Grimoard, at Paris, in 1790. The King's impatience, which sometimes caused the more prudent Oxenstiern a pang, is marked by a story told of the days of his early manhood to the effect that, having a sharp touch of fever, he sweated

it off by a terrific fencing bout with Count Peter Brahe.


It is time that we should consider by what means he succeeded in solving the problem of foreign policy, to which reference has been made in the previous chapter.

For two months after the death of Charles IX. Sweden was without a King, for Gustavus was but seventeen years old, and the age of legal majority for Kings had been previously fixed at twenty-four. The father had so far deferred to precedent that he appointed a Council of Regency, though there is little doubt that he foresaw that the Diet would at once declare his son to be of full age. This in fact happened at the Diet of Nyköping, and on the 17th of December, 1611, the Queen and the rest of the Council of Regency laid down their power, and Gustavus took his father's title, "Elected King and Hereditary Prince of the Swedes, Goths, and Vandals." The foremost adviser of this young sovereign, Axel Oxenstiern, the Chancellor, was only twenty-eight years of age; and these two now sat down to play in earnest the great game of war against all the powers of Northern Europe. The stake was the very national existence of Sweden. ¹

And first for the Danish war. The hero who ended in triumphing over Catholic Europe in arms, had first to seek the keys of his own kingdom from the King of Denmark. We left Christian in possession of the two most important fortresses of Sweden, Kalmar and Elfsborg. One year of terrible frontier war, in which Gustavus nearly lost his life by

falling, horse and all, through the ice on the lake of Widsjö, in one of those winter battles on that "fifth element" which has added such dramatic horrors to Northern warfare, left Denmark still in possession of these fortresses. But Gustavus succeeded in inspiring in the peasants on the frontier, and above all in Dalecarlia, a personal affection and an energy which made any permanent occupation of Sweden by the Danes a moral impossibility. And on the side of Denmark there were influences tending to peace. The nobles dreaded any great personal ascendancy of their King, such as was likely to be the result of a too successful war, and Christian himself was not the man to pursue any plan very consistently. In this state of things the mediation by Christian's brother-in-law, James I., of Great Britain, was accepted by both sides. The Peace of Knäröd, 19th January, 1613, began, as all treaties in all ages have begun, with an article which meant nothing; Denmark was to continue to carry the three crowns on her arms, "without thereby raising any claims on Sweden." More important was the giving back of Kalmar to Sweden, and the retention of Elfsborg by Denmark in pawn for six years, *or* until a million dollars * were paid for its redemption. If not redeemed within the six years, it was to remain to Denmark. It is a proof that Gustavus and Oxenstiern were as good rulers at home as they were statesmen abroad, that the payment was made within *two* years, not of course without heavy taxation, which for this great object was, on the whole,

* A Swedish Rikstaler equals about 3s. 6d. English money.



ELFSBORG.

cheerfully borne. It was not a glorious peace nor a glorious beginning to a new reign, but it was a useful and necessary peace, and Gustavus, though he was incessantly thwarted and provoked by him throughout his life, never had to draw sword against Christian again.

Secondly, his attention was engaged by the Russian war. Gustavus refused, as we have already seen, to place his younger brother on the throne of the Czar, as De la Gardie, the Swedish commander in Russia, was anxious to do ; but the sixteen-year-old Michael Romanoff, who now appeared first as the puppet, then the leader, of the National party in Russia, had hardly fewer difficulties to contend with than Gustavus himself. In 1614, the King of Sweden appeared at Narva at the head of his troops, and stormed Augdoff, and in the following year Pleskoff. The Swedes were almost everywhere victorious, but the campaigns were frequently interrupted by negotiation, in which England and Holland carried on a diplomatic strife at Moscow ; the former, on account of her commercial relations, leaning to Russia, the latter (who had got promises from Charles IX. of free entry to Livonia and the Baltic provinces), for similar reasons, to Sweden. Between their diplomacy and the terror of the Swedish armies, was hammered out the Peace of Stolbova, 27th February, 1617, by which Russia ceded to Sweden the provinces of Ingria and Carelia, henceforward to be the barrier between herself and the sea. These provinces included the fortresses of Kexholm, Noteborg, Ivangorod, Jama,

and Koporie, and were, as the King of Sweden wrote to his mother, the keys at the same time of Finland and of Livonia; "and if at any time Russia should get them back and learn her strength, she would be able not only to attack Finland on both sides, but also to set such a fleet on the Baltic as would endanger our Fatherland." Geijer, who quotes the letter *in extenso*, adds that the King writes as if he had foreseen the plans of Peter the Great. A later famous warrior King of Sweden,* who possessed some of Gustavus's great qualities, but who was destined to undo all, and more than all, his work, might well have taken warning from the views here expressed. "Now," said Gustavus to the Estates of Sweden, on his triumphant return from the Russian war, "this enemy cannot launch a boat on the Baltic without our permission. The great lakes of Ladoga and Peipus, thirty miles of morasses and several great fortresses, are enough to keep him off from us. I hope, in God's Name, he will find this brook a tough one to jump over." The ground whereon St. Petersburg now stands thus passed to the crown of Sweden, and the foundation of the foreign greatness of the latter Power may be said to have been laid. It was after this Russian war that Gustavus's name began to be celebrated in Europe. Skytte writes to Oxenstiern from London at the end of 1617, that, in the course of his recent journey to Denmark, Lübeck, Holland, and England, he has heard loud praises of his master everywhere.

* Charles XII.—not, of course, a descendant of Gustavus. See table.

But it was in the Polish war above all that the young King really founded his European reputation. The campaigns of the 1620 decade were to him, to some extent, what the Egyptian campaign was to the first Napoleon, for it was in these that he trained and attached to himself that brilliant array of generals who afterwards carried out his ideas. Besides old James de la Gardie (whom the King persisted in calling "his master"), Gustavus Horn, John Banér, Torstenson, and Wrangel were all with him in Poland. It is to this period, too, that his more important innovations in the art of war really belong, though it will be convenient for our purpose to postpone consideration of these for the present. Lastly, it was in the Polish war that he first actually crossed swords with Imperialist troops. This is just the reason why it is impossible to make any sharp division between the Polish question and the German question. I am obliged to let them run into one another, both from a diplomatic and a military point of view. But I promise to pause as soon as we stand with Gustavus at Peenemunde on his first entrenched camp on German soil, on the 26th of June, 1630.

We are yet far from that glorious division in his career. At the end of the Russian war Sweden was in a very bad state. She was beginning to feel—what a poor country always will feel, however well governed it may be—the strain of a war of which the advantages, though certain, were future, and she was not yet so well organised for offensive warfare on a grand scale as she was ten years later. Yet to

prolong the armistice, with a still unbeaten Poland, would be more dangerous than war; internal quiet could never be assured as long as Sigismund was an actual and active pretender to the Swedish crown. He must be made tacitly, if not expressly, to renounce these claims, or must be shewn that it was very much more impossible for these claims to succeed than he at present imagined. And worse than Sigismund, I must be allowed to repeat again, was that which was behind Sigismund. We are within a year of the actual outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. The sky over Europe was black with the coming clouds, and the clouds were bursting with electricity. Sigismund was energetically seeking aid from the Courts of Vienna and Madrid. Madrid and Vienna, which perhaps looked forward to a "walk over the course," were hardly yet alive to the importance of assisting Sigismund with all their forces; but the former sent him a little gold to pay his troops, and the latter a great many Jesuits to strengthen his purpose. Spain seemed ready to prolong her truce with Holland, if only she could make such an alliance with Denmark as would give her the mastery of the Sound, and Denmark was not unwilling to lend an ear to the tempter.

Against this combination, should it ever come about, Gustavus had nothing to speak of in the way of allies; he was completely unprepared, when in 1617, immediately after the conclusion of his peace with Russia, he heard that Sigismund was hurling troops on that portion of Livonia which Sweden held. Poland, however, was incapable of a sus-

tained effort, and though the campaign of 1617 and 1618 were not on the whole productive of any success to Sweden, they assured Gustavus that Esthonia and the newly acquired provinces could at least defend themselves; and at the end of 1618 he concluded a two years' armistice, afterwards prolonged to July, 1621. Meanwhile his diplomacy was not inactive. Holland saw no very good reason why her truce with Spain should not expire at the appointed time, and, though Prince Maurice was no great friend to Sweden, his opponent, Barneveldt, was; and Barneveldt at this time led the richest and most powerful corporate body that represented Dutch public opinion, and rendered excellent service in inducing the Elector of Brandenburg to consent to the marriage of Gustavus with his daughter, as the preliminary basis for an alliance with Sweden. But parties at the Hague were too nearly balanced to allow of more, and in 1619 came the revolution, which led to the death of Barneveldt, and which left a deep stain on the character of Maurice of Nassau. It is very interesting to see that it was in these Dutch-Swedish negotiations that the idea was first mooted (by Holland) of having a canal dug from the Oder to the Elbe, and thus evading the tolls of the Sound. Denmark answered with the foundation (1617) of the fortress of Glückstadt at the mouth of the Elbe, opposite Hamburg, a fortress which would have endangered the free traffic on such a canal. The canal project was afterwards carried out by the "Great Elector" of Brandenburg.

John Sigismund, the ruling Elector, did not at all like the idea of the Swedish marriage when it was first proposed to him. But Gustavus, who, we already know, had a taste for adventures, visited the Court of Berlin in disguise, to have a look at the lady; that there was little but political love in question was to be seen from the fact that in 1618 the young King actually proposed that Maria Eleanora should marry Prince Charles of England, and he himself take her sister instead. In 1620 he carried out another secret visit under the name of Captain Gars (*G. A. Rex Sueciæ*), and being apparently more satisfied with the charms of his bride than it is easy to be with her portrait, and having obtained to some extent her mother's consent (her father was just dead from a paralytic stroke), he sent Oxenstiern in August, 1620, to fetch her home to Stockholm. It is, however, worthy of note that on this second visit he made a detour to the Palatinate and the Rhine. Who knows what thoughts may have been in his heart? The Elector Palatine could not be present to welcome Captain Gars, for he had just established himself on another man's throne at Prague.

The marriage thus accomplished gave Gustavus a new link with German Protestantism. The young Elector, George William of Brandenburg, had been tolerably passive in this matter, as in most other matters of his eventful life. Sigismund, his overlord, had indeed threatened to refuse him investiture with the Duchy of Prussia (which, it must always be remembered was a Polish fief), if he consented to

the marriage; but he probably knew that Sigismund was not likely to carry out the threat. And, anyhow, George William's new brother-in-law was sure to keep Sigismund's hands pretty well tied for years to come.

This was just what Gustavus was resolved to do. The campaign of 1621 against Poland was to be a marked one in the history of Sweden. The famous new articles of war, of which more hereafter, were recited to the Swedish army, which was assembled at Elfsnabben in July, twenty-four thousand strong, ready to be transported on one hundred and fifty-eight vessels to the mouth of the Dwina, in Livonia. The war opened with the siege of Riga.

At all periods in her history Poland was capable of making sudden efforts, which surprised her enemies; and the little garrison of Riga, although Livonia was, as a whole, by no means well affected to Sigismund, made a gallant stand. But isolated stands are of little effect, when a government is going down hill as fast as that of Poland now was, and when there is no national unity to take the place of a government. Sigismund had his hands full on the south as well; he was involved in a war with the Turks, who had beaten him at Jassy in the previous year. The Imperial help, which had been promised, was not sent, and the King of Poland left Riga to its fate. The town surrendered on the 16th of September, and Gustavus pressed on through Kurland, took Mittau, and retired for the winter to Sweden. During the campaign his only brother Charles Philip, who was a youth of great promise,


had died. Gustavus was deeply grieved; but the shrewd Chancellor Oxenstiern rejoiced over a loss which, together with that of Duke John and his wife, a little while before, rendered back to the crown two great appanages, and left its wearer free from all those dangers of pretenders within the family which had been so disastrously exemplified in the recent history of Sweden. In June, 1622, Sigismund was glad to conclude a new armistice on the basis of *uti possidetis*, which left Sweden in full possession of Livonia, and of several isolated places in Kurland. This armistice was prolonged until June 1, 1625, although it was all but broken by both parties on more than one occasion. It was, however, of inestimable advantage to Gustavus, as it enabled him to turn his eyes westward, whither we must now also look.



MEDAL OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS'
CORONATION.—1617.



MEDAL (RIGA) OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.



CHAPTER IV.

THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

THE Thirty Years' War may be viewed from two aspects—an European and a German one. In respect of the first, it was the last of the great religious wars, closing the epoch of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, proving to the Catholic Powers of Europe that their ideal unity was no longer attainable, and teaching mankind, by the rudest possible process, the hard lesson of toleration. In respect of the second, it had a somewhat similar effect. Germany was an Europe in miniature; her nominal unity under the Hapsburgs was a parallel to the Catholic ideal unity of Europe under the Pope and the Emperor. This unity was blasted forever by the muskets of the opposing armies. But worse than this; when the war began Germany was a rich country, as the countries of Europe then went. She was really full of cities, which, though their main threads of commerce were fast snapping, might yet fairly be called very flourishing. When the war ended she was a desert ;

“ Her graves with corpses swelling
And mouldering heroes’ bones,—
Heroes of fame excelling
Whatever earth has known.”

It is, however, from neither of these aspects that we have mainly to consider this disastrous war. We have to look at it from a third point of view—the Swedish. In this aspect Germany merely becomes the stage on which our Hero is to fret his brief hour, and to do the deeds for the good cause of Protestantism which have entitled him to the garland of immortality.

I do not propose to go into the direct causes of the great struggle; they are well known, and I should feel that it was out of place for me to wander off into such a very well beaten track. The indirect causes simply resolve themselves into two: (1) the determination of Catholicism to make one grand effort to re-fetter a half-liberated Europe; (2) the determination of an able and energetic man to make the Imperial rule a reality in Germany. The two are inextricably mixed up; yet it was the second design which ultimately ruined the first. The Catholic princes of Germany, and especially the ablest of them all, Maximilian of Bavaria, were heart and soul in favour of the first. Yet Maximilian of Bavaria was the man who again and again threw himself into neutrality, or the arms of France, rather than submit to the second. But without Maximilian, who was the leader of two thirds of German Catholicism, the Emperor Ferdinand was powerless. The German princes were not bad men,



EMPEROR FERDINAND II

but they lived wholly in the ideas of the past, and were unable to see that Germany, if it were to be consolidated, must submit to the natural result of consolidation. To the Catholics the choice was given between an united nation, under a prince of their own creed, and religious defeat, coupled with the maintenance of the old anarchy. They loved anarchy so well that they embraced the latter alternative.

The Protestant princes were hardly less foolish. Even more than the Catholics they lived in the ideas of the past, and they were, moreover, torn by the religious dispute between Calvinists and Lutherans into two hostile factions incapable of recognising their common interest or of uniting against their common enemy. They had to be driven to fight in their own cause, one might almost say, at the point of the pike; even then they frequently stood aside, and in the end practically allowed Frenchmen and Swedes to do the business for them. Not unnaturally these allies soon came to think more of their own business. The French, and small blame to them, did so from the very first. Happily, however, we have not got to consider the last sixteen pages of that awful record,—the most awful, in some respects, that disfigure the book of history. When Gustavus died, the two great designs of the House of Hapsburg had already been overthrown, and it was his arm that had done it; but yet the war was only half over.

From a Swedish point of view we may say that the Thirty Years' War began when Spain turned

her thoughts from Poland to Austria. Spain gradually came to see that Sigismund's game was practically played out, whereas Ferdinand was a man of great promise from the Spanish point of view. Ferdinand might rule on the Baltic—even on both sides, if things turned out well. Sigismund might be rehabilitated afterwards. The universal monarchy of the Austro-Spanish House, so long a dream, should now become a reality. So things were, when the Bohemian succession question suddenly gave the Powers the word to prepare for action. The Bohemian revolution (1618) was undoubtedly the result of bad government and violated charters. The Bohemian crown had undoubtedly been once elective. But that was one hundred and fifty years ago. It was just the sort of question upon which the kind of creature termed a "publicist" (a tame one was kept by most of the German Princes in order to rake up old succession claims on their neighbours' territory), would expend many years in writing many folios, without coming much nearer a solution. But the time for folios was past. Bohemia troubled herself little about the rights and wrongs of her cause. She boldly turned to the natural head of German Protestantism, and offered him the crown. The Elector Palatine was undoubtedly the natural head of German Protestantism. His geographical position as guardian of the Rhine, the richness of his territory, the constant help which his father had sent to the Netherlands, the friendship of that father for Elizabeth of England, the former marriage of his aunt to Charles IX. of Sweden, all pointed him out as the

leader of the cause. Above all, in 1610 the Elector Frederick, himself then seventeen years old, had married Elizabeth Stuart. He thus appeared to possess every possible qualification and advantage for the task. But he lacked one qualification. He was a fool.

It is not half enough remembered how earnest all Frederick's friends were against his accepting the Bohemian crown: the College of Electors, his own Estates, his mother, and his wife * all said no. It is pretty well known that his father-in-law, King James of England, could not bring himself to say either yes or no. James's attitude was not an unintelligent one, but it was not one suited to the times. What he practically said was this: "I don't approve of one prince seizing another prince's crown; Heaven forbid. But I am aware that the balance of Europe needs redressing against the Catholics. You say the Bohemian Constitution is elective; it seems to me more than doubtful, but if it is so——" And there he stopped. Frederick looked on his reserve as the silence which gave consent, and on the 31st of October, 1619, entered Prague. He did not ask Gustavus's advice until after the event. Gustavus, it is true, was not the man to desert a relation when in trouble, and he sent an embassy to Prague in the brief winter of Frederick's reign to see how the land lay. He even acknowledged the obligation to help, but made anything that he could do depend absolutely on the unity of Holland and England in the same cause. That Poland was just going to break

* At least so says Droysen.

the armistice he knew, but he thought it possible that his principle, that "all wars on Europe hang together," might be exemplified here, and that in fighting Poland he might really be striking a blow for Frederick. But the combination of Holland and England remained an idea, and Gustavus sat still. Then on the 8th of November, 1620, came the battle of Prague, and Frederick and his bright Elizabeth became wanderers on the face of Europe. For the war blazed out in a moment on all sides, the Valteline and the Palatinate being the two points of greatest interest for Spain. It was Spain's war to begin with, even more than Ferdinand's; nay, it was possible that Ferdinand's patriotism might at any moment take fire at seeing a foreign power in possession of Imperial territory, even though that power were his dear cousin Philip of Spain. Philip, however, did not much care, and had got fast hold of the western portion of the Lower Palatinate by the end of 1622.

From whence could help to Frederick come? Only from one of the three Northern Powers, England, Denmark, or Sweden. What the help of the two former was worth the event showed; one day they were all for stirring up a league of German Protestant princes (such a league did, in fact, already exist, called, perhaps in irony, the "Union," but was at this very moment hastening to its dissolution); the next, they advised Frederick to cast himself at the Emperor's feet and beg for mercy. Droysen quotes a remark of a Swedish diplomatist, which not unaptly illustrates the view which his

master probably took of James, though I have little doubt that it was a grossly unfair view: "God have pity on him," writes this man; "he must be either a papist or a beast." England, however, differed from Denmark in this, that she had no object of her own to pursue, whereas Christian was perpetually hankering after German bishoprics—especially the Archbishopric of Bremen, which would give him command of the mouth of the Weser. And these objects he hoped to gain now in alliance with, now in opposition to, the Emperor. He was always "temptable," so to speak, from his somewhat easy Protestantism by such a bait as this; and still more by anyone who could work upon his jealousy of Sweden. How this jealousy must have increased, when he saw the rapid substitution of Swedish for Russian and Polish influence in the Eastern Baltic! Rightly indeed Gustavus stood aside from all schemes, which depended upon allies in whose policy revolutions of this kind might at any moment occur.

We must not allow ourselves to be diverted from Gustavus in order to follow the fortunes of poor Frederick. It is sufficient to remember that, until 1625, no foreign help worth having reached him, or any of the German Protestant leaders, who took up arms on his behalf. England, France, Sweden, and Denmark intrigued and planned to interfere, but in vain—the jealousy of France thwarted England, the stupid blunders of Buckingham thwarted France. England alternately cringed to and bearded Spain, who smiled grimly as she tightened her grasp on the

Lower Palatinate. The Upper Palatinate with the Electoral title was handed over, at first secretly by Ferdinand (1621), then openly with the consent of a majority of the Electoral College (1623), to Maximilian, of Bavaria, who had defensible though antiquated claims to it. In the year 1624 Mansfeld, an adventurer with a strong dash of the hero in him, was skipping to and fro between France, England, and Holland, laying schemes before the rulers of these countries for raising on behalf of Frederick a large army to be paid by them. But the aims of all three countries were different ; it was not to restore Frederick that France would take up arms ; it was not to a Mansfeld that Richelieu, who now began to take the lead in French foreign affairs, would give three hundred and sixty thousand francs a month, if any other method of attacking Austria could be found. Richelieu might do a little if England would help too ; and Mansfeld, who was enthusiastically received in London as a Protestant hero, got an impressed army of twelve thousand men and plenty of promises from James. James was also being solicited in this last year of his life by his brother-in-law of Denmark, for the same purpose. He promised to both, and left Charles to fulfil to neither. The natural result was, that the Catholic arms were everywhere victorious in Germany.

The only figure that stands out clearly upon this lurid canvas is the King of Sweden. His position was this : he was most anxious to strike a blow for the Protestant cause ; he was anxious to do so in

alliance with Denmark; he was even willing that Denmark should anticipate him in doing so, if there were any probability of success. But he could not do so, any more than Christian could, alone. Sweden was too poor to attack the Emperor and Spain without large foreign subsidies. She might at any moment be again involved in the weary war with Poland; she might need all her resources to defend her own coasts, if the victorious Catholic Powers got much further. And Gustavus had watched the early course of the war enough to see that adventurers like Mansfeld and Christian of Anhalt were ruining their own cause. He had good reason to distrust Denmark, though he shewed himself eager to bury his distrust. He and Richelieu, probably alone of the rulers of Europe, foresaw the seriousness of the issue at stake. They alone knew that the road to the restoration of the balance of power in Europe was to attack Austria and Spain themselves wherever they were strong; that the whole thing meant nothing less than a life and death struggle with the House of Hapsburg. Compared to this all minor questions, such as the restoration of Frederick, were of very small importance.

England is not to be blamed for not entering into such far-reaching plans as these. They were plans that could only be brought to a satisfactory conclusion by an alliance of all the Protestant princes of Germany and of Europe, with France at the head—France “Catholic at home, Protestant abroad,”—and lavishly fed by French or English gold. Even then Gustavus’s first task would lie rather in the

direction of Poland. At this time, whenever—and it is very often—he writes of any direct attack upon the Empire, it is nearly always to be an attack through Silesia upon the hereditary countries of Austria. Such an attack must necessarily pass over the prostrate body of Poland. One other plan of attack he indeed did propose, and it is an interesting one, for it unveiled all the subsequent Swedish plans. Oxenstiern, who, we must remember, always acted as the drag upon his impetuous master, and refused to look upon the Thirty Years' War from anything but a purely Swedish point of view, said after Gustavus's death: "The first thing that impelled his late Majesty of blessed memory to the German expedition, was his desire of erecting a *Bastion* for Sweden to the south of the Baltic." The King himself, in his last farewell to the Swedish Estates in 1630, said: "This is a war for the defence of our Fatherland. Either we must go and find the Emperor at Stralsund, or he will come and find us at Kalmar." He said almost as much in the proposals which he made in 1624 to England. He would enter the war for the defence of the Protestant cause only on stringent conditions; and these were: (1) That he must be assured of having a port to the south of the Baltic, or on the North Sea, as a basis of operations (Stettin and Wismar were both mentioned); (2) that he should have a much larger subsidy, either from England or France, than that with which Christian of Denmark (who was, at the same time, negotiating with England) would be content; (3) that an English fleet should enter the

Sound and keep Denmark absolutely quiet; (4) that he, Gustavus, was to have the absolute command of all forces to be raised by himself or his allies. Ready for either this or the Silesian plan, he quietly matured his resources throughout the years 1624 and 1625, and practically indicated that, if neither were accepted, he should go and deal his final blow at Poland by himself.

His ambassadors met those of Christian in London, and, after much negotiation, the terms offered by Christian prevailed with the Court of England. Christian was to support an army of twenty-eight thousand foot and seven thousand horse for the defence of the Lower Saxon Circle (that portion of Germany lying immediately south of Denmark and including Christian's own Duchy of Holstein); England was to pay thirty thousand pounds a month, Holland fifty thousand florins. This treaty was concluded on December 9, 1625, and Christian immediately prepared to translate it into action. What finally determined Christian to engage was probably the invasion of the Lower Saxon Circle, a year before, by Tilly, the general of the Catholic League. With a heavy heart, Gustavus, after repeated offers of assistance to Christian upon reasonable conditions, turned to the eastward, as soon as he saw that neither England nor Denmark would write to him. Long before the actual terms of Christian's treaty were settled he was overrunning Kurland.

Sweden, altogether left out by the Protestant allies, and then abused for deserting the cause, had at least one field open to her in which she would


not need their co-operation. The campaign of 1625 resulted in the complete capture of all the strong places in Kurland and the few that remained untaken in Livonia; and an advance was even made into Lithuania. Right into the winter fighting was pushed on; Gustavus's troops were better clad than the Poles; he took care to provide them with fur-lined boots, made waterproof by oil, and two pairs of thick stockings each. He defeated Sapieha and Gosieowski, the Polish generals, in a pitched battle at Wallhof, on the 6th of January, 1626; then leaving De la Gardie to command in Livonia, he returned to Sweden, to prepare to renew the attack in the summer from another quarter. The Vistula instead of the Dwina was to be his theatre of operation—no doubt with the idea that by this means he would be nearer to Germany in case of opportunity. He could not give up the idea that his duty and fortune would sooner or later call him to Germany, in spite of the slights that he had recently received. If the operations on the Vistula were very successful he might advance to Silesia, and hold out a hand on the left to Bethlen Gabor,* the Protestant Prince of Transylvania, who lived in a chronic state of war with Ferdinand in Hungary, and who was besides one of his (Gustavus's) great admirers; and a hand on the right to Christian of Denmark, or to Mansfeld, as the case might be. Anyhow he would be able to act against Sigismund from his new basis in the best possible way. To shut Poland altogether

* Bethlen had married in 1624 a Brandenburg princess, sister of Gustavus's own wife.

off from the sea, as he had already shut off Russia, would be the greatest service he could render to Sweden. For this end he determined, if possible, to make Dantzic his *sedes belli*, as he called it. But Dantzic was not easy to take. It was by far the richest city in Eastern Europe, not even excepting Novgorod ; it had been one of the most important trading stations of the Hansa, and it had maintained the status of a free city, with a very nominal allegiance to the crown of Poland. It was just the failure to take Dantzic which caused the partial failure of the four campaigns of 1626-27-28-29. From a military point of view Gustavus learnt from this failure a very valuable lesson, namely, that it is next to impossible to take a town which can be provisioned from the sea, unless you have a fleet strong enough to enforce an absolute blockade. This experience he turned to good account when he aided the heroic defence of Stralsund. A still more striking proof of the truth was seen in the English civil war, in the hopeless failure of the Royalist commanders to take Plymouth and Hull, and even such a wretched mud-walled village as Lyme-Regis.

In the campaign of 1626 Gustavus had political as well as military difficulties to contend with. He was about to land in the Duchy of Prussia, the territory of his own brother-in-law, George William of Brandenburg. He must have one port handed over to him, as a *sedes belli*, or else take one by force ; and he was most unwilling to proceed to the latter extremity. On the 15th of June he set sail with a large force and one hundred and fifty ships, and

landed close to Pillau, a strong cliff fortification on the Prussian coast. He came, he said, as the friend of his brother-in-law, and only asked for a peaceful march through his duchy, and the temporary possession of the fortress of Pillau, in order to cover his re-embarkation. One feels a good deal of pity for the Elector of Brandenburg in this unfortunate dilemma between his overlord and his brother-in-law. He acted after his kind, and asked for three weeks to consider whether he would give up Pillau. Weeks were precious, and Gustavus refused; then helped himself to Pillau, which was instantly evacuated by the small Prussian garrison. Having thus secured his basis, he advanced into the country. To George William he sent continual messages beseeching him to take up arms against Sigismund. Very possibly he had no *right* to take Pillau; he was ready to admit it; but there are cases where necessity must override legal right; he was engaged in war with the King of Poland, and Pillau was a convenient port in which to secure his fleet—the only one he could at the moment find. “If I had meant any hostility to you, I should not have left such a strong place as Königsberg untaken in my rear.” Finally: “I know that you would like to remain neutral, but neutrality will break your neck. You must hold either with me or with Poland. I am your fellow-Protestant—your brother-in-law; I will fight for you and defend your city. I have good engineers with me, am no fool at the trade myself, and make no doubt but to defend it against the King of Poland or the Devil himself. My troops are poor Swedish



GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS ENTERS ELBING.—1626

peasant fellows, it 's true, squalid and ill-dressed ; but they can smite hard, and shall soon have finer clothes."

The town of Königsberg he frightened into neutrality by telling it that, if it did not swear to be neutral, he would first take Elbing and the other neighbouring fortresses, and then Königsberg itself. Königsberg swore, but not until Gustavus had taken Elbing and Marienburg, and begun the blockade of Dantzic. The poor Elector found himself worse and worse off, and he was already in the toils of Imperial diplomacy. Count Dohna, Ferdinand's ambassador, was at that very moment listening to George William's groans over his brother-in-law's wickedness, although that brother-in-law had scrupulously avoided taking any of his fortresses except Pillau, and was in fact already out of Ducal Prussia in the territories of Sigismund. A glance at the map will show (in reading this campaign one is apt to forget it) that there were two Prussias; and that one of them (West Prussia) belonged to Poland entirely (and was only redeemed in 1772). It was this Polish province which was to be the seat of war, and, with the exception of Dantzic, the King of Sweden practically overran all the northern half of it in the first campaign. Braunsberg, Frauenburg, Dirschau all fell into his hands. The last place was of the greater importance because it commanded the Vistula a little above Dantzic. Here a bridge was built, and the trade of that city with the interior at once cut off.

The great rapidity of this conquest of Prussia may be partly accounted for by the fact that the inhabitants


were nearly all Lutherans, and looked upon Sweden as their deliverer from the persecution of Sigismund. Gustavus systematically confiscated the goods of the Jesuits and Catholic priests, and shewed himself far less tolerant here, than he was to do later in Germany. At the same time, everyone who put himself under the protection of the Swedish crown was declared inviolable. Forced contributions were levied with perfect order on the rest of the country. All was made into a daily common stock for the army, and anyone caught plundering on his own account was hanged on the spot. Sigismund meantime was collecting his Army at Graudenz, anxious to relieve Dantzic. The numerous garrisons, which Gustavus had been obliged to leave in the captured towns, had weakened his force; and Sigismund had got a corps of five thousand Austrian troops to assist him. It was the first time that the Imperialists actually crossed swords with the Swedes; these men, however, were not sent directly by the Emperor, but merely bought by Sigismund from a Gottorp Prince, who happened to have been in command of them. The only thing they did was to sit down before the small fortress of Mewe. It is to be noticed that it was before all things Wallenstein's advice to send as many troops as possible to help Sigismund against Sweden. That baleful star was now beginning to be in the ascendant, not indeed at the Council Board at Vienna, nor in the Imperial Diet, but among those private counsellors, Eggenberg, Lämmermann, and Harrach, upon whom Ferdinand principally relied. Wallenstein dreaded, that which Holland desired, that Gus-

tavus would finish with Poland even more rapidly than he did, and would then be free to ally himself with Christian before the consummation of the latter's ruin (which ruin, it must be remembered, was even now in progress). "A worse foe than ever was the Turk," Wallenstein calls Gustavus in a letter to Colalto in March, 1627. Gustavus went to winter in Sweden, whence he returned to Pillau in the following May (1627) with six thousand fresh troops, and began to push on actively the siege of Dantzic.

He found a new enemy. George William had at length been goaded on to take the field against his brother-in-law. It must therefore have been a sore blow for him, when Gustavus suddenly came upon his little army, entirely surrounded it, and incorporated three thousand men with his own forces. After that the Elector, not unnaturally, relapsed into the neutral state again. Sigismund threatened diversions against De la Gardie in Livonia, and Gustavus was obliged to detach Horn to the assistance of the latter. The siege of Dantzic nevertheless did not languish, and the King was twice badly wounded in the progress of it. In a letter to his brother-in-law, John Casimir, who was left Regent of Sweden, he says: "We went to the isle of Hoefft" (opposite the city). "The enemy was just over against us on the Dantzic side, and began to play upon us with his cannon. J. Baner and Count Thurn were to lead the first attack, and I was to second them with the pikemen. We were all divided into our respective boats, and all would have gone well if my fellows had obeyed orders; but only one boat (Axel Du-

vall's) reached the opposite bank. The others mostly got stuck on a sand-bank, and one division of boats rowed in a wrong direction. So I jumped into a little boat to set the matter right. And *because it is apt to get rather hot on such occasions*, I was actually hit in the belly by a shot. But I have God to thank that it has not endangered my life or health, and I hope in a few days to be able to direct the work again." This was on May 25th; the letter was written the same night, and contained also news of the arrival of a Dutch Embassy at Elbing, "no doubt to treat of peace between ourselves, Poland, and Dantzic." As soon as his wound was healed the King turned to attack the camp of the Polish general, Koniecpolski; and on the 8th of August was hit again in the shoulder, and his troops repulsed. His letters to John Casimir, on which Geijer has founded this part of his most admirable history, contain long accounts of military operations, personal dangers, complaints that the Swedish Government sends him so little money and provisions, oddly mixed up with expressions of affection towards his correspondent, and diplomatic gossip. The campaign of the year 1627 closed with a sharp action between the blockading fleet of the Swedes (six of the line), and ten Dantzic ships under a Danish admiral (18th November). After a long conflict the blockade was broken; one of the Swedish captains blew his ship into the air rather than strike, and Sternskjold, the Swedish Admiral, was about to do the same, when a round shot silenced the order he was giving. Dantzic was still untaken, when Gústavus sailed for Sweden to prepare for fresh efforts.

Dantzic was not likely to be taken. Apart from the military reason given above, which was undoubtedly the main one, we must remember that the city was one of the last which was animated by the old municipal and communal spirit. It cared very little whether it owed a nominal allegiance to the crown of Sweden or to Poland, but did not intend to change its allegiance at the order of either. Like another great trading city, Venice, it was profoundly indifferent to religion. And lastly its rulers had an idea that Sweden was becoming rather too great for the maintenance of the Baltic balance. So Dantzic remained firm, not without much secret encouragement from Holland, whither the citizens had sent an embassy in the previous February, to beseech the mediation of the States-General in their favor. The double attitude, which Holland was obliged to take up, is nowhere better illustrated than in this matter. Holland was, we know, extremely eager for the intervention of Denmark, if not of Sweden also, in the German war. She was, in fact, the real author of the treaty between England, Denmark, and herself, to which we have already referred—the treaty of December 9, 1625. But, on the other hand, she had the strongest objection to allowing the present balance of the Baltic powers to be disturbed, and, that Gustavus should take Dantzic, or even that he should cut off the rest of Poland from the sea-coast, was by no means pleasant to her. The ultimate solution of the question for her was found later, when Sweden, coming into possession of the harbour dues at the mouth of the Vistula, was obliged to agree to share them with the Dutch.



CHAPTER V.

FOREIGN HELP TO GERMANY.

AND meanwhile what of Germany? Gustavus, we know, is detained, at least down to 1627, by the siege of Dantzic, from entering upon his grand plans, but Christian of Denmark has gone to help the Protestants. Every step that Christian took, every turn of the wheel of fortune in the German war, was watched by the King of Sweden, and reacted upon his attitude towards Poland.

The alliance of England, Holland, and Denmark was not by any means the universal combination of all Protestant Powers which Gustavus had hoped to see; but still it was something, and it produced at last a closer *rapprochement* of the Catholic Powers, Bavaria, Austria, and Spain. Ferdinand most distinctly promised the King of Spain a port on the Baltic, if he would send a fleet against Christian; and also promised that he would exclude Dutch commerce from the German Empire. France was profoundly jealous of any such step on the part of Spain; we all know what attention Richelieu bestowed



CHRISTIAN IV. OF DENMARK.

on the creation of the French Navy, and it is probable that he would have come eagerly forward on the side of the allies, if the foolish action of England had not made him pause. England has often been narrow-minded in foreign politics, even when best intentioned, but never more so than when in the case before us she allowed her present jealousy of the infant French fleet, and her Protestant zeal for the revolted Huguenots, to get the better of her judgment,

In 1625, it is true, she had lent her ships to Richelieu for the purpose of subduing the Rochellese ; but the very same year saw a complete reversal of this policy (which had not unnaturally provoked great indignation in England), and on January 20, 1626, it was resolved in the English Council to send an expedition for the relief of La Rochelle. This attitude of England, combined with domestic causes, compelled Richelieu to patch up an indifferent peace with the rebels at Montpellier (February, 1626), and to stand aside from any plans of interference in Germany, which would depend upon the co-operation of Charles I.

With regard to the actual course of the war in Germany, England had now Mansfeld and Christian of Denmark both in her nominal pay. King James had died in the very beginning of the new year of 1625 according to the old style (March 27th), but even before his death the English Court had contrived to furnish the "Protestant hero" as Mansfeld was commonly called in London, with the means of enlisting a considerable force. As for the maintenance of that force, when it was enlisted, the shrewd old King

might have an inkling as to what was intended, but after all that was not his affair. He would pay in regular instalments a proportion; France would pay a proportion; and—well it was perhaps only fair that Germany should contribute also, although not exactly in the same regular manner. James's incapable son shut his eyes to the fact that, by not paying Mansfeld even the proportion which was due from England with anything like honest regularity* (although it seems not impossible that the English Parliament, if humoured in other respects, would have been willing to guarantee a fixed payment) he was sanctioning on the part of a man nominally in his service a system of plunder which went far to stamp the Thirty Years' War with its peculiarly horrible character. In January, 1625, Mansfeld sailed, not to France as had been at first arranged, but to Flushing, where his troops, harassed by contradictory orders from England and from France, melted away without effecting anything. Of the twelve thousand English who went, very soon only three thousand were in a state to bear arms at all. Moreover, from lack of money Mansfeld soon began to prove the truth of the saying, that armies like serpents move upon their bellies. England then almost preferred Mansfeld to Christian, not merely because he cost less money, as subsisting largely upon plunder, but also, because she had an idea that he would set himself more directly to relieve the Palatinate. But the

* As a matter of fact only £75,000 ever reached Mansfeld, and the greatest difficulty was experienced in getting security for even so much.

injunctions given to him not to succour the town of Breda which was being besieged by the Spanish general, Spinola, was a great political blunder, for it alienated Holland from the cause of the Allies, which she thus realised was indeed a narrower one than her own. Christian's campaign of 1626, which need not detain us, began on the Weser, and was in fact wholly one for the annexation of the Weser bishoprics to the crown of Denmark. If anyone at all tried to recover the Palatinate, it was still Mansfeld. And Mansfeld had wider ideas in his head. Early in 1626 he attempted to carry out Gustavus's idea of a Silesian march upon Vienna, or at least to join hands with Bethlen Gabor. On his way through North Germany he was met by the newly raised army of Wallenstein (who after all was only a greater Mansfeld), and utterly defeated at the Bridge of Dessau (April, 1626). It was in the spring of the same year, in which Mansfeld appeared in Germany as the nominal hireling of England, that Wallenstein received his first Imperial commission to raise troops; and in the early summer he was made generalissimo of the Imperial forces. It is a common mistake to imagine that the original arrangement between him and Ferdinand was, that he would find and pay the troops to be raised himself. In practice it came, owing to the emptiness of the Imperial exchequer, to something not unlike this, but regular pay was at first stipulated for. Wallenstein's unrivalled powers as a recruiting agent were displayed first in the territories of the princes of the League, and especially in the valley of the Main, and this was one of the great

reasons of the complaints against him, which soon began to be heard from the Catholic princes themselves.

That soldiers of fortune like Mansfeld and Wallenstein had the power of raising fresh armies almost immediately after defeat, speaks volumes for the miserable condition of Germany. The former now succeeded in doing so, and even in drawing Wallenstein after him into Silesia, while he, Wallenstein, was burning to be on the northern march against Christian. This glory he was compelled, by the Emperor's express order to follow Mansfeld, to leave to his rival Tilly. Four months after the Dessau fight Tilly utterly defeated the King of Denmark at the battle of Lutter (August 27, 1626). These events produced a profound impression in Northern Europe. Spain, it was said, will now be sure to get her Baltic port. What if the Emperor should give her Lübeck? Lübeck, the head of the Hanseatic League, the darling city of the great Hohenstaufen Emperor Frederick II., the pioneer of northern commerce; would Lübeck defend her walls with men or even her men with walls? Lübeck would at least hold a Diet of the Hanseatic League, and turn for help and advice, where alone she could now hope for it, to the King of Sweden.

She was not the only Power that had looked north-eastwards after Mansfeld's defeat. Christian eagerly sent to Gustavus for assistance. But Gustavus had just begun his campaign in Prussia, and could not—dared not—advance, with Dantzic in his rear, to lean upon such a bruised reed as Christian. Nor could

he, at a moment's notice, shift his base of operations to the Weser or to the Oder. Heart-breaking as it was to look on, he must wait. Now it must be observed that, instead of changing this view of Gustavus, the battle of Lutter only confirmed it; before that Christian must have indirectly supported him, whatever forward step he had taken; after that he knew that Christian would soon make a separate peace for Denmark, and leave any allies he might at the moment possess in the lurch.

In 1627 all was, in fact, over with Christian; and it was only owing to Tilly's incredible slowness that it was not all over in 1626. But Christian gathered some sort of a new army after Lutter, and continued to make on his retreat towards Jutland a feeble resistance to Tilly. When, in August, Wallenstein joined Tilly, the retreat became a flight. With swift instinct, Wallenstein saw the chances of the game unfold themselves before him. In October he stood already on the edge of the Baltic Sea. With a fleet at his command Europe would be at his feet—his and his Emperor's; for in that dark heart, which has been such an enigma to historians, there were always personal and national thoughts bound up together. The best we can say of Wallenstein is, that he saw the rottenness of the Holy Roman Empire; that, as a soldier, he believed in strong government, and would have liked to have seen Germany a strong and united military monarchy: under the House of Hapsburg if you will, but at all hazards strong and united. Now the time seemed to be come. Denmark should be followed into her islands, Ferdinand crowned King of

Denmark, or not, as events shaped themselves; and then Kalmar stormed, and the King of Sweden driven back to his snows. About the Catholic part of the business Wallenstein did not care two straws. Fortunately for Europe, Ferdinand cared more for the Catholic than the monarchical idea.

If there were any doubts as to the actual plans of the Hapsburgs at this time, they were cleared away by the publication of a Jesuit pamphlet in Prague, in the spring of 1628. It professed to be the copy of a letter from Father Lämmermann, Ferdinand's confessor, to another Jesuit. It laid down that the time for absolutism was come; that the first thing to be done was to destroy the freedom of the Hanseatic cities of the north; the free cities of the interior would soon follow; all should be made by fraud or force to receive Imperial garrisons. It would not be difficult; and a beginning of the work should be made with the leaders—Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen. Once their *league* is dissolved—and the grant of sudden, extravagant, and easily revocable privileges to one of them would dissolve it,—they can be mastered in detail. Then, to prevent their relief from Denmark, Christian should be lulled into security—"mountains of gold" must be promised him to induce him to stand aside a little while from Imperial affairs. Gustavus would be more difficult, but by dexterous diplomacy he might be kept quiet, until Poland was sufficiently strengthened to resist him effectually. Then the Sound should be seized, and Holland cut off from her Baltic trade, and, what is more important, from her Baltic granaries.

So to this it was come in the year 1628—the most critical year in the fate of Protestantism since Luther had stood up to the Emperor Charles at Worms.

Deliverance came, not only from the north, but also from the south, from the Catholic Electors themselves. When Wallenstein and Tilly were pressing on into Jutland, and Christian had fled, as he soon did, to his island fortresses, Wallenstein had cast his eyes upon the Duchy of Mecklenburg, where reigned two Protestant dukes. He did not intend they should reign there long, and his rearward troops were actually quartered within their territory. Mecklenburg was of supreme importance to him, if he was to create his Baltic fleet, for it possessed some of the best harbours on the coast, especially Rostock and Wismar. Wanton aggression is an inadequate expression to describe Wallenstein's designs against Mecklenburg. The dukes had, it is true, appeared as the allies of Christian in common with the Lower Saxon Circle, but immediately after Lutter they had withdrawn their contingent from his army, and demanded that he should leave the territory of the Circle. Military necessity may have justified the occupation of their country by the Imperial troops, but nothing short of a solemn ban by the Diet could deprive them of their fiefs. It may therefore be regarded as the first revolutionary step taken towards absolutism, whether wholly with, or partly against, Ferdinand's good pleasure may be very fairly doubted. Anyhow, the Emperor promised Wallenstein the investiture of the two Mecklenburg duchies for himself. This was why that general was so anxious to

complete the conquest of Denmark, and to put his master—or his puppet—on its throne. The southern portion of the Danish peninsula would be an invaluable bulwark for his new duchy. But it was exactly to projects of this kind that the whole conservative opinion of Germany, whether Catholic or Protestant, was most pertinaciously hostile. Even before the end of 1627 the Catholic Electors had begun to cry out for peace with Denmark. Christian, as Duke of Holstein, was a Prince of the Empire; Wallenstein was an upstart, an object, half of dread, half of repulsion, to such men as Maximilian of Bavaria. Gradually Wallenstein, whether in fear of the growth of public opinion, or, as is more likely, in fear of Gustavus, came round to the same view, that peace with Christian was necessary. Early in 1628, therefore, he ceased to pursue Christian, and allowed those negotiations to begin, which terminated with the peace of Lübeck in May, 1629. He at once set to work on his new task to make himself Admiral of the Baltic, in fact as well as in name (the title dates from April, 1628). All Mecklenburg was soon overrun, and his troops spread over Pomerania also. "There are 28 ports in Pomerania," he writes. "We must fortify them all, and thus at least keep Sweden from attacking them." Stralsund, Wismar, Rostock, and the Isle of Rügen were the most important in his eyes. His first mention of Stralsund occurs in a letter to his lieutenant, Arnim, as far back as November, 1627. It was not a Hanseatic town, nor a free Imperial city, but simply a strong port belonging to the Duke of Pomerania, Boguslav

the XIVth, the only prince of Pure Wendish blood left on the Baltic, a childless old man of very weak mind. "I am told," this letter says, "that they of Stralsund have begun to fortify their town. That I intend to stop."

Meanwhile Gustavus was preparing for his third (1628) expedition to the Polish coast. All eyes were on him. Holland was up in real alarm at the prospect of losing her Baltic trade. She kept sending messages imploring him to make peace with Poland, and defend the Western Baltic. The Elector of Brandenburg was equally anxious for peace, for the simple reason that his territory was the basis of operations of war for Gustavus. The negotiations did actually begin in February, 1628. The Swedish and Polish diplomats could not meet personally, for each party refused to give to his rival the title of King of Sweden. It does not seem an unreasonable refusal on Gustavus's part. But the negotiations went on by means of Dutch, English, and French go-betweens right through the year. One reason which induced Sigismund not to be in too great a hurry was that Ferdinand promised him ten thousand men from Wallenstein's army to arrive in the summer. Gustavus landed at Pillau in May, almost on the day on which Wallenstein began in earnest the siege of Stralsund. His fleet defeated and sank a Dantzic squadron off the coast, and thus avenged, from the previous year, the honour of the Swedish flag. Then the King, leaving Dantzic again blocked up, advanced towards Warsaw to meet Koniecpolski in the field. But the Polish general avoided a general engagement,

and confined himself to making (with complete success) what the French call "*la petite guerre*." The campaign of 1628 was therefore, as far as Poland was concerned, practically a fruitless one for Sweden.

Not so in Germany. I may be perhaps excused for abstracting at some length from a very important letter written by Gustavus to Christian on October 21, 1627. It is especially valuable, not only from the light which it throws upon the views of the situation as entertained by our Hero, but because it gives an evidently unprejudiced account of the means and ends of the Imperial diplomacy. The King of Sweden writes: "I have now little difficulty in discerning that the projects of the House of Hapsburg are directed against the Baltic; and that, partly by force and partly by cajolery, the United Netherlands, my own power, and finally yours are to be ousted therefrom. On the one side I understand that they intend to offer you the title of Admiral of the Roman Empire, as a bait and as indemnification for your expenses in the late war, provided that you will cede control of the Sound. Perhaps, however, you are not aware that in the same breath they have offered to help me to a safe and durable peace with Poland, which shall include the retention of Livonia and of Prussia by the crown of Sweden, nay even the Kingdom of Denmark for myself as an Imperial fief, if I will ally myself with the Emperor against you. Obviously such offers are illusory, and only meant to hinder an alliance between you and me. I know well how united and diligent *they* are; well how disunited and slothful all those, who ought to

be for us, have as yet proved themselves. At present not one of them dares to defend the other: each will look on quietly at the ruin of all" (this must of course be taken as a reference to the falling away of the Lower Saxon Circle after the defeat of Lutter). "I am now putting everything aside, which can possibly hinder a swift termination of this wretched Polish business of mine. I will take care that Poland shall be in no condition to send help to the princes of the League. I am not ignorant of the deplorable condition in which you stand at this moment; but I wish you had been able to call upon me for help earlier" (*i. e.* in 1625, when you refused my conditions in London). "Now we must positively during the winter concoct measures for our mutual defence, and for the defence of the Baltic."

A few days after this letter Gustavus told Oxenstiern openly, that he saw that intervention in Germany could no longer be avoided, "for the danger is daily drawing nearer to our own doors."

Denmark received this offer with joy, and during the late autumn the negotiations for a treaty between the two countries went busily forward. The chief difficulty lay, as usual, in the not unnatural narrowness of Christian's present wishes. The King of Sweden wanted a league offensive and defensive against all the Catholic Powers of Europe. The King of Denmark wanted an ally to come forward and win back for him his Duchy of Holstein. The treaty however, which, to use a peculiarly expressive Carlylism, was "got signed" in April, 1628, was of sufficient breadth, if not to satisfy all Gustavus's as-

pirations, at least to give that prince a definite and legitimate standpoint from which to interfere in the Western Baltic question. By this treaty Christian promised to exclude from the Sound, (and therein from the whole Baltic) all foreign ships except those of Holland. The ships of the Hansa were also naturally excepted.

Droysen makes perhaps too much of this treaty, when he says it was this which prevented the enemy from carrying out his designs against the German maritime towns; but it is an important point, as giving Gustavus his first direct connexion with, and invitation to take part in a war against, the Emperor. The danger was indeed one before which all rivalry between Denmark and Sweden was of necessity forgotten. No one could say what might be the result of Father Lämmermann's plans for the subjection of the Hansa: many thought that habit and indolence, and their great commercial connexion with Spain, would make such cities as Hamburg and Bremen, if not Lübeck, side with the Emperor. England had constantly preyed upon their commerce; they were not very keen Protestants; the spirit of unity had long ago died out of the League. Above all they hated Denmark. But, contrary to expectation, they, on the whole, decided to act in common, and to fear the Austrian even with gifts of privileges in his hands. From the narrowest point of view they were right. Naval strength as a body they had none. Ferdinand's navy would take at least a year to build, and might not be built after all. Meanwhile it was not at

all improbable that Christian and Gustavus, each of whom had a very considerable navy, would blow their argosies into the air; as in fact they threatened to do, if the towns sided with Ferdinand or lent him ships. The Hansa even went the length of interceding with the Emperor's general on behalf of Stralsund, the siege of which Wallenstein's lieutenant, Arnim, had now begun. Wallenstein rudely rejected their embassy and said to them: "I will have Stralsund first, and each one of you in turn afterwards. I fear neither Denmark, nor Sweden, nor both united." And to Stralsund, which offered him eighty thousand dollars if he would raise the siege, he said he would have the town and nothing but the town.

Stralsund stands under the shelter of Rügen, almost within gunshot across the arm of the sea which divides it from that island. On the landward side it is defended by huge broad dykes, in some places one hundred yards across. Its two lofty church spires, St. Nicholas and St. Peter's, are a landmark for miles, as one comes towards it over the flat Pomeranian heaths, and a sea mark, which the northward-going traveller loses only an hour or two before he comes in sight of the Danish islands. It seems to me to have been a place of quite exceptional strength, and Wallenstein's failure before it appears not at all wonderful. But the merit of its resistance lay in the fact that it was the first German Protestant town, which stood up bravely for the cause; and that at first it was almost unaided; Duke Boguslav was "Imperially minded," though a Protestant, and Gustavus was far away.

But Stralsund always looked to Gustavus. In 1625 he had expressly promised to this particular town that he would come to its help if it were attacked. His keen eye had picked out on the map the immense importance of the position. The time of need was come. Gustavus instantly wrote to Christian to ask him to co-operate for its relief. Poor Christian was not in much of a condition to co-operate in anything, but he promised to victual Stralsund from the sea, and he did so. Gustavus then sent a small contingent of six hundred men and a few ships. He concluded, moreover, a treaty, offensive and defensive, with the town of Stralsund for twenty years to come; "the rights of the Emperor, Empire, and Duke Boguslav being reserved," whatever that might mean. Stralsund promised to receive and assist a Swedish army if it should land in Pomerania. The die was cast. Gustavus had directly allied himself with a German town against the Emperor of Germany. It was still possible for him to retreat from this position. It was no longer possible for him to retreat from it with honour.


The siege went on; Wallenstein came in person. His attempts at storm failed. He tried negotiations. He offered to hold the town at the command of the Emperor, the Duke and the Elector of Brandenburg, who was the Duke's heir-presumptive, and not to enforce Catholicism. Stralsund refused to listen. Storm succeeded negotiation, and bombardment succeeded storm. In vain. Hot debates in the Council-chamber (where there was of course a party for yielding) were held to the music of red-hot shot. On the 9th

STRALSUND
INSULÆRUGEN
PARS—A Section
of the Island of
Rügen.

MARIS BALTICI
PARS—A Section
of the Baltic, i e,
the Stralsund,
from which sound
the city was doubt-
less named.

VERDROCKEN
LANDT.—Drown-
ed Lands.—Three
bridges over these
led to the city.
The letters a, b,
etc., to l, indicate
the city-gates; the
letter m, the Blue
Tower

DER HOLM.—
Fortified Island
of Danholm.



of July a few Danish troops arrived ; on the 12th the Danish fleet were sighted beyond Rügen ; on the 18th Count Brahe and Col. Alexander Leslie* arrived with two thousand picked Swedish troops. On the 24th Wallenstein, who was already gone, sent orders to Arnim to raise the siege. We have had enough occasion to be angry with Christian of Denmark in the present work ; it is pleasant to be able to say a good word for one who is still his country's national hero. He shares with Gustavus and the Stralsunders the honour of the deliverance of Stralsund.

* Colonel (afterwards Sir Alexander) Leslie is a person of considerable interest to Englishmen, still more to Scotchmen. Mr. Gardiner in his "History of the Great Civil War" speaks of him as being the bastard son of a Fifeshire laird, but he was, in fact, on his father's side directly descended from the great House of Balquhain, and had besides the blood of Calders, Ramsays, and Stewarts in his veins. By the law of Scotland he became legitimate when his father, George Leslie of Balgonie, married his mother, although the step was not taken until the son had become famous. He was the first Captain employed by Gustavus in the German war, as we have now seen, but he had previously served in that war in Sir Horace Vere's expedition for the recovery of the Palatinate. He continued in the Swedish service, which he had entered a few months before the affair of Stralsund, until 1638, when he was invited home to take command of the army of the Scotch Covenanters, probably by the influence of his kinsman the Earl of Rothes. The part he played in the English and Scotch civil wars is sufficiently well known to need no mention here. He was created Earl of Leven in 1641, and, living to a good old age, did not neglect with regard to the acquisition and retention of broad lands to follow out his old family motto "Grip Fast."



CHAPTER VI.

GUSTAVUS'S PREPARATIONS.

EVERYONE knew what the failure before Stralsund meant. "Now is the time," cried the author of a spirited pamphlet, addressed to the Hansa, "for the good towns to arm, to drive the enemy back over the Elbe. There is one at hand, who will help; who has already helped. God has raised up for us, a hero, a Gideon, the like of whom lives not among men, nor in history."

Boguslav might send and beseech Gustavus to recall his troops; Gustavus answered by sending a garrison of five thousand more. Wallenstein might take Rostock (as he did in October), and bully the whole Hansa with words, but the plan of a Hapsburg dominion over the Baltic was gone forever. The battle had been fought out in the Council chamber of Lübeck, as well as before the walls of Stralsund. Gustavus had used all his efforts to induce the Hansa to conclude there and then an offensive and defensive alliance with the Swedish crown; he had failed in this, but he had induced them to order a general levy for the defence of their walls.



JOHN CASIMIR.

The Swedish diplomats saw the bastion already growing before their eyes. "The Treaty of Stralsund with our King," writes Salvius, on the 1st of September, to Oxenstiern, "mentions a nominal relation of client and patron; I think it is not far from a real subjection." But if the bastion was won it must be defended, and how to best defend it was just the question. We find two opinions put forward in Sweden on the subject of the best method of interference in the German war. The first is that of Oxenstiern, that the war should be carried on offensively in Prussia, Poland, and possibly Silesia, and only defensively in Pomerania. The second is that of Gustavus, to confine the Eastern operations to an army of observation and occupation only, and to hurl the whole power of the Swedish monarchy upon Northern Germany. No one was ever more open to advice than Gustavus: he discussed both plans with Oxenstiern and other of his principal advisers, for the space of over a year, and finally he referred, as we shall see, the whole question to the Swedish Council, requesting every man to speak his mind freely on the subject, and to vote for one or the other plan according to his opinion. His impetuosity, of which the Chancellor complains so much, was in subjection on this matter. He knew the seriousness of a war whose end no man could foresee; he would not engage in it lightly or without full deliberation and preparations.

We are within sight of the end of the dreary Polish war. "The King of Poland may give himself any title he pleases in the negotiations," said Gus-

tavus, "except that of Sweden." He was anxious to keep these negotiations open, until he could see how the German war went. In May, 1629, arrived Arnim with ten thousand Imperial troops to the aid of Sigismund; and in June Gustavus was unable to prevent the junction of this force with that of Koniecpolski. But, fortunately, Arnim brought no pay with him for his soldiers, and Sigismund could not afford to supply this necessary. On June 17th, a battle was fought against this united army, in which Gustavus was nearly taken prisoner and the Swedes compelled to retreat; the royal hat was taken prisoner and sent to Vienna as a trophy. Those who are curious in such matters may be glad to learn that it was a grey hat with a red feather in it. But it was impossible for the King to have his heart very much longer in this Polish war. As his nephew, Charles X.—almost as great a warrior as himself,—afterwards experienced, Poland is a country which is easy to conquer, but what is to be done with it when conquered? History has proved that partitioning is the only secure method of dealing with it. "Just as I had decided to cross to Sweden," writes Gustavus to John Casimir, on August 1, 1629, "there has come in the Baron de Charnacé, ambassador of the King of France, to offer his mediation for a treaty between us and the enemy." The truce was concluded on September 25th, at Stuhmsdorf. It was to be for six years to come. Its terms were of advantage to Sweden. (1) She retained the whole of Livonia. (2) In ducal Prussia she retained Memel and Pillau (poor Elector of Brandenburg!). In Polish Prussia, Braunsberg,

and Elbing, the latter a place of great commercial importance. (3) She restored the rest of Poland and Kurland to Sigismund. (4) With Dantzic, which was declared neutral, a separate treaty was drawn up, by which the city engaged to pay to the crown of Sweden two thirds of the customs levied at its harbour,—an important clause, as it both gave Sweden a permanent interest in improving the commerce of the Baltic, and also formed a slight set-off for the stream of gold which the tolls of Elsinore poured into the capacious pockets of King Christian. It was probably this treaty which decided Gustavus against Oxenstiern's plan of making Prussia again the main theatre of war. We shall see, however, that the possession of these Prussian and Polish ports was of great assistance during the German campaigns, for a reserve of troops was constantly kept there; and they were at first the position from which Oxenstiern himself watched, not without many misgivings, his master's victorious career. Some historians have rejected the idea that it was French mediation that really produced this treaty; and indeed it does seem probable that a truce would in any case have been concluded before the end of the year. Poland was exhausted and disaffected, and Gustavus, whose interest in Western affairs increased daily, would probably have accepted worse terms. Richelieu in his own memoirs, written long after the event, gives himself the credit of the affair, and it is impossible to avoid seeing what an immense interest France possessed in launching against her Austrian enemy such a weapon as the Swedish King. It is worthy

of notice too that Charnacé, who was one of Richelieu's most trusted diplomatists, had recently been in Bavaria, where he had foreshadowed the latter work of Father Joseph, and encouraged the growing split between the two parties in the Catholic camp ; still more recently at Lübeck, where his presence contributed to disquiet the Austrian negotiations, although he was unable to hinder Christian from concluding a separate peace, or even to prevent the exclusion of the Swedish ambassador from the negotiations. Possibly it was Charnacé's representations that made Richelieu realise what sort of man he had got to deal with in Gustavus.


We have to turn for a moment to the affairs of Denmark, in order to see how fresh causes continually inclined Gustavus in the direction in which his heart was set. The conferences at Lübeck, in the latter part of 1628 and the early part of 1629, were practically ruled by Wallenstein ; Gustavus had sent an embassy thither, relying on his recent treaty with Christian, to urge that no peace should be made, which did not include the absolute restoration of North Germany to the *status quo* before the war, in the case especially of the two Dukes of Mecklenburg. But Wallenstein refused to admit the Swedish ambassador to the sittings, and Ferdinand supported Wallenstein. Richelieu's messenger, as we have seen, was as active at Lübeck as at Stuhmsdorf. His whole energy was bent to effect the alienation of the Catholic League, as represented by the ecclesiastical electors of the Rhine, Maximilian of Bavaria, and Tilly, from Wallenstein and the purely Austrian

party. The Cardinal urged Christian to conclude a separate peace with the League princes, whom he knew to be furious with Wallenstein, and to stand in profound dread of Ferdinand's ultimate aims. Holland urged the same thing. The King of Sweden had an interview with Christian in the winter, and advised him to continue the war against the Emperor, or at least to make no peace that was not common to both of them. Gustavus describes the circumstance in an amusing letter to Oxenstiern. "I was the host, the King my guest; we did n't have much to eat, but drank lots of bad wine—frozen too, it was. . . . I proposed four points" (practically an offensive alliance against the Emperor, unless they could together come to an understanding with him at Lübeck). "He told me he had already sent his ultimatum to the Emperor, and could not go back on it. As for an alliance 'he must ask his Estates, *which would take time.*' When he said that, I thanked God that I could command my temper, and let him go on his way."

So the Peace of Lübeck was concluded on the 2d of May, 1629, without the King of Sweden being allowed to say a word in questions which were of such vital importance to him. By the terms of it Christian received back all his lands, and promised to stand aloof from German affairs altogether, except so far as he regarded his own interests as Duke of Holstein. They were indeed terms extravagantly favourable to Christian, considering the circumstances—not even a war indemnity was exacted; and they justified Richelieu in writing that "this

wretched Prince had betrayed all his allies, and wriggled out of the war untouched." The King of Sweden, he adds, was "the new rising sun." There is little doubt that it was the dread of the as yet level beams of that sun that induced Wallenstein to detach Christian at all costs from the Swedish alliance. It is curious to trace in Wallenstein's letters the change of tone with which he speaks of Gustavus—at first it is in utter contempt of a "King of snow and ice" who would melt in Europe; soon it is curiosity; later still it is lively anxiety. Geijer says that Wallenstein consulted the stars on the question of his luck against Gustavus; but I have been unable to find what answer "the lying spirit whom he served" gave him.

Before we enter upon the immediate preparations of the King for the German expedition, let us clearly understand the significance of the fact that, within three months after the failure of Wallenstein at Stralsund, Richelieu had taken La Rochelle. The last Protestant stronghold in France was down, and the great Cardinal was free to turn his arms in favour of a wider and more enlightened Protestantism than that of the Soubises and Rohans, who looked upon their religion largely as a potent weapon to be used against the centralising policy of the Bourbon Kings. Thus even before the third period of the Thirty Years' War—the Swedish period—has opened, the fourth, the French period, is already in sight. Gustavus *has* interfered; there is no longer any reason why Richelieu should not interfere. We must be completely on our guard, however, against allow-



JEAN ARMAND DU PLESSIS,
Cardinal and Duke of Richelieu.

ing equal weight to the two interferences. Richelieu was entirely political ; his aim was the greatness and strength of France. It happened to coincide with the religious determination of Gustavus to succour the Protestants of Germany, and defend the Protestants of Sweden ; but it was a mere coincidence. No two men ever had less in common, except the fiery courage which enabled them to cut through difficulties. Richelieu deliberately allowed Gustavus to *begin* the campaign absolutely unaided, and later on thwarted him over and over again, when he dreaded that he would be too victorious, or victorious over the wrong people. Gustavus was for the Cardinal, in fact, merely a knight on the chessboard of Europe ; it is true he estimated his value above that of many pawns, and would in no wise allow him to be taken. France had in 1626 been obliged, by internal trouble, to make peace with Spain ; now that her hands were free, she concluded with her rebellious subjects the Peace of Alais (which secured perfect toleration, but no political advantages, to the Huguenots), and began with Spain a little border war in the north of Italy on the matter of the disputed succession to the Duchy of Mantua. At the same time (April, 1629) the Peace of Susa between France and England put an end to a war which ought never to have been begun. And now, too, the essential divergence of the aims of the Catholic Electors of Germany from that of the Catholic Emperor became more obvious. Ferdinand, truly recognising the struggle as a European one, sent help to the anti-French party in the Mantuan war, not unaided by

Spanish gold. The Electors, anxious only for the supremacy of their own party in Germany, and equally with their Protestant neighbours careless of the European fortune of their creed, never ceased to clamour for the withdrawal of the Imperial troops from Italy. "Let the Emperor observe strict neutrality in this quarrel, and also in the quarrel between Spain and Holland. Let him attend strictly to German business, and we shall soon see an end of the usurpations of the Protestant princes on the territory of the Church." It was in a spirit like this that they soon appeared at the Diet of Regensburg of 1629, prepared to go even further, and to dictate to the Emperor as to the management of the German war. Their main complaints were, as we shall see, directed against Wallenstein, but as early as 1627 I find them grumbling that Tilly had been obliged to take up his quarters in Catholic territory because the Imperialists were occupying nearly all the Protestant countries (Saxony hitherto excepted).

Gustavus returned from Poland immediately after the Peace of Stuhmsdorf, seriously prepared for the German war. Was he right or wrong? Were his aims personal—for glory; or, national—for Sweden; or religious—for the faith? I can give no direct answer to such a question, nor can any one. All human motives are mixed, and, if there is one lesson that history teaches, it is that no principle works in exclusion. But we must beware of judging Gustavus in the light of the later history of Sweden. That his countrymen did imbibe a taste for foreign conquest and foreign gold is undoubted, and it

brought about the ruin of a noble country. But if his motives were as pure, as I believe them in the main to have been ; if they were resistance to the tyranny of Austria, defence of his father-land, and the rescue of Germany, we must pause before we lay at his door the later foreign ambition of his countrymen.

Another question irresistibly presents itself. What were his ultimate intentions ? Did he—seeing, as he must have clearly seen, the corrupt condition of the German Empire, the absolute necessity of its reconstruction, dream of reconstructing it under a Protestant head ? And was that head to be himself or someone else ? I think the best answer to that question is found in the simple fact that his ideas developed as he went on. In December, 1628, he wrote to Oxenstiern : “ Here is a plan, from which you can gather at least the feasibility of my ideas. You say we have n’t money to pay troops for more than four months ; granted ; but once let us plant our foothold sure ” (he means on German soil), “ and God and the hour will teach us how to strengthen ourselves further.” It is the strong dash of knight-errantry combined with lofty aims that separates Gustavus Adolphus from his contemporaries. There were knights-errant in plenty (like Christian of Brunswick) in the field, but in Gustavus alone met the knight-errant, the statesman, and the king. That he wanted Pomerania as a bastion for the crown of Sweden is nothing whatever to the point. He could not go to war for nothing. His wide and new relations on the Baltic made it imperatively necessary that future kings of Sweden should be princes of the

Empire; and the German Protestant princes had only too recently proved how utterly incapable they were of defending themselves or their faith. Sweden in Pomerania would be a *point d'appui* for Protestant Germany, and would be in a condition to make her voice heard in the Diet, in case of future attempts at oppression. We shall have to revert to these questions again for a moment when we have laid our Hero to rest in the Riddarholm Church at Stockholm.

In his own country Gustavus probably stood alone in his lofty aims. We have already seen how anxious Oxenstiern was to induce his master to continue to make Poland his main object. When he found that that was in vain, he was almost equally anxious to induce him not to risk his life in person. The Swedish Estates in 1629 (in the absence of the King it is true) urged that the war, if carried on at all, should be carried on as far as possible from the frontiers of Sweden, and should support itself. In October of the same year came Gustavus's personal address to the Estates, and his conference with his Council at Upsala, of which I have already spoken. It is interesting to see how completely he succeeded in inspiring both Assemblies with his own spirit. When Skytte, his old tutor, represented that he was hazarding the Vasa monarchy (his daughter Christina was only three years old), he nobly replied—it was in an age that produced royal houses like the Stuarts and Bourbons—"All monarchies have passed from one race to another; a monarchy consists not in persons, but in the law." He laid, before his Estates, as before his

Council, naturally very little stress on the oppressed Protestants in Germany, but confined himself to the dangers threatening Sweden. "Denmark is used up. The Papists are on the Baltic, they have Rostock, Wismar, Stettin, Wolgast, Greifswald, and nearly all the other ports in their hands; Rügen is theirs, and from Rügen they continue to threaten Stralsund; their whole aim is to destroy Swedish commerce, and soon to plant a foot on the southern shores of our Father-land. Sweden is in danger from the power of Hapsburg; that is all, but it is enough; that power must be met, swiftly and strongly. The times are bad; the danger is great. It is no time to ask whether the cost will not be far beyond what we can bear. The fight will be for parents, for wife and child, for house and home, for Father-land and Faith." It was no wonder that he carried his point. The Estates to whom this speech was addressed voted at once heavy and regular taxation for three years. They voted a general levy of troops for the two following years. The nobles renounced their privileges of freeing their tenants from taxation and service. They themselves by the law of Sweden were only free, provided they served in person in the field. The mercantile companies renounced their government subsidies, and handed them over to provide for the fleet. When the Council came to vote their opinions for or against the war, though many had spoken against it, all voted for the King; and the King then addressed to them a speech, from which I may perhaps be pardoned for quoting at some length. "I did not call you together because I had

any doubt in my mind, but in order that you might enjoy the freedom of opposing me if you wished. That freedom you can no longer enjoy; you have spoken. My view is this: that, for our safety, honour, and final peace, I see nothing but a bold attack on the enemy. I hope that it will be for the advantage of Sweden, but I also hope that, if the day go hard with us, no blame will be laid upon me, for I have no other end in view but that advantage. I do not underrate the difficulties—such as the want of means, the doubtful issue of battle; in which it is no idle glory that I am seeking—the King of Denmark is a sufficient warning to me against that—besides the judgment of posterity generally leaves a man very little glory. And I am satiated with glory, and want no more. Your duty is clear; to exhort all my subjects to continue in their present devoted attitude. I hereby advise you so to bear yourselves, and all over whom you have influence, that either you or your children may live to see a good end of this matter; which may the Most High grant. For myself I foresee that I have no more rest to expect, but the rest of eternity.”

It is not difficult to see, in considering the willingness of Sweden to undertake the war, the immense effect of the possession of Stralsund. There at least was a harbour where the Swedish fleet could ride, a fortification, behind which the Swedish army could retreat. In fact, when Stralsund took a Swedish garrison the war was already begun, and begun well for Sweden.

The next matter to receive attention was that of

alliances. Nearly a year before, Gustavus had decided on sending an ultimatum to the Emperor, but had angrily recalled his ambassador, when Wallenstein had refused to admit his representative to the Lübeck conferences. An Imperial ambassador arrived at Stockholm at the end of 1629, but his instructions did not give Gustavus the title of King. Gustavus returned his letters unopened. He was quite open about his intentions in his dealings with Ferdinand. He publicly gave out that he demanded, as a preliminary condition of any negotiation for peace, the full restoration of North Germany to the *status quo* before the war. The Imperial ambassador, not unnaturally, said: "What more could the King of Sweden demand, if he stood a victor in the heart of the Empire?" Ferdinand said: "We have got a new little enemy, have we?"

The ally whom Gustavus would most dearly have wished, Denmark, was evidently hopelessly out of the question. The treaty of the spring of 1628 had been practically rendered valueless by the exclusion of Gustavus's ambassadors from the conferences of Lübeck. If Christian receded from the coveted position of neutrality, which he had gained almost against hope at the peace, it would probably be to throw his weight on the side of the Emperor,—possibly to attack Sweden in the absence of its King. Next in importance came the Protestant princes of Germany. Their attitude towards Sweden, however, I propose to discuss a little further on, in order to obtain therewith a view of the state of Germany during the year 1629. After Germany came France.

Richelieu spared no pains to excite Gustavus to attack Austria, against which Power his own King, having just taken the field in Italy, was about to conclude a closer alliance with Holland. The days of Henry IV. seemed about to revive, when, in August, 1629, the French aided the Dutch to besiege and take Bois-le-Duc, and when French troops were actually sent into the "Three Bishoprics" to operate against the Spaniards in the Palatinate.

But Richelieu's own position was still so unstable, that he, over and over again, hesitated to throw away the scabbard, even when he had drawn the sword. Charnacé twice visited Stockholm (winter 1629, spring 1630), and tried to induce Gustavus to take up the peculiar line of action which suited Richelieu best, peace with the Catholic League, and war in the hereditary countries of Austria. The objects of the two leaders were, in fact, different. France naturally thought more of the Rhine frontier, of the Palatinate, and of Italy, than of the Northern Protestants and the Baltic coasts. And France found Gustavus's demands for subsidies very high, six hundred thousand dollars a year and a lump sum down to begin with. "And not for tons of gold," said the Swedish diplomats, "will our King take service as the hireling of France or any other power; his hands must be free, and he must attack Austria in the way that seems good to him." As for an alliance with the Catholic League, which Charnacé proposed, they scouted the idea. So no direct help came from France, but it must be remembered (1) that Richelieu was at hand to help if things went well, and (2) that France did

render an estimable service to Gustavus in this very year, 1629, by fomenting the growing discord between Ferdinand and the Catholic Electors.

From France Gustavus turned to Holland ; but Holland, having been forcibly persuaded, on at least one occasion* that the German Protestants had little interest in her quarrel, felt very little interest in theirs. With French help she had now little fear of carrying her eighty years' war with Spain to a successful issue, and it is not in the nature of a commercial republic to make great sacrifices for the liberty of its neighbours. This neutral attitude was much strengthened, when, in 1630, England, whom Holland at this time generally followed, made her peace with Spain. Moreover the Dutch hated the idea of the new position which Sweden had acquired in Eastern Baltic waters. Their subsequent hostility to the Vasas was already foreshadowed in this jealousy.

On one ally, and one only, Gustavus reckoned,—the restless Prince of Transylvania, Bethlen Gabor. But Bethlen died before the year 1629 was out ; and the King of Sweden was left to face the greatest power of Europe in sole reliance upon a land which possessed a million and a half of inhabitants, and which had only just concluded a long and exhausting war.

We must now consider upon what amount of support from the German princes our Hero could count, when he should land. It will not perhaps be out of place if we pause for a moment to consider the position of these princes as a whole—we shall have

* The fall of Breda.

enough to do with their individual shiftings and twistings later. We are so accustomed to look upon France as infinitely the superior of seventeenth-century Germany in military matters, that we are apt to forget that in the year 1629 this superiority was still to be demonstrated. We have seen what steps Spain and Austria were taking towards universal monarchy: we are too apt to consider these hollow and unreal. In short we judge the relative positions of France and Austria by the condition in which Richelieu left them, not by that in which he found them. The German princes, on the whole, would have followed Austria against France with hearty good-will even now, but for that intolerable persecution of Protestantism (which was the faith of at least half of them) which was sure to result from the triumph of the Hapsburgs. In like manner they would have followed Austria against Sweden but for the same reason. They did follow her on more than one occasion against Turkey with hearty good-will. An able sovereign of the House of Austria, in the sixteenth century, *ought* to have turned Protestant; such a sovereign would have created an united Germany, in a sense in which even our own days have hardly realised that idea. But Austria in the last quarter of the sixteenth century deliberately chose the retrograde path, and Germany had to pay the penalty of finding herself without a head. In the very year now under consideration, Germany was learning to lean upon foreign powers, in a way that was abhorrent to whatever sparks of patriotism might be left in German breasts. It is true that those states,

which now, however unwillingly, became clients of Sweden, did afterwards transfer their confidence to Brandenburg-Prussia, and that thus the later system known as the "Dualism" was founded; but we must beware, in reading the subsequent history of Germany, of imagining that all German patriotism was ranged on the side of Prussia in her contests with Austria. On the contrary, the smaller states of the Empire were perhaps the most faithful, though by no means the most effectual, allies that Austria had; and it was not until she had over and over again shown how little she valued German interests, not until she had repeatedly sacrificed Imperial territory on the western frontier, in exchange for advantages of a purely dynastic character, that the eyes of all good patriots turned to the north.

Therefore, pour as much contempt as we will upon the sluggishness of North Germany to welcome her deliverer, upon her stupid repugnance to take up arms for the very purpose for which he came, we must pause before we pass by without a word of praise the obdurate tenacity, with which she clung to the worn-out idea of the Empire. The spirit of George William and John George was as far as possible from the noble spirit of Gustavus, but it was on a very much higher level than the spirit of a representative German man of the eighteenth century, who said: "Patriotism seems to me at best to be an heroic weakness, of which I willingly disembarass myself." *

The King of Sweden was not unacquainted with

* Lessing.

the views of his friends across the Baltic; naturally enough, he looked upon the dark side. If he was intolerant of anything, he was intolerant of sloth; we see it in all his letters, dashed off on the spur of the moment and always going straight to the point; in all his proclamations, with their vigorous wording. For devotion to a worn-out idea such as the Holy Roman Empire is, it was hardly to be expected that he would make very much allowance, and he did not. But he well knew that he would have to reckon with it as a practical fact. It was all very well for Characé to tell him that he was awaited like a Messiah in Germany, that its people would pour out their blood for him, and that he might "aspire to the Empire of the East." Gustavus knew better, and coldly told the Baron, that his opinion of the probable attitude of the German princes was a very different one; that in particular John George the Elector of Saxony, the most powerful Protestant prince in North Germany, had declared openly that he would side with his Emperor. Very probably John George would have done so, but for an event which happened in 1629 and materially aided to smooth Gustavus's path for him.

Ever since 1627, as we have already partly seen, signs of a rift within the Catholic camp had become visible. The German language possesses an excellent word, which we do not possess, and for which we have no equivalent,—*grudeln*, to growl (in a political sense). The Electors were now beginning to grudge against Wallenstein, and the grudging increased with every increase of Wallenstein's army.



JOHN GEORGE I.

France eagerly caught at the opportunity and encouraged the Electors. The military jealousy between Wallenstein and Tilly, between the army that was paid (or not paid) by the Emperor and the army that was paid by the League, made matters worse. Now the Emperor would perhaps (I say perhaps, because it is somewhat of a riddle to me how far Ferdinand was prepared to acquiesce in Wallenstein's revolutionary designs) have laughed at all this, but for one thing. He was dominated by the idea of the necessity of getting his son elected King of the Romans, which title, as is well known, carried with it the almost certain succession to the Imperial Crown. But only the Electors could confer the title, and on every previous occasion they had taken the opportunity to wrest from the Imperial power new privileges or "capitulations." One *via media* presented itself to the astute mind of Ferdinand, or of his Father Confessor. There was a whole row of lawsuits depending in the Imperial courts between Protestants and Catholics, especially between those Protestants who had secularised bishoprics and the former chapters of those bishoprics, or Catholic claimants to the same. Among those who so possessed secularised ecclesiastical territory were the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, and almost every Protestant prince in Germany. The Peace of Passau in 1552 had solemnly confirmed all secularisations made before that time, but most of the great northern bishoprics like Magdeburg and Halberstadt had changed hands and creeds since then. The system it must be admitted was a remarkable one. The new proprietor of

the bishopric was called sometimes an "administrator," sometimes a Bishop; and it will be remembered that the Duke of York, the second son of George III. of England, counted among his other titles that of "Bishop of Osnabrück. Among the strangest products of German conservatism was the survival of the rights of the chapters side by side with the secularisation of the lands of the bishopric. But for this fact probably three fourths of the disputes with regard to the secularised territory would never have arisen. In many places it remained open for the chapter to turn Catholic again, and elect a Catholic successor to a Protestant administrator. Every variety of ecclesiastical and municipal law had been applied to reconcile these mutually divergent rights, the result of which was a confusion which the Peaces of Passau and Augsburg had signally failed to regulate. Behind the Peace of Passau Ferdinand of course could not go (except indeed by the strong hand), but what if he took up a pen and wrote that all the disputes since that date should at once terminate in favour of the Catholics? Not only would he be doing an inestimable service to Holy Church, but also this would surely satisfy the League, even better than a reduction of Wallenstein's army. The grateful Catholic Electors could hardly then refuse to crown his son. As for the two Protestant Electors, they had long ago proved how patient they were in such matters; and at the worst a few months' quartering of Wallenstein's troops on their territories, which had hitherto been spared by the war, would soon bring them to their senses. It was no sooner

resolved than it was done. The edict of Restitution was issued on March 6, 1629.


Wallenstein was furious—it spoilt all his pet plans—the division in the Empire was apparently to be made perennial. The unity under the Hapsburg monarchy was further off than ever. From that time forward he hated the Jesuits, whom he regarded, and rightly, as the authors of “this unconstitutional act,” worse than ever. Except in the case of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, of which it is supposed that he had advised the Emperor, even before the edict, to take forcible possession, with a view of placing a young Hapsburg prince, Leopold William, in the possession of the line of the Elbe at an important point, he refused to allow his army to be made use of for the purpose of assisting in the transfer. He openly told the Hanseatic cities that the edict was a “pleasantry” and that he would take care that it was not executed within their district. But, so far as Ferdinand was able, it was ruthlessly and systematically carried out, commissioners being appointed for the different districts to see to its execution. All former bishoprics that “held immediately” of the Empire were to be restored, and all ecclesiastical lands which had been secularised since the Peace of Passau. One of these bishoprics, as I have already mentioned, was Magdeburg, which had chosen a Saxon prince as successor to the existing “administrator,” Christian William of Brandenburg, and had then ejected the latter. Wallenstein, who saw clearly what a handle this edict would give to Gustavus, was anxious to finish off Magdeburg be-

fore his arrival. But the city which had defied Charles V. defied the Bohemian condottier, fresh from his failure at Stralsund; and like that town turned in its agony to the King of Sweden. What he promised and what he did for Magdeburg we shall have to consider after his arrival in Germany. The Imperial commissioners however did get to work in many districts, and, with the aid of the League troops, contrived to eject the administrators from several of the Westphalian Sees. The two Protestant Electors were, however, not as yet meddled with, except so far as this matter of Magdeburg concerned John George.

The end of the Emperor's high-handed proceeding turned out after all not at all to his advantage. Not that the *grudeling* of the Protestant Electors at the edict affected him much. Imperial diplomacy was not unused to drug the sluggish John George; he was continually assured by Ferdinand that an exemption should be made in favour of his dominions; and he utterly failed to see that he was like *Ovris* in the cave of Polyphemus. Gustavus was constantly sending messages to him for help, and getting no answer; and had little better luck with his brother-in-law of Brandenburg, who, moreover, had not very much ecclesiastical territory to disgorge. But in June, 1630, when the Catholic Electors met at Regensburg, Ferdinand found that they had not in the least abated their opposition to Wallenstein, and were not one whit more inclined to elect his son. Two demands they there put forward—and it proved how completely Richelieu was lead-

ing them by the nose : first, that the Emperor should make peace with France, as far as the Italian war was concerned ; and, secondly, that he should reduce his army and dismiss Wallenstein. The Emperor, who still hoped ultimately to secure the election, gave way to the Catholic Electors, and dismissed his general, whose army, reduced to forty thousand men, was handed over to Tilly and incorporated with the League army, which numbered somewhat over thirty thousand. Thus the best general that Austria had yet possessed received his *congé* at the very moment that the worst foe she had yet encountered took the field against her.





CHAPTER VII.

THE ARMY OF GUSTAVUS.

ALL being prepared for his expedition, Gustavus assembled his Estates for the last time on 19th May, 1630. Once more he recapitulated his reasons, his hopes, and his fears in the presence of his people. Then he stepped forward, with his three-year-old girl in his arms, and solemnly commended her to their protection. Historians have united in attributing to King and people a strong presentiment that it was their last meeting. Whatever the truth of that may be, the occasion was a sufficiently solemn one to remain a life-long possession in the memory of those who were present. For Sweden indeed Gustavus's reign was over. For yet two years and a half his meteor-like course across Europe was followed with intense pride and intense anxiety by those he left behind. Then his name remained enshrined forever in every Swedish heart.

From the early days of 1630 the assembling of the troops had begun. Regiment after regiment was drafted down to Elfsnabben or to Kalmar. The



GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS II.
(Full figure in armor.)

conscription had been preached from all the pulpits in Sweden ; the male population between fifteen and sixty had been assembled, and all who had no settled dwelling of their own were enrolled. Of the rest all between eighteen and thirty were allowed to draw lots, and the tenth man only was taken. Exemptions ran in favour of all who worked in the mines, or at the manufacture of arms or powder ; also peasants, who had already one son in the army, were not obliged to send another, and those who had no sons were free. It was this "primæval peasantry" that furnished the strength of Sweden's armies. In the Middle Ages many of them had been serfs of the church or the nobles, but even then a great number had been proprietors. When the crown entered upon a large part of the possessions of the Church, the serfs became much more free. They were in fact almost exactly in the position of copyhold tenants, with the addition that each peasant's holding was obliged to supply a man to the army, unless its labour or quit-rents were appropriated to some other department. The nobles were constantly striving to depress their tenants into a servile condition—the *Vasas* constantly regarded themselves, and acted, as the champions of the peasants. That is the secret of the popularity of their monarchy.

It is not easy at any given time to estimate the exact strength that Gustavus put into the field—the numbers are very variously given, but, according to the (probably) best computation, the native Swedish troops raised in 1630 were about forty thousand or a little more. Besides these, however, he raised nearly

another forty thousand from foreign countries. We are all familiar with Captain Dugald Dalgetty, and some of us possibly with "Colonel Andrew Newport," an (imaginary) "Cavalier who served in the armies of his Majesty the king of Sweden, and afterwards in that of Charles I. of England," and who left behind him a set of "memoirs," which have been strongly suspected of being the work of one Daniel Defoe of Cripplegate, London. Less familiar but equally interesting is the book from which Scott acknowledges that he partly drew the portrait of the immortal Dugald: "Monro, his expedition with the worthy Scots' regiment called Mackey's regiment, levied in August, 1626, by Sir Donald Mackey Lord Rhees, Colonel for his Majestie's service of Denmark, and reduced, after the battle of Nerling, to one company in Sept., 1634, at Worms in the Paltz . . . first under the magnanimous king of Denmark . . . and afterwards under the invincible king of Sweden during his Majestie's life-time," etc. Monro afterwards served the Covenant in Scotland, and got handsomely beaten by Montrose, but his book is one of the most entertaining that ever was produced on the military art, and I shall have frequent occasion to quote from him. His opening pages in Part II. well illustrate the method which Gustavus employed in levying troops, and the readiness of Scotchmen to serve for pay. "Our regiment," he says, "being thanked off by his Majestie of Denmark in May 1629, my Colonel being in England, I, hearing his Majestie of Sweden much engaged

against the Pole in Spruce [Prussia],* did stand in great need of a *supply of foot*, thought it was a fit time for me, being out of service, to offer my service unto his Majestie of Sweden." So he sent to treat with Gustavus for a commission and money, on terms to which the King instantly agreed. The regiment was then collected together and some companies sent to garrisons in Prussia, others to Sweden, till they should be ready to cross into "Dutch land," The Colonel (Lord Reay) came back and joined Monro in Denmark; they crossed to Sweden, and made the winter journey from Gothenburg to Stockholm, visiting on the way "that worthy Cavaliere, Colonel Alexander Hamilton at his workehouses in Urbowe" (Örebro, which, by the way, Whitelocke in his "Swedish Embassy" calls *Horseborough*), "being then employed in making of cannon and fireworks for his majestie."

From the early part of the fifteenth century, and until far on in the sixteenth, the Scots had been in the habit of selling their swords to the court of France; later they found in the Netherlands a field for their valour, their Protestantism, and, it must be confessed, their cupidity; and they were now proving themselves among the best, but by no means among the best-behaved, foreign troops that served on either side in the Thirty Years' War. The spirit in which such men as Monro undertook the life of mer-

* Cf. Chaucer's Knight:

Full ofte tymes he had the borde begone
Aboven alle naciouns in *Pruce*.

cenaries was perhaps a little more religious than that described in the Forfarshire song :

“ Oh Randal was a bonny lad when he gae'd awa
To fight the foreign loons in their ain countrie,”

but, after all, it was little different in substance. Neither of them much cared what foreign loons he fought, or in whose service.

Three Scotch and two English regiments at first seem to have followed the King of Sweden, but I cannot ascertain their exact strength.* Besides this, Colonel Falkenberg had been sent to Holland, and another man to Denmark, to raise troops. A large quantity of the disbanded Poles, Brandenburgers, and Dantzickers passed into the Swedish service; and in the Hanseatic cities, and all along the coasts, of Mecklenburg and Pomerania recruiting went on, chiefly by Leslie's agency from his fastness at Stralsund.

The total strength of the army, counting the troops in Prussia, Livonia, and Stralsund, is given in the spring of 1630 as seventy-six thousand. It must be remembered that Wallenstein had not yet been dismissed, and had on foot a victorious army of near one hundred thousand; while Tilly, with from thirty to thirty-five thousand, was giving proof that a “ragged soldier with a bright musket” can do most things that are required of him.

Gustavus, however, at his first landing in Germany, determined to take with him only thirteen thousand men, of which two regiments of cavalry

* The foreign regiments varied in strength very much more than the Swedish.

and four of infantry were Swedes ; four other infantry regiments being foreigners. But before the end of the year 1630, other regiments, native and foreign, rapidly followed, making the total in Germany a good forty thousand. Besides this, must be reckoned the perpetually fluctuating garrisons in Prussia and the Baltic Provinces.

Now it is quite evident that the King cannot have reckoned upon the resources of Sweden alone for any long period for the payment of these enormous armies. His revenue was but little over twelve million dollars, and there was a deficit of a million. *Five sevenths* of this revenue was now set apart for the payment of the army. Several interesting contemporary pamphlets give us the scale upon which both branches of the service were paid ; and it must further be remembered that a large sum was required to provide for the artillery and the engineering corps, both by far the best of their kind in Europe.

The monthly pay scale of a regiment of foot was as follows :

Colonel.....	184	dollars.
Lieutenant-Colonel.....	80	"
Sergeant-Major.....	61	"
Chief Quartermaster.....	30	"
Two Preachers.....each,	18	"
Two Schultz *.....	30	"
Four Surgeons.....each,	12	"
Clerk of Regiment.....	30	"
Clerk of Council of War.....	18	"
Four Provosts-Martial.....each,	12	"

* The regimental Schultz were examiners and registrars of criminal cases brought before courts-martial.

Sergeant of Court of War (Gerichts-Webell).....	18	dollars.
Two Beadles*	3	"
Hangman.....	7	"

And in each company of the regiment :

Captain.....	61	dollars.
Lieutenant.....	30	"
Ancient (Standard-Bearer).....	30	"
Two Sergeants.....each,	9	"
Fuhrer (Assistant Standard-Bearer).....	7	"
Furrier (Under Quartermaster).....	7	"
Chief Armourer, or Rustmaster.....	7	"
Clerk of Musters.....	7	"
Drummers and Pipers.....each,	4	"
Six Corporals.....	6	"
Fifteen Fileleaders (Ritt Masters).....	5	"
Twenty-one Under Ritt Masters.....	4	"
Privates.....	3½	"
Four Muster Boys, and Fourteen Passevolants (Officers' Servants).....	3	"

If the pay had to be advanced (and we may readily suppose that such was not infrequently the case), a proportion was deducted and the arrears paid up at the end of the month.

The Dutch tract, entitled "*Sweedsche Oorloghen*" (Arnheim, 1632), gives the following incomplete pay scale of the general staff:

A Field-Marshal received.....	florins, 2,000
(The florin = 1 <i>s.</i> 9 <i>d.</i> English money, = about half a Swedish rix-dollar.)	
The Colonel-General in Command of the Artillery....	" 1,200
Colonel Scoutmaster-General.....	" 1,000
(Chief of Intelligence Department.)	
Colonel Baggage Master	" 1,000
Colonel of a Regiment of Cavalry.....	" 600

*Beadles, or stock knights, are assistants to provosts-martial.

The figures for the foot are, however, somewhat different from those given in the above list, which is taken from the "Swedish Discipline" (London, 1632), and which is constantly quoted by both German and French writers as worthy of reliance.

As a matter of fact the King knew that if he was successful the cost to Sweden of the war would diminish every year. He was right. In 1632 only one-sixth of the Swedish revenue had to be devoted to it.

Gustavus decided not to declare war upon the Emperor in the usual fashion by a herald. He alleged that the war was really a defensive one, in consequence of the attack upon his ally Stralsund. Two letters, however, passed between them, in which each made his own cause appear the better. The day of sailing was perhaps hastened by two incidents which happened on the Pomeranian coast. There had been several skirmishes between the Swedish garrison of Stralsund and the Imperialists, who had taken possession of Rügen; and Leslie heard a report that the King of Denmark was in negotiation with Duke Boguslav, for the purchase of that island; and also that Wallenstein, whose whole object was to embroil the two Northern Powers, had consented to the arrangement, and promised that his troops should evacuate the island, if the sale should be completed. To prevent this Leslie made a bold dash, and occupied the whole island, turning out the small Imperialist garrison of two thousand men with little difficulty. This was in April. The second incident was that the Imperialists began in the following

month the siege of Stettin, the capital of the Duchy of Pomerania, and the seat of the government; a city, moreover, which absolutely commanded the lower valley of the Oder. It was of vital importance to Gustavus to save Stettin.

Yet in order to shew the world that he was ready for peace as well as for war, Gustavus allowed negotiations to be carried on at Dantzic, up till the last moment, under the so-called mediation of Christian of Denmark. But Christian in fact had no very different object from Wallenstein. He was anxious to involve Gustavus in the war, in order (as he believed the result would be) to wreck the Swedish power. The negotiations under such auspices, it is needless to say, came to nothing.

On the 30th of May the King of Sweden went on board his fleet at Elfsnabben. There he had to wait until the south-west wind, which lasted for nearly three weeks, and detained the ships in harbour till the army had eaten up all its provisions, gradually veered round, and allowed them to creep across the Baltic; and on Midsummer-day the fleet anchored off the little island of Ruden, at the point of Usedom, close to the mouth of the river Peene. The next evening the landing of the troops began. The coast seemed alive with camp fires, which had been lit by the enemy (a portion of Wallenstein's troops under Torquato Conti was then at Anklam, a little to the south), in order to terrify the Swedes. The King led the way in a little boat, not to the isle of Ruden, but the larger one of Usedom. He knelt down, and prayed aloud; and then, first of his troops, took in

hand a spade, and began to labour at the entrenchments, which were necessary to cover the landing, and to form the first Swedish camp on German soil. No one understood better the duty of a sapper than Gustavus; it was one of the points about him that particularly struck Monro, who says: "he was ever out of patience till his works were done, that he might see his soldiers secured and guarded from their enemies, and when he was weakest he digged most in the ground"; and again: "spade or shovel are ever the best companions in danger, without which we had lost the most part of our followers."

During the night of the 26th nearly all the troops were landed, the artillery, cavalry, and baggage last. Soon all stood safe within the now famous entrenchments of Peenemünde. The King then addressed his soldiers, and told them that the enemy were largely the same men whom they had already fought in Prussia; that he would share all danger and privations with them, they all comforts and booty with him. "For booty you must not look to the land or its inhabitants. The enemy have got it all. It is for you to take it from them."

And now, while Gustavus and his veterans are labouring at their entrenchments, let us consider a few of the causes of the superiority of the Swedish army over its foes. The first of these clearly lay in the character of their leader. Gustavus was perhaps not a greater master of strategy than Wallenstein; he was certainly a greater master of tactics. He was not a greater cavalry captain than Pappenheim, but the latter had not the *coup d'œil*, which enables a

man to grasp a whole battle at once. He had not more endurance than Tilly, but he kept his soldiers better in hand in victory as well as in defeat. Moreover, his position as a king, who was his own commander-in-chief, and disposed of the resources of a kingdom, limited though they might be, and who was also independent of orders from any superior, gave him, as it afterwards gave to Frederick II. and Napoleon, an inestimable advantage over his rivals.

Secondly, he had better troops, and they were better armed. Not in every respect, or in every branch of the service. His cavalry, man for man, were probably not equal to the best cuirassiers of Pappenheim's black brigade. His infantry might fairly challenge comparison in swiftness of movement with Tilly's, but they did not by any means excel them in steadiness. But his artillery and his engineers were immeasurably superior to anything that the enemy had to shew. It is here first that he stands out as an innovator in the art of war. The first great artillerists had been the Turks, and the early idea of artillery was to have the biggest guns that could be got. This had already been abandoned, but the science of projectiles was in a very chaotic state. Cannons were of every size and shape. "There was no kind of serpent, beast, or bird, that had not given its name to some kind of cannon," says Montecucculi in his memoirs, which were written in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Gustavus had steadily bent himself to shorten the bore of his cannons, and had greatly improved the pace at which they could be fired. There were three main classes of cannons in

his army, ship's guns, siege guns, and field guns. The heaviest of these would need thirty-six horses for transport, and would only be employed in big sieges. The lightest would be a two-pounder, and might be drawn by one horse or two or three men. The enemy had nothing to compare with his light iron four-pounders, a few of which were attached to each regiment, and called "regimental pieces." They could be fired eight times in the same time in which a musketeer could deliver only six shots. The celebrated "leather cannons," which were used in the Polish war, had been invented by a German officer called Wurmbrandt; but these, though very light and movable had to be cooled after each ten or twelve shots, and were not much used in this war. They made their last appearance at the battle of Breitenfeld. Accuracy of aim was the point to which Gustavus attached most importance; at the passage of the Lech he pointed more than sixty of the cannons with his own hand.

Of his capacities as an engineer officer we have already seen Monro's estimate. The Germans were amazed at the large scientific staff of miners, engineers, and sappers that he brought with him. He in his turn was amazed at the ease with which his enemies would abandon as untenable positions which he could make defensible in a few hours; and Wallenstein was only taking a leaf out of his rival's book when he so fatally strengthened that famous position of the "Alte Veste," above Nuremberg.

But even more than his own personal greatness or his superiority in artillery, and the scientific depart-

ments of war, he owed his success to his improvements in *Tactics*. Bound up with and dependent on this, are his improvements in the weapons of his cavalry and infantry. Speaking generally we may say that in the campaigns of 1630-1-2 the old Spanish system of *Weight* gave place before the new Swedish system of *Mobility*. As in the department of artillery, so in that of cavalry and infantry, it was to rapidity of movement that he trusted. And this is the second point in which he was a great innovator.

The battles of the Middle Ages had been won by cavalry. For a long time no amount of foot-soldiers could stand the shock of a large man on a large horse, completely clad in heavy armour. Then the English archers and the Swiss pikemen respectively found that there were weak places in a mail-clad line, which an arrow could pierce, and that no horse would charge against a steel hedgehog* of pikes, each with a three-foot blade on an eighteen-foot ashen shaft. The Spaniards with complete success adopted the Swiss pike-tactics and supported their pikemen with musketeers on the flanks. The result was that cavalry soldiers lost their proper place in the practice of war. They were used chiefly to skirmish or forage, and, when they charged, were made to do so at a pace not much greater than that of the infantry. The arms of the cavalryman were, when the Thirty Years' War began, mainly firearms—pistols, car-

* The "hedgehog" was the last formation of the Swiss pikemen, when hard driven, a solid phalanx of men ten or twelve deep, presenting a front of steel in all four directions. See Mr. Oman's "Art of War in the Middle Ages."

bines, or even muskets. (The dragoons are said to have fought in some cases with muskets from horse-back, but it is difficult to believe, as the muskets of those days needed a rest, as we shall see further on.) The cuirassiers were in complete armour, and though they carried a sword, hardly ever charged at speed, so that they lost the full advantage of their weight. Their usual tactics were to ride up to the enemy's ranks, discharge their pistols, and then each rank in turn wheeled off to reload. The only light cavalry, the Croats, or Hussars (in the Imperial armies mostly small Hungarian noblemen), were used chiefly as foragers, and were so little regarded as soldiers, that it was generally understood that they were exempted from quarter. Now Gustavus gave a new complexion to war, when he completely altered the equipment and tactics of his cavalry. He had only cuirassiers and dragoons; the former alone had defensive armour, a back and breast piece, and a helmet or "pot." They carried a long sword, and two wheel-lock pistols. They were arranged only three, or at most four, deep and charged at a hand gallop, making their movements entirely independent of those of the infantry. It was to the bright steel, and the shock of charging man and horse, that they trusted. "Rupert of the Rhine" taught the gentlemen who served under him in England the same charge, and Cromwell and his Ironsides, sweeping over the brow of the hill at Naseby, were only putting in practice the lessons of Gustavus. The dragoons carried musket, sword, and axe; but the dragoon of the period was little more than a mounted infantry soldier.

He lacked the distinguishing marks of a cavalryman—riding boots and spurs.

The infantry in both armies, Imperialist and Swedish, appear at first sight to have been armed in much the same fashion. They consisted of musketeers and pikemen. But here, too, Gustavus proved himself a great reformer. The musket of those days was an extremely unwieldy weapon, but slightly developed from the arquebus, which again was a descendant of the crossbow. It was over five feet long, and had to be fired by resting it on a fork. Ever since 1626 Gustavus had been labouring to lighten the musket, and he had so far succeeded that he had done away with the fork and replaced it with a thin iron spike, called a hogsbristle or "Swedish feather," which could also be used as a palisade stake, when driven into the ground, to receive cavalry.* This may or may not have been the origin of the later bayonet.

All three kinds of locks, matchlocks, flint-locks and wheel-locks, were in use in the early part of the seventeenth century. The inconvenience of the matchlock was that the match had to be carried burning, and was apt to be extinguished in heavy rain. But, on the whole, it maintained its ground fairly until the middle of the seventeenth century. In the English civil wars, when a garrison marched out with the honours of war, they were described as having "matches burning and bullet in mouth."

* "Whilk your honour must conceive," says Captain Dalgetty "to be double pointed stakes, shod with iron at each end, and planted before a square of pikes, to prevent an onfall of cavalry."—"Legend of Montrose," Chapter I.

Gustavus, by his introduction of cartridges, did away with half the difficulties of loading, but the use of them even in his army was by no means universal. They were carried in a bandolier going across the chest. The defensive armour of the musketeers he reduced to the simple pot, and they were thus enabled to bear the weight of a sabre in addition to their principal weapon. The officers of the musketeers carried only a partisan and a sword. Those of the pikemen were armed like their own soldiers. Pikes may be said to have made their last appearance on a large stage in the Thirty Years' War. In the wars of Louis XIV., they gave way more and more to muskets, and to the newly introduced bayonet. In the English civil war (which is, however, hardly a fair criterion), the numbers of pikemen and musketeers were about equal. Gustavus had more musketeers than pikemen in each company (72 musketeers to 54 pikemen, and 18 supernumeraries in a company of 144). His Imperialist adversaries had rather more pikes than muskets. Monro had a curious preference for the former. "Pikemen," he says, "shall ever be my choice when going on execution, as also in retiring honourably with disadvantage from an enemy, especially against horsemen, and we see oftentimes, that when musketeers do disbandon, of greediness to make booty, the worthy pikemen remain standing firme with their officers guarding them and their colours," etc. Gustavus shortened the length of the pike shaft from fifteen or eighteen to eleven feet, and frequently replaced it by a partisan. These soldiers had full back and breast

armour, and also thigh pieces, but not the arm pieces and greaves which the Imperialists still wore. It is worthy of notice that Gustavus's preference for lightly armed troops may have been the result of personal experience, for, after his wound in 1627, he found his breast-plate galling, and he went into the battle of Lützen in a hat and a riding coat. Englishmen will recall Sir Edmund Verney's letter the morning before Edgehill, in which he says that he shall only wear his pot and his "back," not his "breast." We have already seen Gustavus's care for the warm clothing of his troops when in Poland; the same was now applied to an even greater extent. It has been usual to say that he was the creator of uniforms, and to a certain extent this is true; but the names given to the brigades, the "yellow," and "blue" brigades, for instance, were not those of their uniforms, but of their standards, which were self-coloured with various devices and mottoes embroidered on them; and uniforms did not at any rate become universal in the Swedish army until the days of Charles X. Gustavus was, however, undoubtedly the creator of field hospitals, and travelling medicine chests, and to his general care for his soldiers' comfort, is to be attributed the fact that they suffered comparatively little from sickness.

The formation of troops in battle is a subject on which a civilian must speak with diffidence. The Spanish armies relied, both in the case of infantry and cavalry, as I have said, almost wholly on weight. Their infantry, whether musketeers or pikemen, were arrayed in solid masses, ten, twelve, and in some

cases as much as fifty deep. Of what use the rear rank can have been it is hard to say, except to fill up the places of those who fell. Gustavus drew up his men six deep, each division of a company having its pikemen in the middle and its musketeers on the wings. He would probably have made the lines even thinner, but for his knowledge that the men were still accustomed to associate the idea of safety with that of compactness. At Breitenfeld, Tilly ranged his infantry in huge oblong battalions of one thousand five hundred or two thousand men, with all the pikemen in the centre, and all the musketeers on the wings of each battalion. The method of fighting was for the musketeers to fire and then wheel right about and retreat behind the pikemen, who stood to receive or charge, as occasion offered. The King of Sweden, on the contrary, had little oblongs of about one hundred and forty to two hundred men, each mixed in the fashion I have just described.

It was the same with the cavalry. At Breitenfeld, Pappenheim and Fürstenburg, who commanded the left and right wings of the Imperial horse, respectively, were in line with the infantry, but entirely upon the extreme left or right of the army. They were also in large squadrons, some of one thousand cavaliers, ten deep. Gustavus, it is true, placed his infantry, as a rule, in the centre, and his main cavalry on the wings, but he generally supported the foot with small bodies of horse immediately behind, and interspersed the horse with platoons of musketeers. This must not be understood to contradict what I said above, that the movements of his cavalry were

independent of those of the infantry, which means that they did not depend, for the speed of their charge, on the pace of their foot-soldiers. Suppose a square of pikemen to be broken by a volley, the small squadron of horse that was nearest would instantly charge the musketeers at a gallop, and thus prevent the rout spreading along the line, and give the broken square time to re-form. The space between the King's lines was generally about three hundred paces, and he almost invariably managed to have a good reserve between the first and second, and another behind the second line, whereas the Imperialists often had only one, and never had more than two long lines.


Another great difference between the opposing forces was, that Gustavus always had artillery—his light field-pieces and regimental pieces—posted *among* his troops, whereas the Imperialists ranged their artillery either on a hill to the side or on a long line in front. It is extremely difficult to get a clear idea of a battle in which the tactics must have been somewhat different, although not so different as is generally supposed, from those of our own day. Indeed it is said that a civilian would form but a poor idea of what was going on, if he were placed in a favourable position to view a nineteenth-century battle.

But from Breitenfeld and Lützen we can learn that the first thing to do was to clear the ground from the small detachments, which were occasionally posted in front, and which appear in the English civil war under the name of "forlorn hopes." This was generally effected by a charge of cavalry, which


sometimes swept up to the first line of the enemy. Then followed a general discharge of artillery and musketry all along the line, under cover of the smoke of which the cavalry would charge from the wings. At this stage the immense advantage of the extra swiftness of Gustavus's horsemen would make itself felt; and, moreover, their shock would be of the greater advantage, because it would be felt at more places at once, than in the case of the Imperialist troops, who were obliged to charge from the flanks alone, and so either across the main battalion of the foe or else on the opposite cavalry. When the line was even as much as six deep it would be impossible to practise the latter manœuvre of "rolling it up." The great point in a cavalry charge was to get either through or round the enemy's lines, so as to capture his guns, and if possible turn them against him. This was effected by Gustavus at the beginning of the battle of Lützen, and the guns were afterwards recaptured by Wallenstein, and again taken in the last desperate charge of the Swedes. In the event of the cavalry charges being successful, a general advance along the whole line would be ordered at the double, and the men would then come to "push of pike." Now the difference between such an advance in the Swedish and Imperial troops I take to be, that the Swedish cavalry would make repeated charges on the front and flank of the enemy, while their infantry were coming up, instead of, as in the case of the Imperialists, mainly on the flank. It most frequently happened, however, that, as in a fairly equal battle each side would launch its cavalry at the same

moment, cavalry charged cavalry only, and came to a hand-to-hand fight. Indeed it is difficult to avoid the opinion that after the first hour of such a battle, where both lines were engaged at the short ranges then in use, the whole was a most confused business. Superior dispositions before the battle might be completely upset by one brigade failing to do its duty. Not unfrequently, as in the English civil war, each right wing of cavalry beat the left wing opposed to it, (or *vice versa*), and pursued it off the field, imagining a similar success all along the line; and then the two centres would come to mortal shock as best they could.

I have thus endeavoured to enumerate the main reforms introduced into warfare by Gustavus, and the main causes of his success. Of these, the greatest was undoubtedly, as I have pointed out, his employment of smaller bodies of men, and of swifter movements. For the same reasons as those given above, he reduced the size of his regiments. Tilly would have 2,000 or 2,500 men in a regiment; Gustavus had eight companies, or about 1,000, in the foot, and 500 or 600 in the horse. He thoroughly understood the cohesion and *esprit de corps* which the regiment always possesses. His foreign regiments it is true were somewhat larger, often very considerably so, but they never reached the unwieldy size of those of the Imperialists.



GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS II.—1632.



CHAPTER VIII.

THE CAMPAIGN IN POMERANIA AND MECKLENBURG.

THE first object of the King of Sweden was to secure the coast of Northern Germany, in order to be sure of his communications by sea. With the exception of Stettin, Stralsund, the isle of Rügen, and the ground on which his army stood, it was wholly in the hands of the enemy. But that enemy had allowed him to land unhindered. Wallenstein was away in the south at Memmingen, watching the fluctuations in his master's policy at the Diet of Regensburg. His army was distributed about in various places of strength in Pomerania and Mecklenburg. In his absence it was more like a band of robbers than an army; equally undisciplined and equally cruel. As Gustavus had said to his soldiers, it had effectually plundered the land of everything worth plundering. Torquato Conti, who commanded in Pomerania, was among the cruellest, and soon shewed himself among the most incapable of all the Imperial generals. Savelli, his lieutenant in Mecklenburg, was rather more active, but was unable to

keep his troops in hand. In these circumstances no opposition was made to the first advance of the Swedish King, who in his first campaign of eight months—July, 1630—February, 1631—took as many as eighty strong places in the Duchies of Pomerania and Mecklenburg. When Colberg fell in the following March, Wismar, Rostock, and Greifswald alone remained to the Imperialists.

The Duchy of Pomerania is divided into two unequal halves by the river Oder, with its double mouths running into the “Frische Haaf,” a long shallow fresh-water lake, separated from the sea by the large islands of Usedom and Wollin. The shores of the lake and the coast were then, as now, dotted with innumerable windmills, and from the southern point of the lake it is not more than a couple of hours’ sail with a fair wind up the river to Stettin. The King’s first point undoubtedly was to get to Stettin. The siege of that city had already been given up, but Conti was still hovering about in its neighbourhood. Gustavus easily made himself master of the islands of Usedom and Wollin, the enemy retiring before him on one side to Anklam, and on the other to Garz and Greifenhagen farther up the river, and thus committing the great mistake of dividing his forces. Gustavus saw the chance of cutting him in two, and was not slow to utilise it. He had already begun negotiating with Boguslav, and finding that the old man’s chief wish was to save appearances, told him roundly that he (Gustavus) must have Stettin, and that no neutrality on the part of Protestants would be allowed. This was a

principle which he laid down from the very first, and, though he occasionally waived it for a time, there is no doubt that to it he owed his ultimate success in overcoming the sluggish North German spirit, and stimulating it into fighting for itself. On the 9th of July he embarked his troops for the sail up the Oder, and in a few hours was under the walls of Stettin, Stettin was commanded by a brave soldier, Colonel Damitz; but Colonel Damitz was commanded by Boguslav, who found himself in a somewhat similar position to Charles I., when the Scots ordered him to order Bellasis to surrender Newark. Terror of Gustavus had possessed the old Duke, body and soul; he came out for an interview, and from the Swedish camp ordered the surrender of the city, stipulating for a show of stratagem, if not of force, in order to save appearances.

The treaty between Sweden and Pomerania, which was then concluded, provided that Boguslav should pay a round sum of money, and that Damitz and his three thousand Pomeranians should take service under Gustavus. They were enrolled as the White Brigade, and, although we find little mention in the contemporary records of one of their fine qualities, for which their subsequent masters, the Kings of Prussia, most chiefly valued Pomeranian soldiers—their gigantic stature,—they did excellent service in this very campaign. Further, with the usual reservation of the rights of Emperor and Empire, that the King of Sweden *should hold Pomerania after the death of Boguslav, until he was indemnified by the Elector of Brandenburg* (Boguslav's heir-presumptive), or who-

ever should succeed the reigning Duke, for the costs of the war. On these conditions Gustavus would restore to Boguslav all the places he had already taken, who was to admit no other power to occupy them for him. To restore the conquered territory to Boguslav, however, was now only to restore it to himself; the whole effective military strength of the province being incorporated with the Swedish army. It was an excellent treaty for Gustavus from a military point of view; it can hardly, however, have been likely to encourage other German princes to offer him their alliance. The Elector of Brandenburg might not unnaturally complain that he was thus at one stroke deprived of an inheritance far larger than that of which Ferdinand could possibly deprive him by any number of Edicts of Restitution. But still less was the treaty likely to encourage them to resist Gustavus. No wonder Boguslav begged pardon of the Emperor for concluding it, and alleged that it was all the fault of the Imperial generals, who had practically left him without support. Ferdinand angrily ordered those generals to treat all Pomeranians as traitors; and they redoubled, if possible, their cruelties, with the natural result that Gustavus was more and more looked upon as a deliverer.

The next bit of business was to clear the coast between Stralsund and the mouths of the river Oder, and thus to keep in touch with Leslie. This was not quite so easy, but no stand was made by the Imperial troops at Anklam, Uckermünde, or Barth. Wolgast surrendered on the 16th of August to the first appearance of a siege, but Greifswald held out

till the following summer. Against this the Imperialists had only to set the recapture of the little town of Passewalk farther inland, where they put the new Swedish garrison of three hundred men to the sword. While thus extending his left wing in the direction of Leslie (I place the King with his face to the sea—a glance at the position of Stettin on the map will shew why), Gustavus was anxious not to lose sight of his communication with Pillau and Elbing, where the faithful Oxenstiern was in command, seconding the efforts of the King by all means in his power, and busying himself just at this time in forwarding, or trying to forward, to him troops and supplies. To keep the communication open, the right wing of the Swedish army under Kniphausen was ordered to occupy the strong places in that eastern half of the duchy which is generally called Farther Pomerania. The most important of these were Colberg, Cammin, and Rugenwalde. Himself, with the centre of his troops, proposed to concentrate on the Oder, in the immediate neighbourhood of Stettin; but in the autumn he allowed himself to be diverted into a westward march into Mecklenburg, which was productive of no great success. We have thus to keep our eyes at the same time upon four separate scenes in the war, bearing in mind always that no advance could be made into the interior of Germany while a single fortified place remained untaken. That was the belief of the time, and for long after. It was not merely sufficient to “block up” a place, however securely, for an enemy might arrive in overwhelming force to relieve it, and

might overrun the whole country, which had just been conquered. If we do grasp this fact, we shall readily acquit Gustavus of having come, as some German historians have asserted that he came, solely for the purpose of conquering Pomerania.

His centre took possession of the strong post of Damm on the right bank of the river before the end of July, and thus found itself almost face to face with the Imperialist garrison at Greifenhagen and Garz, which, though both Pomeranian, were really the keys of the New Mark of Brandenburg, on the right and left banks of the river respectively.

What was doing on the right wing we shall learn best from Monro. The town of Cammin was obviously the first step towards the occupation of Farther Pomerania, and Cammin had been deserted by the Imperialists almost as soon as Gustavus had landed at Peenemünde. He had at once sent to occupy it, and, before the end of July, Damitz and his Pomeranians, had possessed themselves of Naugard, Stargard, and Treptow. The last was the next fortress to Colberg, which had become the rendezvous of the Imperialist forces, and which was reputed the strongest fortress in North Germany. In September General Kniphausen began the blockade of Colberg. Oxenstiern was ordered to hurry up troops from the east to complete its investment. Accordingly, on the 12th of August, Monro received orders to ship from Pillau to one of the Pomeranian ports with the three Scots regiments. He was shipwrecked a day or two after, and, being driven ashore near Rugenwalde, thought that it would be better to take

that town, than to perish of hunger, or fall into the hands of the enemy, from whom he had little quarter to expect. By a stratagem, and the treachery of the commander, he possessed himself of it, and held it for nine weeks, until he was relieved by Hepburn, whom Oxenstiern had sent with further reinforcements for the service of the siege of Colberg. His next exploit was to advance to capture the outpost of Schievelbein, where he managed to keep in check some Imperialist troops, which were advancing to the relief of Colberg. Continual alarms of relief, however, made the blockade of the latter a very intermittent one: at one time it seemed as if all the enemy were pouring out of Greifenhagen and Garz to save their last eastern stronghold (November); but a smart skirmish near "Shivel-beane," as Monro calls it, with an advanced detachment of Conti's army, proved the superiority of the Swedes, and ended in the complete discomfiture of the Imperial troops and the resumption of the blockade of Colberg.

In the meanwhile, Gustavus, who had been present in person at the taking of Wolgast, had returned to Stettin early in September, to prepare for his expedition to Mecklenburg. Although this expedition was hardly in harmony with the plan he had laid down (or rather, though the time for it had not yet come), it seems that he was prompted to it by the desire to do something for the two Dukes of Mecklenburg, who, no doubt, were importunate in their demands for assistance. It was important for him to shew German princes, who had been driven out, that he *could* restore them to their territory. As yet not

a single prince had come forward to meet him, with the exception of Boguslav (and we have seen of what fashion his welcome was), and the young Landgraf William, of Hesse Cassel, who offered to raise three thousand troops on his estates for the service. The Mecklenburg pair had indeed betaken themselves to him, but when they were in the position of men who had nothing left to lose by throwing for high stakes. Moreover he was beginning to be straitened for provisions in his camp at Stettin, and (as so often happened on both sides in this war) he was compelled to extend his army over a large space of country in order to feed it. The impatience of the King comes out forcibly at this time in his complaints of the apathy of the population, and in his letters to Oxenstiern he continually presses for further supplies from Prussia and from Sweden. Gustavus Horn had arrived at Stettin, in the end of August, with considerable reinforcements from Finland and Livonia, and he was now left as Field-Marshal in command of the camp at Stettin, while the King went to Mecklenburg.

I have little doubt that, from a military point of view, this expedition was a mistake.

A pretty mixture of piety and worldly wisdom appears in the King's last despatch to the Chancellor before starting: "God, Who at all times hath wonderfully directed our counsels, can turn everything for the best, but I refer to your earnest consideration the present state of affairs." He reached Stralsund on the 9th of September. Horn was to send him, from time to time, all the reinforcements that he could

spare, but really he could spare none. The King had reckoned on the co-operation of a Swedish fleet for the capture of Rostock and Wismar, but bad weather detained it in harbour. The frontier between Mecklenburg and Pomerania was strongly occupied by Savelli's troops. The King's troops were far inferior in numbers,—he had not more than five thousand foot, and one thousand five hundred horse, with him—but he succeeded in out-manceuvring his adversary and taking Damgarten and Ribnitz, the keys of the province, before the end of the month. He got no further, however, than the seizure of one of the "sconces," opposite Rostock, which put him in a favourable position for an attack upon that city, recently occupied by the Imperialists. It is evident that he expected an attack of the enemy in force on the newly won frontier, for he withdrew shortly after (October 6th) to Ribnitz. But then he heard that Schaumburg* had made a bold dash upon the camp at Stettin in his absence, and, divining from this that the enemy was concentrating there, he determined to leave Mecklenburg alone for a time. For the moment the idea of finishing the campaign at a blow on the frontier of Brandenburg seems to have struck him, and Horn urged the same plan. In the end of October the King was back at Stettin, sick at heart that Oxenstiern could send no more troops; obliged to leave numerous garrisons behind him, he could muster no more than twenty thousand men, yet he determined to march on the Imperial camp.

* Schaumburg, one of Tilly's lieutenants, succeeded Conti in September, the latter retiring to Rome, to the more peaceful command of the Papal Guards.

All November he was preparing his dispositions. He would advance up the Oder and either meet the foe in the field or storm Greifenhagen and Garz. On December 4th, he wrote an affecting letter to Oxenstiern, which has been often quoted: "The issue of battle is doubtful by reason of our sins, doubtful too is human life's span. I beg you, therefore, if it go hard with us, not to lose heart, but to look to my memory and the welfare of those dear to me. Deal with me and mine as I would with you and yours. I have reigned for twenty years with grievous toil, but, God be praised, with honour too. I have honoured my Father-land and made light of life, riches, and good days for its sake. I have had no other end in life but to do my duty in my station. But, if I fall, my dear ones will be in a pitiable state; they are women,—the mother none too wise [this is not the first indication Gustavus gives that Maria Eleanora was hardly a help meet for him], the daughter a tiny maiden; too weak to advise themselves in danger, and equally weak if they receive advice. It is *στροφή* naturalis that drives me to write thus to you, and it is a relief to write. Yet them, and my body, and my soul, and all God hath given me, I do commend to His Holy Keeping."

During the last two months of the year 1630 reinforcements did arrive at the King's camp, though from a very different quarter from that which he expected. Wallenstein's troops, over half of which were disbanded, offered to take service with him in great numbers. It is one of his highest titles to praise that he made out of these men soldiers at

least sufficiently disciplined not to sully the fame of his arms during his lifetime. He had a high opinion of the individual German as a soldier, and Banér, one of his ablest generals, avowed that he preferred Germans under Swedish discipline to native Swedes. At the same time Falkenberg who had been sent to Holland to negotiate with the States-General for three additional regiments, began to forward his men. The slippery King of England was allowing, underhand, the almost equally slippery Marquis of Hamilton to raise 6,000 Englishmen, but these did not arrive till the following July.

It was with about * 14,000 men, of whom 6,000 were horse, that Gustavus began to advance up the Oder from Stettin against the main Imperial position. Schaumburg had been obliged to widen his cantonments a little more than he would have liked, in order to collect provisions, for the winter was very severe, and he was even worse off than the hungry Swedes. His main body lay at Garz, the rest between Pyritz and Greifenhagen and he then covered both branches of the river. Greifenhagen might be regarded from a military point of view as the *tête-du-pont* of Garz, and there were bridges over both streams. On Christmas eve the Swedes lay before Greifenhagen and occupied both banks of the river. After service on the morrow the storm began. Don Ferdinand of Capua made a feeble resistance, tried to fly across the bridge, met on

* Droysen's figures, from the archives and letters. The numbers are given in other historians with every variety that mathematical ingenuity can suggest.

the other side another detachment of the Swedes, who drove him back, and was finally taken prisoner with all his guns. Schaumburg saw from Garz what was going on, blew up the bridge over the western stream, threw his artillery into the marsh, and made off at full speed with all his troops for Frankfort-on-Oder. A detachment of the Swedes sent eastwards from Greifenhagen against Pyritz had equal success, and soon the roads to Landsberg and Frankfort were covered with fugitives remorselessly pursued by the Swedes. The King himself followed them almost as far as Landsberg. Three of their regiments, including that which had been Wallenstein's own, were practically annihilated.


Landsberg was a place of great strength, and commanded the pass of the river Warthe, one of the most important tributaries of the Oder. Gustavus anxious as he was to pursue the enemy and relieve Magdeburg, of which more hereafter, found it necessary to give his troops a rest. He therefore strengthened the defences of Garz, so as to keep open his communications with Stettin, quartered his troops at Schwedt and Bärwalde, and prepared seriously for the negotiations with the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, which should unlock for him the gates of Central Germany.


So ended the year 1630. Gustavus had cleared the enemy out of all the sea-coast districts with the exception of Wismar and Rostock in Mecklenburg, Demmin and Greifswald in Hither, and Colberg in Farther Pomerania. All these places were either besieged or the sieges could be taken up again at any

moment, for Banèr had been left with four thousand men on the frontier of Mecklenburg, and Colberg was completely isolated from the other four. The King had little doubt that all would fall in a month or two.

Satisfactory as such success must have been to Gustavus, he would probably have been more pleased, could he have forced on a general engagement. He did not quite realise as yet what the dismissal of Wallenstein meant, and that the enemy only did not fight him, because they had in that part of Germany at the moment no corporate existence. Tilly was far away to the west, busy incorporating the disbanded soldiers of Wallenstein in the League army. The enemy with whom Gustavus had to deal in the first six months of his campaign was nothing but a series of garrisons, under commanders who were indeed, equally with himself, at present incapable of realising that their bond of cohesion was at an end. Gustavus certainly expected to find much larger garrisons in Garz and Greifenhagen, and thought it not impossible that, either there or in Mecklenburg, a concentration of all the old Wallenstein troops might take place, and give him battle in the open field. But nothing proves more conclusively the awful misery that the Thirty Years' War inflicted upon the population of Germany, than the fact that it was a year and two months before Gustavus could draw Tilly to meet him in a pitched battle. During that weary period the war was partly a starvation match, in which the movement of the armies was determined by the rapidity, or the re-

verse, with which they ate their way through a country, and partly a series of manœuvres on the side of the Imperial general to avoid a pitched battle altogether, with the idea that the discipline of the Swedish army must give way under the pressure of hunger, and that the German people would pay any price to be rid of their deliverers.





CHAPTER IX.

WHICH WAY?

VEN if he should be compelled to violate all the laws of war, and advance into the interior before Mecklenburg was cleared, there were weighty reasons which urged Gustavus to such a step. There was one supremely weighty reason. The city of Magdeburg had claimed his protection. Magdeburg was torn with party strife. There was a party for the (recently deposed) "administrator," Christian William of Brandenburg, a party for the newly elected Saxon administrator, and, of course, an Imperial party. The country districts of the archbishopric, more open than the city to Imperial influences, began to suffer from a restoration of Catholicism even before the publication of the "Edict of Restitution," and Wallenstein had for a short while besieged the city, with the intention of forcing the edict upon it. But in September, 1629, he was in little mood for another hopeless siege, and had allowed himself to be bought off with one hundred thousand dollars.

Magdeburg, which was one of the most powerful of the inland members of the Hanseatic League, always endeavoured to induce the other towns to make common cause with her, and in November, 1629, the greater members — Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Brunswick, and Hildesheim—had agreed to come to the help of Magdeburg, or each other, in case of future attacks from the Imperialists. Meanwhile Christian William, the ex-administrator, whose only idea was to get back into possession of his “bishopric,” worked for that end, both upon his party in the city and also upon the King of Sweden, with whom, in the early days of 1630, he entered into a lively correspondence. He promised Gustavus that he would raise in the city and the archbishopric a large army, if the latter would use his influence to get him restored there. Gustavus considered it a mad plan, as he did not clearly see where Christian was to get his army, but he promised him some money when he should be in possession of Magdeburg. The leading citizens were, no doubt, averse to him and to Swedish influence, but he came in disguise to the city, raised a revolt of his partisans, and became master of the situation (June, 1630). This was followed by a regular treaty between Gustavus and the administrator and city of Magdeburg, to stand or fall together (beginning of August). Gustavus promised to *interest himself for the city in all dangers, to defend it at his own cost, not to forsake it in any need, and to conclude no peace in which it should not be comprised.* The whole of the diocese soon fell into the administrator’s hands, and he really

seems to have set to work to raise an army for Gustavus; but the treaty was hardly concluded when the Imperial troops began to advance (beginning of September). They overran the country districts without difficulty, and, before the end of the month, had taken everything except the city. Gustavus had particularly warned Christian William against scattering his newly raised levies in different places, but the warning was unheeded.

The rising had come too soon, but the King had no choice but to make the best use of it. Quite apart from all treaty considerations, the possession of the line of the Elbe at the most favourable point possible, which it would give him, was of inestimable value for the prosecution of his march into the interior of Germany, and lastly the same reason applies in this case as in the cases of Stralsund and Mecklenburg,—the importance of shewing to the Protestants that if they rose and trusted to him he would not fail to assist them. He should have been prepared for people rising at the wrong time. He sent money for the levying of new regiments from among the citizens, and an incomparable commander, Falkenberg, the marshal of his household (the same man who had been employed to raise troops for him in Holland), to animate the resistance of Magdeburg, and, by express agreement, to take full command of the defence, for he knew that Christian William was as incapable as he was weak and selfish. His instructions to Falkenberg are important. He is to “make at Magdeburg such a diversion, that he shall not only get command of the Elbe, but also *keep the*

enemy employed in those parts, and so prevent them undertaking anything against himself (Gustavus); further, to give room for discontent to spread" (against the Emperor), "and to support the malcontents in refusing contributions to the enemy; finally, to make this insurrection the torch to kindle an universal rising throughout Germany."

Again I am compelled to use italics. If the light in which Gustavus looked upon Magdeburg was simply to keep the enemy employed while he himself mastered Pomerania; if, careless whether the greatest Protestant city in Germany fell or not, he kept encouraging an insurrection, which he lacked alike the means or the good-will to support, he acted more like a Borgia than a Vasa. The charge was of course made then, and has been made since. But his whole life belies the charge. He never again took his eyes off Magdeburg. It was to be his first goal. As early as August 17th he writes to Oxenstiern to hurry up his Prussian regiments, and to send them straight to the relief of Magdeburg. His steady advance up the Oder Valley had no other end than that relief. All the subsequent negotiations with Brandenburg and Saxony were for the purpose of enabling him to advance to the Elbe.

But if the verdict be "Not guilty," and it should be so unanimously, on the charge of fraud or indifference, it is not so easy to acquit him of a blunder. It was lightly undertaken, that treaty with Magdeburg. Gustavus ought to have reckoned on the impossibility of clearing the sea-coasts in time to permit him to advance to its rescue; he ought to have con-

sidered the sluggishness of Brandenburg; the timidity and ill-will of the drunken John George of Saxony; the immense difficulties that Falkenberg would encounter in organising resistance; finally the thousand and one things that might intervene between himself and a city more than one hundred miles, as the crow flies, from Stettin. On two things principally, however, he counted: first, that Magdeburg was capable of enduring any siege that the then divided forces of the enemy would be able to lay to it; secondly, that he would have met that enemy in the field, and annihilated him before the siege could even begin. The latter was a fair calculation. Had Wallenstein and not Tilly been the leader of Ferdinand's army in the end of 1630, the first decisive battle would in all probability have occurred a year earlier than it did. The former was a false calculation. There was treachery enough in Magdeburg, as there was in nearly every Imperial town, to make the danger almost as great from within as from without. Finally, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Gustavus might have spared three thousand or four thousand veterans to go with Falkenberg, and if need be to die in the breach with him, if only to prove to the world that Sweden would be true to her allies.

Too great caution carried the day. He wrote to Magdeburg to hold out to the last; he would do all he could for its relief. In one respect he was not far wrong; he gave Tilly so much work to do in the early months of 1631 that the siege never became serious until March.

Meanwhile, Gustavus was doing his utmost to per-

suade the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony to take up arms for the cause. Even before his sailing, as we have seen, he had negotiated with them, and got no satisfactory answer. He had also written to the whole body of Electors, who promptly told him to mind his own business. While he was at Stettin in July, 1630, he put his demand more plainly before George William, somewhat after this fashion :

"Now is the most favourable time," he wrote, "for you to occupy and defend your own fortresses. If you wont do that, give me one of them. Give me only Küstrin " (which commands the junction of the Oder and Warthe). "I'll defend it. What else can you do? He who makes a sheep of himself will be eaten by the wolf. For I tell you plainly I will hear not a word of neutrality. Your Serenity must be either friend or foe. As soon as I get to your frontier you will have to declare yourself. Here strive God and the devil. If you will hold with God, come over to me. If you prefer the devil, you will have to fight me first. *Tertium non dabitur*, of that you may be sure."

It was exactly *tertium* that George William thought might be given to him. The idea of a third party in Germany, which should gradually acquire such power as to be at first independent of the Emperor and his foreign antagonists, and soon strong enough to dictate peace to both, had been growing fast since the Edict of Restitution. Arnim, who had at one time been Wallenstein's lieutenant, was particularly active in this cause. He was a Saxon and a Lutheran, and at the present time he had the ear of

the Elector John George. If John George had been a man of any worth, the idea might have come to something. But he was as incapable of adhering to a resolution, as of keeping sober after dinner. To him, however, George William now turned for advice. John George had no advice to give, except to refuse Küstrin to Gustavus. Accordingly we find the Elector of Brandenburg giving to his commandant at that fortress orders to give the Imperialists "pass and repass" by Küstrin in any case; if the Swedes came he was to "pray them to turn back." If prayers failed he was to let them pass, for it would be a sign that they had won the lower valley of the river.

Towards the end of the year 1630, the ambassadors of the two Electors had a conference at Annaburg, where they agreed to hold a meeting of all Lutheran states, at Leipzig, in the following February. That was in the very days of Greifenhagen and Garz. Meanwhile the Swedish banners were over the frontier, and George William had to decide what to do. He refused Küstrin. Gustavus halted for a moment, loth to proceed to extremities against a Protestant prince. Even while he halted he found a better ally than George William.

The ubiquitous Charnacé had been with him soon after his landing, and had shewn himself with each turn of fortune in Gustavus's favour, more and more ready to come to terms. On the 13th of January, 1631, the Treaty of Bärwalde was concluded between France and Sweden. Hard cash had been the principal subject of the negotiation, and Louis XIII. had agreed to pay to Gustavus a lump sum of one hun-

dred and twenty thousand dollars in consideration of his recent expenditure,—further a sum of four hundred thousand dollars a year for six years to come. Until that time, or until a general peace, if such should supervene earlier, Sweden was to keep in the field an army of thirty thousand foot and six thousand horse. The object of the alliance was declared to be “the protection of their common friends, the security of the Baltic, the freedom of commerce, the restitution of the oppressed members of the Empire, the destruction of the newly erected fortresses in the Baltic, the North Sea, and in the Grisons territory, so that all should be left in the state in which it was before the German war had begun.” Sweden was not to “violate the Imperial constitution” where she conquered; she was to leave the Catholic religion undisturbed in all districts where she found it existing. She was to observe towards Bavaria and the League—the spoilt darlings of Richelieu’s anti-Austrian policy—friendship or neutrality, so far as *they would observe it towards her*. If, at the end of six years, the objects were not accomplished, the treaty was to be renewed.

It was not a magnanimous nor a splendid offer, that the great Cardinal here made. Gustavus was to him as I have said, an important piece upon the chessboard, but still only a piece. He was to fight Richelieu’s battles hampered with conditions that would seriously clog his path if he were to observe them. Suppose he were to come to what had once been Magdeburg and find Catholicism “existing there,” having been established by force amid the

ashes of the town — was he not to restore Protestantism? Or suppose it were Augsburg, the birth-place of the Lutheran confession, from which an Imperial garrison might have just ejected the Protestant preachers: what was he to do there? Or again, suppose that the Duke of Bavaria refused him the passage through his territories, that blocked the way to Vienna, and at the same time declared that he was "neutral": what were Richelieu's intentions? The answer can only be one of two, for Richelieu seldom did anything by halves. Either the religious clauses were only inserted in the treaty in order to flatter the sentiments of Louis XIII. (who had feelings akin to those of his great-great-grandson, albeit based upon a much more real religion, with regard to taking part with heretics), and the clauses in favour of the League, because the Cardinal really hoped to work upon Maximilian to desert the Emperor, or else his intention was (and this it really seems to have been) that the King of Sweden should advance straight into the hereditary countries by way of Silesia, and dictate a peace within the walls of Vienna.

But, hampered with conditions as the alliance was, it was of inestimable advantage to Gustavus. Even in prestige the chosen ally of the Most Christian King was a very different person from the King of snows and ice. He would not melt so easily now before the beams of the Imperial sun. And money was of more importance than prestige. It was just at that time of supreme importance. The harvest had been a bad one in Sweden, and there had even

been one or two small *émeutes* against the tax-collectors; the German allies, if allies they could be called, had neither the means nor the will to pay much. Lastly, he would be sure of getting more support in Germany now that his threats and prayers were supported by Richelieu's diplomacy. As for the conditions, for the present they sat lightly on him; when the time came, he might consider whether they should be observed or modified.

Full of bright hopes and confidence he writes home to John Casimir, immediately after the treaty with France,—it is his first really cheerful letter, the earlier ones had contained so much grumbling about want of money and the like: "We have now got, by God's grace, a good foot and '*sedes belli*' fashioned in such a kind that the enemy by all human calculation, will not find it easy to eject us from it. The country is not so poor as to be unable to feed a moderate-sized army." With his own troops, he adds, he is well contented, the alliance with France is a great gain, and the German princes and states are gradually drawing away from the Emperor, and will in time learn to lean upon Sweden. If, but only if, Sweden continues to be victorious, great help may be expected from them. Magdeburg, too, and the connection with that, has opened a wide door for deliverance of many oppressed Christians. It must anyhow cut the enemy off from the passage of the Elbe.

His plans for the year 1631 were calculated upon a scale based rather upon his own impetuous confidence, than upon the actual facts of the situation. His

quarters in the New Mark of Brandenburg were now well provided with necessaries. He issued a proclamation, recalling to their homes the inhabitants who had fled while the Imperialists were in the land. The rigid discipline which he maintained in his camp encouraged the population to return; they were obliged however to provide regular contribution of forage and victual proportionate to their means. This was all brought into a common stock, and the soldiers received it at the canteen. In their billets they were to demand nothing but bed, vinegar,* and salt, and the right to cook their provisions at the host's fire. All guides, horses, and provisions at inns were to be paid for in hard money, or a token which at headquarters would be exchanged at once for money. From this quarter he proposed to act outwards in several directions. His main army, now of forty-two thousand under himself, was to remain on the Oder until the Magdeburg business should have so far ripened that a general rising should take place on the Elbe. Then between these two Protestant armies, the two Protestant Electors would have room to declare themselves without fear of consequences.

Horn and Teuffel with two other detachments were to complete the reduction of the northern fortresses, and then advance into Silesia. Lastly, he had hopes

* Is this on account of the strange appetite of the Northern nations for pungent food, or for the same reason for which Frederick the Great obliged his troops to use vinegar? I find that Frederick, whenever he was in a district where the water was bad, compelled his men to put a few drops of the condiment into the water which they drank, in order to avoid sickness. The water is no doubt decidedly indifferent in the Lower Valley of the Oder.

that a fifth army might be raised on the Weser by the Protestants of Bremen, Hildesheim, Brunswick, and Hamburg, just the districts, be it observed, in which the Edict of Restitution was being actually put in force at this very time. It is hardly likely that he expected to be able to carry out such a plan as this in its entirety. But it was a glaring error of Tilly's to remain as long as he did inactive on the Weser, and to allow unhindered the fall of Greifenhagen and the practical scattering of Schaumburg's corps. In the last days of 1630 the old General, who had been waiting for the Imperial regiments which were coming up from Italy (since the conclusion of the peace with France it was no longer necessary for Ferdinand to keep troops there), and for Wallenstein's disbanded soldiers to be re-formed into regiments under him, advanced slowly towards the Elbe. Bad news met him at every step. Now it was the fall of Garz, now the threatened blockade of Landsberg. This he resolved, if possible, to prevent; he therefore pushed on more rapidly through Brandenburg and reached Frankfort-on-Oder on the 18th of January. Gustavus resolved to strengthen his garrisons in Pomerania, and to divide the rest of his forces into two parts, with the first of which, thirty thousand strong, he would himself compel Tilly to give battle between the Elbe and the Oder; with the second, thirteen thousand strong, Horn should clear the coasts, and then advance into Silesia. This was Oxenstiern's plan. No one can deny that it was a more feasible one than the King's. But it took too little account of Magdeburg.

For the moment, however, contenting himself with blockading Landsberg, Gustavus resolved to draw Tilly after him, by another attack upon the yet remaining fortresses in Mecklenburg. Here Monro comes forward to act as our guide again. His regiment had in due course come into the camp at Stettin, and now he says: "we brake up from Stettin, taking our march towards New Brandenburg, the earth clad over with a great storm of snow, being hard frost, we carried great cannon of battery, and a number of small cannon being well provided of all things belonging to artillery, our little army consisting of about 8,000 horse and foot." Almost without a blow they occupied successively Prenzlau, New Brandenburg, Treptow, and Klempenau, and then sat down before Demmin. Monro can hardly find words to express his admiration of the King on this his first march immediately under his orders. "He did not like so well of an officer that was not as capable to understand his directions, as he was ready in giving them; nevertheless he would not suffer an officer to part from him, till he found he was understood by the receiver of the order. Such a general would I gladly serve, but such a general I shall hardly see, whose custom was to be the first and last in danger himself, gaining his officers' love in being the companion both of their labours and dangers," etc. He was impatient, too, of excuses. A soldier complained to him that the ground was frozen; the digging could not be done in time. "Necessity" said the King "admits of no such excuses." The want of good maps made frequent recognisances

necessary. In these the King was ever foremost, often to his own great danger. Before Demmin when he was engaged in this work he tumbled through the ice on a marsh and was immersed to his middle, whereon Monro's Captain Dumaine went towards him to help him out. His Majesty "wagged his hand that the Captain might retire, which the enemy perceiving shot above a thousand shot of musket at his Majesty, who at last wrought himself loose, coming off without hurt, and sat awhile by our guard fire." Whereupon the bold Dumaine remonstrated with him for hazarding his person, on whom the eyes of Europe were fixed; "what would become of us," he said, "the brave cavaliers of fortune, if anything should happen to your Majesty?" The King was grateful for the warning, and confessed his fault, and then "before he had changed his wet clothes in a cold tent, called for meat and dined grossely, and taking a great draught of wine went and changed his clothes."

Savelli was in command at Demmin, which was immensely strong, yet before the Swedes had taken any of the approaches, except two small sconces, he agreed to surrender (February 13th), and thus Gustavus was free either to advance into Mecklenburg or to turn upon Tilly. For his plan had succeeded. He *had* drawn Tilly after him. Tilly considered that his troops, 15,000 strong, were now sufficiently re-established to be able to offer battle to the Swedes. On his way north-westwards he came before the newly taken Swedish position of New Brandenburg, where the brave old Kniphausen with 2,000 men commanded. Gustavus sent him orders to retire, as

the place was not worth the risk of holding it against such a force. The messenger who carried the letter was intercepted. Knipphausen refused to surrender. Tilly determined to storm. The Swedish commander had no guns, and the issue could hardly be doubtful. After a desperate struggle, which cost the besiegers four hundred lives, the town was won, and the entire garrison, except the commander and sixty men, together with the entire male population of the town, were put to the sword (March 13th). The heroic defence of such an untenable place made a great impression on Tilly, and he determined to retreat again. This time, however, not in the direction of Landsberg and Frankfort, but towards the Elbe, where Pappenheim had already begun the siege of Magdeburg. It is worthy of note that a few days before the loss of New Brandenburg the far more important fortress of Colberg had surrendered, and thus Gustavus's communications with his Prussian base of supplies were safe.

What was Gustavus to do? Should he follow Tilly at all costs and prevent his junction with Pappenheim? or should he try to draw him back by attacking Landsberg and Frankfort? He decided for the latter. Tilly would surely never abandon such a place as Frankfort, by far the most important eastward position the Imperialists now held. He must fight in defence of that. To attack Frankfort, however, Gustavus had to get by Küstrin somehow or other. He therefore simply marched up to that fortress, and terrified its commander into giving him free passage and some of the outworks.

Then in the night of the 3d of April he stormed Frankfort.

Monro, who had taken a short "forloffe" in order to go to Stettin to see his wife and children—he did not see them again for three years which he found "much to his prejudice,"—had rejoined the King at Schwedt, on the march to Frankfort. There all the Scots regiments were re-formed into one brigade, and put under the command of Sir J. Hepburn. The brigade had its full share of the dangers and honours of the storm, Hepburn himself being hit in the knee, as he led his men through a great sallying port, "which dazling his senses with great paine, forced him to retire, who said to me, 'bully Monro, I am shot' whereat I was wondrous sorry." His Major was next shot dead, and the pikes halted for a moment. Up came the fiery Baner, and urged them to lead on: "whereat Col. Lumsdell and I being both alike at the head of our own colours, he having a partisan in his hand, and I a half-pike, with a head-piece that covered my head, commanding our pikes to advance, we lead on shoulder to shoulder," and so won the gate. The enemy retired in confusion, having neither the wit nor courage to let down the portcullis. So that we, entering the street at their heels, made a stand till our body of pikes were drawn up orderly and flanked with musketeers, and then we advanced," etc. Thereon three thousand * of the garrison were put to the sword, as a reprisal for the

* Droysen says (but quotes no authority) 1,700 in all was the total loss of the enemy. I prefer Monro in this instance, as he several times reverts to the subject, which evidently made an impression on him.

New Brandenburg business. Monro bears witness to the great courage with which some Irish troops under Colonel Butler held out. Three hours' plunder was allowed, and for once his troops seem to have got out of Gustavus's hand. He was obliged to draw his sword, and rush in among some of the companies, to check the plunder, at the end of that time. Monro's righteous soul was vexed, not so much at the fact of the plunder, as at the desertion of their colours for three hours together that resulted from it. "In some regiments, I am confident there was not one man with the colours," says he. He was also a little uneasy at the reprisal business, and at the battle having been fought on the "Sabbath."

After such a lesson as this, Landsberg was not likely to hold out long; and in fact it capitulated after a ten-days' blockade on April 16th. This was the last stronghold of the Imperialists in the New Mark of Brandenburg. The few fugitives from Frankfort had run till they reached Glogau in Silesia, and had spread all up the valley of the Oder the news that the terrible conqueror was coming. Vienna and Munich felt the shock reverberate. Even in Ingolstadt men prayed in the litany to be delivered "from the Devil and the Swedes, the Finns and the Lapps." Looking nearer home Gustavus's successes here had partly produced the desired result. They had drawn Tilly back from Magdeburg into Brandenburg; but they had not unnaturally failed to make him any more eager for the decisive hour of battle. Pappenheim was furious with him: "Why won't he either go and meet the Swedes in the field, or else come

and help me to take Magdeburg?" he wrote to the Emperor.

But Tilly was hampered by his double relation to Emperor and League. He hovered about the frontier of Brandenburg, ever and anon casting an eye on the Leipzig convention of Protestant princes, who had been in session since February. There were sixty-two princes of the two reformed creeds there. There were committees without end. All the ecclesiastical grievances that oppressed ecclesiastics could imagine, were presented to the Emperor. There was even an intention declared of arming, at some future time, for the defence of the Augsburg confession. John George said he would contribute eleven thousand and George William five thousand men for such a cause. But there was no word of relieving Magdeburg. *And the name of Gustavus Adolphus was not mentioned in any public act during the two months' conference.* An "appeal to the Emperor,"—that was the result of their palavering, and the natural result of that appeal was an angry order to dissolve, or Leipzig should be blown about their ears.

The King of Sweden had come to that place, to which another Christian so often came in his life's pilgrimage—the place where two ways met. Before him on his left lay Silesia, Bohemia, Vienna, and peace; a beaten enemy, a few ill-defended fortresses; no Protestant Electors whose feelings had to be considered and whose territory had to be spared; the approval of his great ally the King of France, glory without end. And on his right a sea of troubles,

drunken John Georges and timid George Williams, incapable Administrators, stingy Hanseatic towns, certain complications with the League, probable disapproval of Richelieu, Tilly and Pappenheim with an unbeaten army larger than his own. But in the middle of all that lay Magdeburg.

To his everlasting honour he chose the latter way. The lonely figure of Falkenberg bravely striving to organise that hopeless defence, in a wilderness of treachery and incapability, as the dark masses of the enemy gathered in greater and greater strength on both sides of the river during the month of April, must have been continuously present to his mind. The knot looked almost hopeless, but Gustavus resolved to do his best to untie it.

From Landsberg, where in grim northern jest he made a blacksmith, who had acted as guide to his army, burgomaster of the town, he marched straight upon Berlin. Berlin seemed inclined to resist. Once more the King hesitated to quarrel with his brother-in-law. The precious days were wasted in diplomacy between them, and at last on the 5th of May Gustavus by treaty got possession of Spandau. He was promised Küstrin also, but, at the earnest solicitation of Saxony, George William evaded this part of the agreement. There were now two paths open to Gustavus for the relief of Magdeburg. The easier one by old Brandenburg and Moeckern, the more direct; the other by Wittenberg or the bridge of Dessau. On the former of these routes the land had just been eaten up by Tilly's troops; the latter that general had strongly fortified and guarded. On

hearing of the fall of Landsberg, Tilly had rapidly retired towards Magdeburg, and was now before the doomed city with twenty-six thousand men. He had laid waste everything behind him, and Gustavus had got nothing from the Elector of Brandenburg but the bare fortress of Spandau—no stores, no provisions, no money. On the other hand, if the King should try to free a passage at Wittenberg or Dessau, his way lay through the country of the Elector of Saxony, who had hitherto shewn himself almost an open enemy, yet who was not a person who could be treated as such. If the King got through without the consent of John George, Saxony and Brandenburg would be certain to rise in his rear. The third party in Germany might become a fact, and the whole fruit of Gustavus's conquests might be lost in a day. Could Magdeburg hold out but another three weeks he would have time to terrorise the Elector of Saxony into a treaty, as he had already terrorised the Elector of Brandenburg, and would drag him along with himself to the relief. That was his view of the dilemma. From this aspect it is useless to blame him for not forcing the passage at Wittenberg. How far he knew the actual condition of Magdeburg it is impossible to say. He must have known that it was in the gravest danger. But he also doubtless knew that Tilly was little inclined to risk his reputation on such an uncertain event as the storm of such a city; very likely he knew that Tilly was continually within an ace of raising the siege, and retreating to the Weser.

All his diplomatic efforts to move John George

proved in vain. The Elector even refused a personal meeting. Ten more precious days were wasted in this effort, and then the King resolved to employ terror. He prepared to advance towards Wittenberg, and his advanced guard were even upon Saxon soil, when the terrible news met them that Magdeburg was down.

Falkenberg had worked hard at the defence ever since the previous October, and had reported at the end of the year that the city now began to look something more like a fortress. The town council too was coming round to Falkenberg's views of the necessity of sparing no efforts. Christian William was a thorough nonentity and was completely passed over. The wonder was that Tilly did not attack earlier. Pappenheim indeed had appeared before the city in November, but from that time until March the number of troops that he could muster for the siege seems to have depended entirely on the demands of Tilly. Sometimes it was eight thousand, sometimes it was only two thousand. On the other hand, Falkenberg's garrison was but little over two thousand four hundred, and the townsmen were disgracefully slack and indifferent. Information of whatever Falkenberg did was promptly conveyed to the enemy by traitors and spies.

Magdeburg lies on the left bank of the Elbe, sheltered from the right bank by one small and two large islands. An outwork on the right bank, called, in remembrance of the failure of the general of Charles V. nearly a century before, "Trutz Kaiser," was connected with the suburbs by smaller outworks and the

islands themselves were strongly fortified. "Trutz Pappenheim" and "Trutz Tilly" were two sconces farther up the river on the right bank. There were also on the left bank redoubts all around the city itself. By the 30th of March all the *detached* outworks had been stormed, not without heavy loss to the little garrison. In the middle of April, Tilly returned for the last time with twenty-six thousand men. A last gleam of hope shone when it was announced that the Emperor had again recalled him for the defence of Silesia and Bohemia. But Tilly was the servant of the League as well as of the Emperor, and he refused to go. The last outwork on the right bank was stormed on April 19th. There remained only the islands, and they soon followed. Why did not Gustavus come?

He wrote continually and frankly, explaining his difficulties and urging steadfastness, but his messengers had much ado to get through. On the 24th all the suburbs were burnt by the inhabitants themselves. Tilly sent on the same day three separate summonses to the Council, to Christian William, and to Falkenberg. The Council asked leave to consult their brethren of the Hansa; the administrator returned a vague answer. Falkenberg simply said: "I hold out while I live." As daily news came to Tilly of Gustavus's advance, the determination to take the city, before he could arrive, hardened in him. He sent to destroy the bridge of Dessau and thus cut off one means of relief. On the 7th of May he began the bombardment of the city. From the islands and from the north side a perpetual hail of balls poured in for three




MAGDEBURG AT THE TIME OF THE SIEGE BY TILLY.


1. St. Michael's. 2. The Cathedral of St. Maurice. 3. St. Gangolph's. 4. St. Sebastian's. 5. St. Nicholas'. 6. Ch. of Our Lady. 7. St. Anna's. 8. Ch. of Holy Ghost. 9. St. Ulrich's.
 10. St. John's. 11. Rath House. 12. Barefoot Cloister. 13. St. Catharine's. 14. St. Mary Magdalene's. 15. Hunentower. 16. St. Peter's. 17. St. James'. 18. St. Augustine's. 19. High-
 gate Rath House. 21. St. Laurence's. 22. St. Peter and Paul's. 23. Sudenburg. 24. The New City. 25. Toll-Redoubt.

consecutive days, under cover of which mines and galleries were incessantly applied to sap the foundations. On the 8th the powder of the garrison began to fail, and Tilly demanded unconditional submission. The Council resolved to treat—to the despair of Falkenberg who still believed the place to be tenable. On the 9th Tilly drew back his cannons and ceased bombarding. He was hardly less irresolute than the Council itself. Finally the advice came *from within the city* to storm on the morning of the 10th, treaty or no treaty. The Council was sitting at 4 A.M. on that morning to consider a new message from Tilly when Falkenberg appeared, coming straight from the walls into the chamber, and represented to the Council that every day, every hour was of priceless value, that the King of Sweden was on his way. While he was trying to persuade them, a cry of “Pappenheim” resounded through the street. Tilly had not waited for the return of his trumpeter, who was actually in the Council-chamber, when the leading desperadoes of the Imperialists were over the walls. Falkenberg caught up his sword and hurried to the scene of action. His garrison fought desperately till he fell. The subsequent horrors of the two days’ sack have become a byword, and it is happily not our duty to look into them. At the end of that time twenty thousand people—I give the lowest computation; Sir T. Roe, the English diplomatist says forty thousand—had perished, and Magdeburg was in ashes.

The fall of Magdeburg was by far the most important event that had happened in the war since the battle of the White Mountain outside Prague; not

merely on account of the greatness of the city, although that in itself was a serious matter, for it was now manifest, from the history of the siege, that the proud commercial spirit of the German cities was a thing upon which reckoning could no longer be made; but far more, because it seemed for the moment as if the King of Sweden had come in vain. Loud and high were the accusations against him, raised by those who little understood the difficulties with which he had to contend. He seemed for the moment, to both sides, to be merely a new Christian of Denmark, who would now be only too glad to wriggle out of the war just as that monarch had done. The universal cry of joy raised in Catholic Germany, which, considering the odds against the city, was as ridiculous as it was indecent, and may be aptly compared with the one famous smile of King Philip II. of Spain, which he smiled on receiving the news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, was echoed back by a wail of terror from the opposite party, and even the imperturbable Wallenstein, on receipt of the news, is said to have hurled a piece of his table furniture at the head of the messenger with the words: "It is a lie!"





CHAPTER X.

THE CRITICAL TIME.

AND how did Gustavus receive the same news? Gustavus, who at once grasped its full meaning, saw that he must retreat. Tilly would probably press on with his victorious army, would compel the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg to join him, and would then cut off the Swedes from the sea. That his fears on the score of Brandenburg were not groundless was shewn by the demand instantly made by the Elector that he should restore the fortress of Spandau. It had been given simply for the purpose of the relief of Magdeburg. Now that that relief was no longer possible, why should the King retain it? The terms of the treaty had been that it should be restored within a month, if the relief of Magdeburg was effected by that time. Gustavus, utterly broken down by the apathy of the Protestant princes, resolved to restore it at the end of the appointed period, and to retreat to his bastion of Pomerania. He published a manifesto, in which he laid all the blame of the destruction of Magdeburg on the

Elector of Saxony, and before evacuating Spandau, sent a last message to George William.

But the situation gradually began to look more favourable. Nearly a month elapsed from the taking of Magdeburg, and Tilly still lay idle on the eastern frontier of Saxony. Pappenheim had complained bitterly of this inaction, and subsequently told the Emperor that they could have conquered the whole of Germany in fourteen days, if the generalissimo had not been so irresolute. Gustavus realised from this inaction that the cause was not yet lost. So he played his last and strongest card against his brother-in-law. "Unless," said he, "you confirm me in possession of Spandau, I will retire altogether from the war, and, leaving a strong garrison to hold Pomerania for the crown of Sweden, let you and your fellow Protestants defend yourself against Tilly as best you can." Even then the Elector, in some faint hope that Tilly would let him alone, returned an evasive answer, and talked about defending himself with the help of Saxony. Gustavus laughed aloud. "Then I am going," he said. On June 9th he withdrew his troops from Spandau, and left the fortress undefended. On his retreat he came past Berlin, and, whether in grim fun or in earnest, pointed his cannon against the palace. Out came the ladies of the Electoral family to implore the King of Sweden not to desert them—above all, to point those grinning iron mouths another way. The Elector would conclude the treaty—any treaty—rather than be left at the mercy of Tilly. "And the King answered merrily," says *Monro*, "that if the Duke (Elector) did

not conclude with him before night he would send the Duchess and all the Ladies prisoners to Sweden, and that the Duke should follow." On June 11th the treaty was concluded. Gustavus got possession of Spandau during the whole period of the war, free pass through Küstrin, and any other fortresses he might need, and a payment of thirty thousand dollars a month, besides the right of levying ample contributions for his army within the Electoral territories. On the part of George William there followed the usual excuses to the Emperor, which were received in the usual way. To John George he could only advise a course similar to his own.

Not that by this treaty Gustavus was in any better position to advance southwards. On the contrary, unless he could persuade Saxony to do the like and more, he would have to be content with maintaining himself on the Lower Oder. All the rest depended upon Tilly's coming. But Tilly never came. Tilly seemed wholly to have forgotten Gustavus's existence. After the sack of Magdeburg, he busied himself almost entirely with attempts to disarm the Protestants of central Germany, who had flattered themselves that they would be allowed to remain neutral. Thuringia occupied him a long while, especially Hesse Cassel, whose young Landgraf, having thrown himself heart and soul into Gustavus's cause was endeavouring to raise troops for him. Landgraf William resolved to ally himself with Saxe Weimar, and at least make a diversion in favour of the Swedes. Here again the extraordinary slowness of the Imperial commander was of the utmost advantage to Gustavus.

Before Tilly had taken a single important fortress of the Landgraf's, the King had completed his operations in the north, and had advanced to the Elbe. There is this to be said for Tilly, that, for a few weeks, after the fall of Magdeburg he had no idea what Gustavus was going to do. He was a very old man, and not at all of the temper to go and seek out the enemy wherever he might find him ; and his troops were probably almost as much demoralised by their success at Magdeburg as they could have been by any defeat. Whatever a fiery cavalry leader like Pappenheim might think, a general-in-chief ought to think first of the preservation of what he had got. It was an ungenerous view which most of his contemporaries took, that Tilly was always looking to his "reputation." The word is an Italian word, and had survived from the Condottiere wars of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Wallenstein's letters to Colalto and Arnim are full of expressions indicating "that his reputation is at stake," "that he will not risk his reputation," etc. But Wallenstein had much more of the Condottiere in him than Tilly, a fact of which Protestant pamphlets and squibs were not slow to lay hold.

If Tilly was slow, Furstenburg, Aldringer, and Gallas, who were bringing up the Italian army, were much slower ; it appears to have taken over a year for some of the regiments to march from the Mantovese to Thuringia.

The latter part of the month of June had been employed by Gustavus, despite many discouragements, in a third attempt to reinstate the Dukes of


Mecklenburg in possession of their duchy. The fruit of this was the surrender of Greifswald (the last fortress in Pomerania) on June 15th. This was the work of Åke Tott, a general of great worth, but some sluggishness, to whom the King throughout the rest of the war entrusted the leading position in Mecklenburg. The Dukes were now restored to everything with the exception of Rostock and Wismar. It cannot be said that they shewed much gratitude. Tott had the utmost difficulty in wringing contributions out of them, and Gustavus soon came to have small scruples about squeezing a reluctant German prince.

Meanwhile, Baner, who had been left behind in Brandenburg when the King returned to Pomerania, stormed Havelberg (close to the junction of the Elbe and the Havel), and fortified it for the King, June 12th. The last important garrison (with the exception of the two Mecklenburg ports just mentioned) north of the Elbe was thus cleared from the enemy, and that river naturally became the scene of the summer campaigns, Gustavus determined at the beginning of July to resume the offensive in this direction. Monro describes the march southwards by old Brandenburg, Barnow, and Tangermünde to the junction of the two rivers, and the formation of the camp of Werben. At Barnow he found the beer remarkably good; but not so good as some beer he had drunk at Soest, "a good Calvinist town, which brews liquor best for the body and clearest from all filth or barme, as their religion is best for the soul, and clearest from the dregs of superstition." At

Tangermünde they crossed the Elbe, and so northwards again to Werben, where Gustavus "did resolve to set down his leaguer, and spying a parcel of ground, the most commodious that could be had for situation and air, having first the commodity of transportation by water on the river of Haggie (Havel), running into the Elbe at the leaguer, he had also the whole country on the other side of the Elbe behind him as his friends." The camp was thus on the left bank of the larger river, and a bridge was made across both streams, in case of need for retreat. The town of Werben with its outworks formed the defence on one side; on the other a "long earthen dike made to hold the river off the land, which his Majesty made use of, dividing it by sconces and redoubts, which defended one another with flankering, heavy batteries and cannons set within them amongst the whole leaguer." Horse and all were quartered inside. Every brigade of foot had a definite post within the earthworks, and a brigade of horse in attendance on it in case the foot should be driven back. There were "voides for letting the troops in and out, with slawght bommes before them, where strong guards were kept for defending the passage." One almost fancies, in reading Monro's description, that one is listening to Captain Tobias Shandy, re-enacting with Corporal Trim the defence of Namur. Regular advanced posts lay continually outside to skirmish with an approaching foe.

The King had good reason to take every possible precaution, for Tilly was known to be at last advancing in force. The month of July, of which he spent

Vergleiche Abbildung des künftigen Schmiedischen Feldlagers bei Spiren an der Elbe Juni 1631
WERBEN C. K. CASTELL. AUCORVM



GUSTAVUS'S CAMP AT WERBEN

the greater part in this camp at Werben, with not more than 16,000 men, was without doubt the worst period for him of his whole sojourn in Germany, with the exception of the still more fatal August of the following year under the Alte Veste by Nuremberg. In the first place, he could not get supplies of money. Provisions indeed he had, but not without great difficulty ; not, indeed, as he bitterly complains in his letters to Oxenstiern, without having to wink more than once at the depredations of his soldiers. Pestilence stalked abroad in his camp ; Monro lost thirty soldiers in his own regiment alone. Hamilton's troops, which had landed at Peenemunde a little before, were withering away with disease and bad food before they could reach him. On the other hand, he received reinforcements of a few thousands from Sweden, and the Queen herself came over to Pomerania to be near her husband ; and he was now also joined by the young Landgraf of Hesse and Bernard of Weimar, "who were the first that did hazard with a private convoy to come to his Majesty through their enemies, and who were therefore joyfully received."

On July 22d, Tilly, who had 22,000 men, and who was continually receiving reinforcements from the Italian army, appeared in the neighbourhood of the camp. Gustavus called his staff officers into his tent and asked them whether they would fight or run away. No one spoke. Gustavus gave his voice for remaining. At the first attack, on the 23d, the Imperialists never fairly got up to the camp, but withdrew after a few hours' hot skirmishing outside. At the

second, a few days later, Tilly, who had intelligence that a traitor would spike the Swedish guns at a particular place,—a statement that either proved false or was discovered in time,—led his troops right up to the earthworks. The guns remained silent until he was within pistol-shot. Then they spoke, and with such effect (the Swedish horse at the same time pouring out and charging the Imperialists in flank,) that Tilly found himself obliged to retreat without further attempts. His total loss during these few days in killed and wounded amounted to 6,000 men.

And what was the Elector of Saxony doing? Ever since the fall of Magdeburg he had been gradually giving way to the conviction that he must do something. It was no doubt an extremely painful conviction for him to arrive at; but he began to levy troops. Arnim was the chief director of his conscience in the matter, and it is impossible to do more than guess at Arnim's reasons for his change of front. Probably, however, it was the feeling of the utter failure of the neutral position; the growing sense of isolation, now that Magdeburg was lost, and Brandenburg, Hesse, and Weimar had openly declared for Gustavus; above all, it was the change of tone of the Court of Vienna that produced the revolution in Saxon politics. Polyphemus was gradually swallowing all who had not contrived to escape out of the cave. For John George the way of escape was still open. But the monster was already stretching out his hands towards him. The Emperor was determined to enforce the Edict of Restitution. At


the end of May Tilly had already demanded that John George should hand over his bishoprics; all the Saxon embassies to the general and his master had proved equally vain. From Wollmirstädt at the end of July Tilly addressed an ultimatum to Saxony. The Elector must instantly open his territories to the Catholic army, and furnish it with quarters and provisions; must disband all his new levies, and join Tilly with the rest of his troops; must recognise the supreme authority of the Emperor, and use his influence with other princes for the same end. What would Saxony do? The future of Protestantism seemed to hang on his answer. He returned no answer, but he went on with his levies. Tilly therefore broke up from Wollmirstädt before the end of August and advanced into Saxony. A line of two hundred burning villages marked his path towards Leipzig.

Meanwhile Gustavus had not been idle. He laboured to support the insurrection, which broke out every now and then in Hesse and harassed Tilly's rear; he took his good old course of threatening to John George that he would withdraw from the war altogether and leave him to the tender mercies of Tilly; and on the 23d of August, when Tilly advanced towards Leipzig, Gustavus marched out of his camp at Werben, directing his forces straight upon Wittenberg, in full confidence that the good time had come. It had. On August 25th Tilly was at Halle, plundering and destroying on every side. On September 1st John George concluded a solemn treaty with Gustavus, wherein the King promised

him to stand by him to the last, and to drive the enemy from his lands ; and the Elector on his side swore to join his troops with the King's, and not to ask them back till the danger was past ; to conclude no peace without him, and to leave him the fullest direction of the war.



MINNESPINNING.



CHAPTER XI.

BREITENFELD.

HAT everything indeed hung in the balance, the pamphlets of the day on the Protestant side leave us assured. Droysen gives long extracts from some of them. The tone of all is that the war must be carried on offensively. Only one man has proved himself Tilly's equal—that man is the King of Sweden. To join hands with him and yet not to fight would be like giving a man, whom you wanted to keep alive, insufficient food; for an army lives by fighting.

Thus everything pointed to the necessity of striking a decisive blow. Gustavus was astonished at the eager way in which John George had thrown himself into his arms. He had at first only asked for Wittenberg, and for the Elector's son to serve in the Swedish army. The Elector had answered: "Not Wittenberg only, but my whole Electorate. Not my son only, but I myself also am at your service." Rage and resentment against the Emperor, who could so requite his faithful sluggishness, had wholly

taken possession of John George. Monro says: "He damned himself soule and body if ever he will forsake his majesty and his crowne, if then he will but help him to beate the enemy out of his country again." It was decided, therefore, that the Swedish troops should cross the Elbe at Wittenberg, and advance as far as Düben on the Mulde, where they should join the Saxons, who were to advance from Torgau to meet them. Then, united, they should offer battle to Tilly wherever he might be found. Monro's heart leaped at the thought of battle. It is curious to see the precedence which he gives to the various causes of the war. "I was longing to see a day," he says, "when I might hazard my life . . . for many reasons, but especially for the liberty of the daughter [sister] of our dread sovereign, the distressed Queen of Bohemia"; (Monro afterwards came to take a somewhat less enthusiastic view of his dread sovereign); "next for the liberty of our distressed brethren in Christ; and *thirdly* for my better instruction in the profession of arms which is my calling." And after the battle, he says: "Oh, would to God I had once such a leader again, to fight such another day in this old quarrell. And though I died standing, I should be persuaded I died well."

It appears that the number of men that Gustavus could have put into the field had now reached, including the reinforcements from Sweden brought up from the north by Gustavus Horn, and the German troops which were beginning to come in from Hesse, the respectable total of 27,650, of

whom 7,500 were cavalry. The exact strength of the Saxons is not ascertained ; the numbers given vary from 16,000 to 20,000. Tilly, who had redoubled his plunderings and burnings on the news of the treaty, could not put together more than 32,000. According to a list in the archives at Stockholm, 26,800 Swedes were actually present at the battle of Breitenfeld.

Tilly was thus much stronger than when he had attacked the camp of Gustavus at Werben. The difference is to be accounted for by the reinforcements which Furstenburg had brought up from Italy. He had good hope also that Tiefenbach, one of Wallenstein's former lieutenants, who was in Bohemia and Silesia in command of an army that was rapidly growing formidable, as being strengthened by Ferdinand for the defence of the hereditary countries, might be able to send reinforcements from thence, which would suffice to overwhelm the allies. Aldringer was also on his march from the south, with the last detachments of the Italian army, and was now at Jena, not more than five days' march from Leipzig. It was not, however, numbers that were to decide the day. So well did Gustavus know this, that he even, on second thoughts, sent back Tott, whom, with 4,000 men, he had called up from Mecklenburg to his post in the north a few days before the battle.

It seems to have been undoubtedly a blunder on Tilly's part that he did not possess himself of the passage of Wittenberg, as he had done on a previous occasion when he dreaded the advance of the

Swedish king. It would not have been difficult in fact, for him so effectually to guard the whole line of the Elbe, that the junction between the Swedes and Saxons might have been prevented; and as Gustavus would probably have hesitated, before such a junction, to try and force the passage, Tilly might have disarmed the Saxon troops at his leisure. Instead of that he had marched by Eisleben towards Leipzig, and the union of the allies took place unhindered at Düben, on September 5th. "The Saxons were well mounted," says the King, "and fine fellows to look at." What followed we had better let Gustavus tell himself:

"The Elector ranged his army in battalions, and signified that he would come and salute me if I pleased. I took therefore a fair squadron of cavalry and rode a little way to meet him. My brother-in-law, of Brandenburg, was with him. We rode round the Saxon troops together and then to our infantry, and then I took the two Electors with me to my tent. We held a consultation as to whether we should attack the enemy or endeavour to wear him out by diversions only. I advanced my reasons for the latter—the Elector was for the former, because that it was the only way to get the enemy out of his territories. . . . At last we resolved to go united against Leipzig under the eyes of the enemy, and offer him battle. We had news that he had taken Leipzig by accord, and that his light cavalry were quartered in the villages almost up to our own position."

Monro, too, describes the Saxon officers as looking

“as if they were going in their best apparel and arms to be painted . . .” whereas the Swedes, “having lyen overnight on a parcell of plowd ground they were so dusty, they looked out like kitchen servants.”

Tilly meanwhile had advanced to Leipzig, and threatened it with the fate of Magdeburg if it did not yield. There was a feeble garrison of Saxons inside, and the town was nearly indefensible from a military point of view. But the inhabitants burnt the suburbs and prepared for a seige. On September 4th the bombardment began. On the 6th the townsmen sent to offer Tilly a large sum in ransom, and then capitulated upon condition that the Protestant religion should not be suppressed, the privileges of the town or the prerogatives of the Elector of Saxony interfered with, and that the garrison should be allowed to march out with the honours of war. Tilly threw a garrison of 3,000 men into the city and determined to await the attack of the Swedes and Saxons with his back to its walls.

In the councils of the Catholic camp there was even more hesitation about risking a decisive stroke than in the Protestant. Tilly was himself seventy years old, and had the reputation of never having lost a great battle. His experience at Werben must have given him an uneasy feeling, that he might now be on the point of breaking his fair record. He had won nearly all his previous laurels by waiting for the favourable moment when he should be greatly superior in numbers. He knew now that the contrary was the case. Therefore his idea seems to

have been to remain entrenched under the walls of Leipzig, much as Gustavus had remained at Werben, till Aldringer could bring him reinforcements from Erfurt and Jena, and Tiefenbach from Silesia. But the younger leaders, and, above all, Pappenheim, whom Tilly well knew to have got the ear of the Emperor, were burning for a fight. It was their rashness in council, as afterwards on the field, that lost the day. Schaumburg alone was of Tilly's mind, and it was therefore finally decided not to await the attack under the city, but to advance about an hour and a half northwards. Tilly comforted himself with the reflection, that, if it came to a question of retreat, it would be better to secure a retreat towards Halle, than to be shut up *after* a beating within the walls of Leipzig.

To continue the King of Sweden's narrative of the events leading to the battle: "On the 6th we went in early twilight through Düben, and towards evening reached the village of Wolkau, within 1½ [7 English] miles from Leipzig, where we rested the night.* On the 7th, as soon as the sky began to grey, I gave the order for the trumpets to blow for the advance, and, because between us and Leipzig there was no wood, but only great flat fields, I drew out my army in full battle array and marched towards the city. The march lasted a short hour and a half, when we came in sight of the advanced guard of the enemy with his artillery on a hill, and behind it the whole mass of his army."

* Gustavus slept in his travelling-coach, and Johan Banér and Gustavus Horn with him.

The plain of Leipzig, which was one hundred and eighty-one years later to be the scene of a not less decisive nor less important victory of a good cause over a bad one, is a wide extent of arable and pasture land to the north of the city, with here and there a small village, here and there a small grove of trees, to break the horizon. A little brook, the Loberbach, trickles across it between some rather swampy meadows, and crosses the road from Düben to the city, a little to the north of the place where the armies were actually engaged. A gentle slope from both sides rises towards the middle of the plain, on the top of which Tilly had erected some sort of a battery for his artillery. Towards this spot the Imperialists directed their march early on the morning of the 7th. A lovely September morning with a bright sun and a sharp wind at their back, seemed to promise them no inconsiderable advantages to start with. They marched past the villages of great and little Widenitsch, leaving Breitenfeld itself a little to the left (west), and established their long line of battle on the gentle hill on which the battery had been erected. Their line reached nearly from Breitenfeld to Seehausen. In front of them lay the village of Podelwitz on the left, Göbschelwitz on the right. Between these four "dorps" would be the decisive point. It is a curious thing that no one quite knows whether Tilly drew up his army in one line or two: there has been at least a lively controversy between historians on the subject. Herr Martin Weibull, the latest Swedish historian of Gustavus, whose admirable description of the battle I have endeavoured

to follow throughout, does not touch upon the question, but in making no mention of a second line, he may be considered to agree with the majority of critics and assign to Tilly only one. On the other hand a French writer of great authority, General Grimoard, maintains * (following Gualdo Priorato and his commentators, Colonel Staunfort and Heillman, "Das Kriegswesen der Kaiserlichen und Schweden"), that all the battles of the day were fought with two lines, and that Tilly would never have committed such a glaring error. But on the other hand we have (1) the fact that no single account of the battle mentions two lines with the exception of Gualdo, who is a bad authority, and (2) the fact that none of the contemporary plans or pictures, confusing though they often are, show more than one long extended line; (3) lastly the great extent lengthwise, which we know the battalia of Tilly to have covered, together with our knowledge of the great depth and solidity of the Imperialist squares, utterly precludes the existence of a second line.

We are now in a position to examine the actual formation of the two armies. Tilly placed all his cavalry on the two wings, and no doubt intended to execute his favourite manœuvre of altogether outflanking his foes by the much greater length of his line. The cavalry were drawn up in huge squadrons, Pappenheim with his black cuirassiers on the left, Furstenburg on the right, with the horse newly returned from Italy. In the centre the old general

* His opinion to this effect is quoted by the editors of the "Précis des Campagnes de Gustave Adolphe." Brussels, 1887.

took his own place, on his well-known white horse, in old-fashioned Walloon dress, among his old-fashioned heavy-armed Walloon troops. They were the best regiments he had. There were men there who had followed him in every battle for the last twenty years. There were very likely men who had helped Spinola to harry the Palatinate and to take Breda; there may have been men who had served under Parma, and stood firm in their rocky squares against charges led by the white plume of Navarre. When their "Father," as they called Tilly, rode to the front of their line, they raised a cry of joy and greeting. Tilly's artillery, as we have seen, had been ranged on the low height. His heavy cannons were placed between the right wing and the centre. His light cannons were in front of the centre itself. Unfortunately it is impossible to say exactly how many cannons he had; it seems probable, however, from the description of the battle and of the great havoc at first wrought by the Imperialist cannonade that he had more than twenty-six, which is the number usually given. Certainly he was immensely inferior in this arm to Gustavus, who, counting the Saxon contribution, had nearly a hundred pieces, and of these the Swedish were sure to be admirably served.

The order of the allies was as follows: to the furthest left, with the road to Düben between it and the Swedes, lay the Saxon army under Arnim and the Elector in person. ("I was not particularly inquisitive of the manner of their formation," says Monro scornfully.) In touch with the Saxon right, the Swedish LEFT WING under Horn, the field mar-

shal, and second in command. Between each division of cavalry in the first line was a squad of 200 musketeers; in the second line cavalry only [?]. On the RIGHT WING cavalry under the King himself and J. Banèr. In the first line the East Gothland regiment, the Småland regiment, the West Gothland, and two regiments of Finnish cavalry (Stål-hanske's Finns were among the finest of all the King's troops). Musketeers were interspersed similarly to those on the left wing. In the reserve of the first line (*i. e.*, between the two lines) one regiment of cavalry. In the second line four cavalry regiments. CENTRE: the foot under Teuffel and Hall; four half battalions in the first line, a cavalry regiment, and two divisions of the Scots foot under Monro and Ramsay in reserve between the lines; in the second line three brigades of infantry, respectively under Vitzthum (the German brigade), Hepburn (the Scots brigade), and Thurn. A final reserve of cavalry besides, behind the second line of the centre. The ARTILLERY under Torstenson lay a little to the left of the centre, with the exception of the light regimental pieces, which were in front of each regiment. There was also a small reserve of artillery, the first known instance of such a thing, in the extreme rear.

It was in the method of composing the infantry squares, however, that the greatest difference, as I have already pointed out in a previous chapter, appeared between the two armies. The deep oblongs of the Spanish pattern, with the pikemen ten files deep, and fifty along the front, and the musketeers at the four corners were "like square castles

with bulwarks at each corner." Gustavus, on the contrary, ranged his infantry in brigades, or half brigades, each divided into small oblongs, the largest of which was little over two hundred.

In this way the musketeers were covered by the pikemen, and could file out between the ranks of the latter, deliver their volley, and retire. Thus instead of an immovable square castle, says an old writer, "each brigade was like a little moveable fortress with its curtains and ravelins, and each part would be able to come to the assistance of the other."

"The whole army," says Monro, "did get green branches on their heads, and the word was given, 'God with us'; a little short speech made by his Majesty, we marched towards the enemy." Tradition has it that it was in this speech that Gustavus told his musketeers not to fire till they could see the whites of the enemies' eyes. "We tried," says the King (to continue the letter above quoted), "to get the better of the advantages of sun and wind, which the enemy had, and which drove dust in our faces, but in vain: we had some awkward ground to cross in full view of him, and we therefore drew up our battle . . . and advanced in that shape steadily towards the foe, who began to pound us with his cannons . . . so that he had fired three salvos before our men were in readiness."

"Tattered and torn and dirty," says an eye-witness quoted by Wiebull, "looked our people compared with the besilvered and begilded and beplumed Imperialists. Our Swedish horses were but small compared to the gigantic German chargers: our

Swedish peasant lads made a poor show alongside of the handsome troops of Tilly." The King himself was no splendid dresser: to-day he wore his usual buff coat, and no breastplate nor helmet, only a grey hat with a green feather. The only fault that could be found with his appearance was that he was rapidly getting fat!—a fault that even his most ardent admirers have been unable to conceal. From mid-day till half-past two the cannonade went on on both sides, and indeed "during the whole battle," says the King, "and naturally did great execution. Ours answered theirs with *three shots for one*." About that time Pappenheim could stand it no longer; with the fury of a Rupert, he and his whole five thousand picked cuirassiers hurled themselves upon the extreme left wing of the Swedes. When Tilly saw it he is said to have thrown up his hands and exclaimed: "The fellows have robbed me of my honour and glory, and the Emperor of his empire and his people." It was indeed a grave error, and Pappenheim made it worse: in his anxiety to come completely down the wind upon the Swedes, he swept round so far to the left that he lost touch with the rest of his army. Worse than all, the charge was not successful. He got fearful volleys from the "commanded musketeers" who lay between Stålhanske's Finns and the East Gothland men, and between each salvo these splendid troops charged out upon their charging foe. Pappenheim swept round their front towards the rear. Out darted Johan Baner with the reserve of the first line, and hurled a fresh cavalry regiment upon Pappenheim's already reeling horse-

men. In the desperate hand-to-hand fight that ensued all along the right wing of the Swedes, the finest cavalry in the Imperial service was, after seven heroic charges, completely broken ; those who escaped fled in the direction of Halle. Gustavus knew what he was about well enough to check the pursuit in time. There would be more work for that right wing yet. Tilly, seeing that Pappenheim must be supported if possible, had thrown forward an infantry regiment, under the Duke of Holstein, towards the same place. It was cut to pieces and the Duke killed.

Very different had been the fate of the battle on the Swedish left. Furstenburg, when he saw that Pappenheim had charged, charged too—upon the unhappy Saxons. “The Saxon cavalry,” says the King, “and their artillery-men held themselves bravely at first, but after their best gunners were shot, the rest began to fly and left their cannons. The Saxon infantry did no better ; it ran away by companies, and spread the report that we were beaten and all was lost, which terrified our baggage train, which also ran away as far as Düben. . . . The Elector, who had remained in the rear, ran away with his whole life guard and never stopped till he got to Eilenburg.” Furstenburg followed hard after, and Monro tells us that the Saxons lost more men in their flight than the Swedes lost in the battle. Tilly, seeing the attacks of his two wings, and hoping to improve that on the right into a complete victory, as the Swedish left wing would now be uncovered, being moreover unable to stand longer the fearful accuracy of Torstenson’s artillery fire, advanced in good order

with his whole centre, in the same direction as Furstenburg. Horn was indeed in the greatest danger; all might yet have been lost. Had Tilly thrown himself straight upon Horn, probably it would have gone very hard with the latter. But to do so would be to get between Horn and his own artillery. He therefore followed up Furstenburg, as if going after the Saxons, so as to take Horn in flank; and Horn had time to wheel right round, and, while lining the ditches on the Düben road with musketeers, to present a wholly new front to the enemy. Meanwhile the King sent to his help Vitzthum's and Hepburn's brigades from the reserve of the centre, and, *right across the battle from the right wing*, he sent the West Gothland cavalry. The rest of the victorious right he gathered himself, and, charging Tilly furiously in the rear with the gallant Smålanders, East Gothlanders, and Finns, captured his artillery, and turned it against its master. There in front of the Swedish left, hemmed in between two divisions of the foe, the gallant representatives of the old warfare turned to bay. Every moment the gaps in their lines became wider, and at last they began to give way. Those who could, and who had a mind to live, cut their way through the foe and fled to Merseburg or to Halle. But four regiments of Walloons, having retreated towards the edge of a small wood, made there a desperate stand. There were seen old soldiers, says the "Soldat Suédois," who could no longer stand, fighting on their knees, like Widdrington in "Chevy Chase":

" For when his legs were hewn away
He kneeled and fought on his stumps."

But when the sun was already down, and the autumn mist lay thick on the field, these veterans, reduced to some 600, formed one last iron ring around their leader, and bore him from the field. The old man had three shots in his body. "How many of the enemy were left dead," says the King of Sweden, "it is impossible to say . . ." (the usual number given is 7,000-10,000)* "all the artillery, 106 standards, the whole plunder of the camp is ours. We have so many prisoners that we shall not only be able to fill up the gaps in our old regiments, but to even create new ones out of them" (this curiously illustrates the principles upon which Captain Dalgetty and his kind were wont to take service). The Swedes lost Teuffel, Hall, and Damitz, with about 2,100 men in all. "Though such a loss is profoundly to be regretted, yet this victory, on which the *summa rei* may be said to have turned, is so decisive that we have every reason to thank God, who has mercifully protected us in danger so imminent, as we never were in before." This long letter, from which so many extracts have been given, is dated September 10th.

The battle of Breitenfeld was an epoch in war, and it was an epoch in history. It was an epoch in war, because first in it was displayed on a great scale the superiority of mobility over weight. It was an epoch in history, because it broke the force upon which the revived Catholicism had relied for the extension of its empire over Europe. The failure before Stral-

* The peasants killed some thousands more as they fled towards Leipzig, Merseburg, and Halle.


sund had reminded the Emperor that there *was* a limit to his power; the battle of Breitenfeld fixed that limit, and won Northern Germany for the cause of freedom and the Gospel. "Germany might tear herself and be torn to pieces for yet another half-generation, but the actual result of the Thirty-Years' War was as good as achieved."

Monro, whose account of the battle itself, in which he played a gallant part in the Scots Brigade, I confess to be somewhat confusing, tells us that "His Majesty did under God principally ascribe the glory of the victory to the Swedes and Fynnes horsemen . . . for though the Dutch (German) horsemen did behave themselves valorously divers times that day, yet it was not their fortune to have done the charge which did put the enemy to flight, and though there were some brave briggads of Swedes and Dutch (foot) in the field, yet it was the Scots briggad's fortune to have gotten the praise of the foote service." In fact only the horse and three brigades of infantry had been engaged at all. The Saxons had contributed their share, and that no small one, to the victory, in running away as fast as they did, for it tempted the right wing of the Imperialists to pursue them so far that they returned too late to turn the fortune of the day.

"We encamped," says Monro, "upon the place of bataille, the living merry and rejoicing, though without drinke at the night wake of their dead camerades and friends, lying there on the ground in the bed of honour. . . . Our bone-fiers were made of the enemies' ammunition waggon, and of pikes

left for want of good fellows to use them, and all this night our brave camerades the Saxons were making use of their heels in flying ; thinking all was lost, they made booty of our waggons and goods, too good a recompense for cullions that had left their Duke [?], betrayed their country, and the good cause, whenas strangers were hazarding their lives for their freedom."





CHAPTER XII.

FORWARDS.

ONCE more the two paths stood open to the King of Sweden—the path of gain and the path of honour. Once more he proved of what stuff he was made by choosing the latter.

A day or two after the fight at Breitenfeld a council of war for the decision of the next step to be taken was held at Halle, whither the Swedes had advanced. Gustavus Horn now urged from a purely military point of view the same thing that Oxenstiern, speaking wholly as a statesman, afterwards sketched out as the proper course for the King to take—namely, an immediate march upon Vienna. Everything seemed in favour of such a march. Tiefenbach had in Silesia not more than 10,000 men, and these much demoralised. A march to Vienna would enable Sweden to dictate peace on her own terms. The Elector of Saxony, who was present at this council, spoke urgently to the same effect, and boasted that he would put the crown of the Empire upon the head of his ally. "Let me," said he, "un-

dertake the relief of my oppressed brethren in South-western Germany, while you seek out the eagle in his eyrie."

Exactly opposed to this was the King's own decision. In the first place, he was anxious to make Saxony's quarrel with the Emperor a desperate one. He wanted to leave no chance for a reconciliation between them, and no chance for the birth of the unborn third party in Germany. Now, if John George were to go southwestwards with the slippery Arnim at his ear, what more likely than that the moderates—the "politiques," to use an old French civil-war word—should unite under him, to expel from Germany both Swedish and Spanish influence. They might for a time get strong enough to make head against both. Tilly would probably be won over; he was already *grudeling* at the small amount of support he received from Vienna. What more likely, then, than that this new party would stretch out its hands to the weak Elector of Brandenburg, whose alliance would be all that would be needed to cut off the Swedes from the sea. If a single disaster befell the Swedish army in the intricate and mountainous march through Bohemia, that was what would almost certainly happen. And another idea was no doubt present to the King's mind. If he knew John George, he also was not without experience of the Emperor. Let Vienna be taken—what then? That man of iron will, over whom the great wooden Christ above the altar had bent its head in blessing, while a heavenly voice said, "Ferdinand, I will not forsake thee," was not likely to yield a step, though Vienna should

be as Magdeburg. Vienna was then even less than in 1806 the capital of Austria. Yet even in 1806 Austria was not conquered when Vienna fell into the hands of Napoleon. Ferdinand would simply retire inch by inch to the wild country on the edge of the Adriatic, and Gustavus was no selfish daredevil who would risk his army in following his enemy to such a lair as that. Had his object merely been to make a good peace for Sweden, a direct attack upon the hereditary countries would very likely have surprised Ferdinand into granting him investiture of Pomerania; this was no doubt why Oxenstiern, to whom that "bastion" was the whole object of the war, told the King plainly, when he met him in Mainz, that he "would rather have offered him his congratulations in Vienna."

But—and here lies the *nœud* of the whole matter—the King's aims were far other than this. Such a course certainly would not have got the Edict of Restitution withdrawn. Such a course would have left the Protestants of the south and west, and even of the north too, just as much at the mercy of the Catholics as before. Nothing proves more conclusively than this noble decision of Gustavus's what thought was ever uppermost in his mind. Even now there was a small congress of Protestant powers sitting in Frankfort-on-the-Main who sent prayers to him to come and deliver them. Tilly might at any moment gather a fresh army for the defence of the territories of the League; he would squeeze the last penny out of Augsburg and Nuremberg, and if they resisted, the fate of Magdeburg would await them.

That must at all costs be prevented. That corner of Germany which lies between the Main and the Danube and the Rhine teemed with small Protestant states, and, above all, with rich Imperial cities, also mostly Protestant or which had been Protestant before the recent persecution had been applied. There was Donauwörth, one of the earlier causes of the war. A little to the north lay its last and greatest cause—the Palatinate, all in the hands of the oppressor. Between Gustavus and these territories, crying out for liberation, there lay the richest lands of Germany—the richest and also the least defensible. The great Abbey of Fulda, the Bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg, which lay all down the lovely valley of the Main, were connected with the Rheingau by the Electorate of Mainz, and that again with the two northern Rhenish Electorates. This country had obtained the name of the “Pfaffen-gasse,” that is to say, the “Priests’ Alley.” What territory could be more fitting for Gustavus to winter his troops in than that of these deadly enemies of the faith? He had been long enough living upon the black bread and beer of his friends; he would now give his soldiers a taste of the wheaten loaves and wine of their foes. And lastly, what territories could possibly be better than the Priests’ Alley to hold as a pledge, to be restored to the Catholics only in the event of a satisfactory general peace?

These were the reasons of his decision to lead his army into Franconia immediately after his victory at Leipzig. That he was right there cannot be the slightest doubt. For him too

“The path of duty was the way to glory.”

Geijer quotes from one of the orations made at the University of Upsala on the two hundredth anniversary of the King's death some words which seem very clearly to prove this. "After the hero's death where was it that Oxenstiern found his best support? Where was it that he organised the Protestant League? Not in the north, but in the south of Germany; not among the strong powers, but among the weak; not with Brandenburg and Saxony, but with the small princes, the small Imperial nobility, the inhabitants of the free Imperial cities, who, surrounded as they were in those lands with Catholics, had experienced the greatest oppression, and therefore rejoiced most over their deliverance. It was their joy that made his road from the field of Leipzig one long triumph; it was their thankfulness that over his bloody corpse knit the bond with Sweden. It would not have been knit at all had his banners never waved over them."

It was decided therefore that Saxony—much against its will—should take the eastward road, while Sweden took the westward. As for the incapacity of the Elector, Gustavus did not dread that very much. He did not want him, as is generally believed, to advance at once into Bohemia, but only into Silesia. For the further campaign on the east, Gustavus had, as we shall see presently, quite another plan and quite another leader than John George in his mind. Meanwhile it must be remarked that, in taking the path he did, the King of Sweden took the wrong turning to please Richelieu. Richelieu, as we know, looked upon the south-west of

Germany as peculiarly the province of French diplomacy. In his memoirs he bitterly complains that the King of Sweden did not know how to use his victory at Breitenfeld, which he should have improved by at once advancing against Austria. Louis XIII. had little inclination to see this "Goth," as he called Gustavus, stamping about so near the French frontier as the line of the Main. The gaze of the great French statesman was already towards the Rhine. But it speaks volumes for his singleness of purpose and his clear vision that he did not let this jealousy of Gustavus, who treated his complaints somewhat scornfully, interfere with the payment of the French subsidies. Even when the King of Sweden was over the Rhine, Richelieu knew that he must be supported at all costs.

The battle of Breitenfeld had one great effect in Europe ; it made Gustavus the hero of Protestantism. An epigram, engraved on a half-length portrait of him that was struck at this time, is quoted by Droysen :

"Here, Germans, you can see the kingly form
Of him who hath delivered you from harm,
Half drawn : if on the whole ye seek to gaze
Look through the world, the world his fame displays."

A medal struck at the same period shews on one side the King's portrait, with the inscription :

"Ensem Gradivus, sceptrum Themis ipsa gubernat ;
(Mars guides his sword, Justice his sceptre sways ;)"

and on the reverse a cross, with "in hoc signo vinces," and a long inscription to the same effect in German.

From that time the name by which Captain Dalgerty always named him, "The Lion of the North and the Bulwark of the Protestant Faith," was in every man's mouth.

Ferdinand received the news of Breitenfeld with the simple order to raise more troops, and to send forward every thing that could be spared for the reinforcement of Tilly. He was not the man to give way while a foot of land remained or a single brigade upheld the Imperial banner. On the other hand, Maximilian of Bavaria, equally with Ferdinand the pupil of the Jesuits, either lacked that indomitable confidence in the righteousness of the cause which upheld his Emperor, or else trembled so much for his own country that he constantly sent to Tilly contradictory orders, and prevented that general from retrieving his defeat. For the strange thing is that Tilly, with extraordinary rapidity, recovered his strength. He had fled by Halle to Halberstadt, where he was rejoined by Pappenheim, and from thence they retired on the Weser, gathering up their scattered forces, together with new recruits, which were never wanting at this period in Germany (for "he whose house is burnt," says the proverb, "must become a soldier")—even from these Protestant regions. From Corvey, on the Weser, he advanced to Fritzlar, where he was joined by Colonel Fugger with other ten thousand men, and soon after by Aldringer with eight thousand, the last instalment of the Italian army before mentioned. His idea was to draw Gustavus after him, and so turn him aside from the Catholic states. Gustavus would like to have

beaten Tilly again; he said he would pursue the "Little Corporal" to the end of the world, but the deliverance of South-west Germany and good winter quarters for his army were just at that moment more important.

The King was by no means sure that he should get beyond Thuringia before the spring, and his first plan, as communicated to Oxenstiern, whom he sent for to attend him in the weighty diplomatic business which would necessarily follow his advance, was to make his winter quarters in that district. He soon, however, found that so little opposition was offered, that it would be better to push on at once to Franconia. He had with him about 26,000 men when he quitted Halle, on September 17th. Before he left there the first fruits of his victory appeared in a regular alliance with the princes of the House of Anhalt, who gave him a monthly contribution and promised free quarters if he should pass through their territory. From Halle he marched straight to Erfurt, which surrendered on the 22d. It had been a Protestant city, but belonged to the Elector of Mainz, the Primate of Catholic Germany. The career of the Liberator was begun. There, too, was concluded the final alliance with the Dukes of Weimar, the eldest of whom, William, agreed to raise an army for the King in his own territories, while the second, Bernard, had already taken service under the Swedish banner and was destined one day to avenge his leader's fall at the battle of Lützen. The Landgraf of Hesse was equally zealous, and was raising a good force further to the west.

In the last days of September the royal army was led in two columns, partly by night with torches blazing, through the Thuringian forest. The two columns rejoined each other before the fortress of Königshofen, the key of Franconia, within the territories of the Prince-Bishop of Würzburg. Torsenson's guns had but to pound one of the towers, and the fortress surrendered. A regular *sauve-qui-peut* set in all along the Priests' Alley. The Prince-Bishop sent all his valuables to the impregnable stronghold of Marienburg, just opposite Würzburg, and took flight himself to the Danube. It was a general flight, not unlike that which took place over the same country in 1792, when the French, under Custine, burst into the Ecclesiastical Electorates. But Gustavus was no wolf in sheep's clothing, proclaiming, as Custine did, war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and then plundering palace and cottage alike with the greatest indifference. He came not to overthrow but to restore. He treated the Catholic inhabitants with the greatest kindness; no instance of violence against ecclesiastics is reported, with the exception of some monks who were killed at the subsequent storm of the Marienburg, and a few Jesuits who had got mixed with the soldiers who fled from Donauwörth. The King levied no heavier contributions on these countries than they had up to that time paid to the army of the League. Only everywhere the property of the Jesuits, whom he regarded as *hostes humani generis* was confiscated, and in all places where Protestant worship had ever existed it was at once restored; the Catholic priests

were turned out of the churches and the revenues that they had appropriated ; and Protestants—whether Calvinists or Lutherans, for he shewed himself, as Monro bears witness, nobly tolerant in this matter—were restored. Even to the Jesuits perfect security from violence was expressly promised, and the promise was kept. In this he did of course no more than his duty, but I think it is not exaggerating to say that it was a marvellous thing to have done in that year 1631.

As for the governments, that was another thing—Gustavus was not in any way bound to spare them. What he intended to do in the future with his conquests seems quite uncertain : for the present he possessed himself of all the resources of the Catholic governments, whether of towns or bishoprics ; made the population take an oath to the crown of Sweden, furnish him with ample supplies, and swear to hold no correspondence with the enemy. In each place to which he came he left a trusty governor and a garrison ; the Protestants for the most part agreeing further to raise troops for the cause.

Not universally however. The Imperial cities in particular were anxious to remain neutral, especially the greater ones, like Nuremberg and Frankfort, whose existence depended on commerce, and who could perhaps afford to buy off Tilly with a round sum of money. But of neutrality, Gustavus would not hear. From Königshofen he issued a proclamation to all the Protestant states of the south : “ Up for the Gospel, those of you who believe in it, or it will be the worse for you ! I shall treat neutrality as

equivalent to a declaration of war against me." It was a rough medicine, but Germany needed it. Schweinfurt, a little Protestant city-island in the middle of the bishopric of Würzburg, received its deliverer with open arms, and from thence he passed due south, and appeared on the 3d of October before Würzburg the capital of Franconia. The town itself was capable of but a slight defence; the garrison of 1,500 men had therefore crossed the river to the before-mentioned fortress of Marienburg and had broken down the bridge behind them. It was to a detachment of the Scots and to Colonel Axel Lilly's regiment that the honour of leading the storm of this fortress was accorded; and it was one of the boldest deeds of the whole war. All the approaches had to be made, and the bridge to be repaired under a shower of musket- and cannon-balls from the rock; the gate had to be burst open with a petard. But it was done, with fearful loss considering the shortness of the time—two days,—and the garrison after a stout resistance were put to the sword. There, too, in the heat of the conflict, were slain the monks already mentioned, a bloody deed, for which no excuse can be made. The riches taken were enormous, for half Franconia had deposited its treasures in this fortress, over which the Virgin was believed to extend a special protection. The northern peasants had seen with their eyes and tasted with their lips the riches of the south. "Our Finnish boys," says Salvius, the diplomatist, "make rich wine soup in their helmets; they will hardly care to go back to their savolax again." The cathedral library of

Würzburg, which was part of the spoil of the storm, was sent to Upsala, a reprisal indeed for the previous sending of the far more precious library of Heidelberg to the Vatican, but a bad precedent; later on in the war the Swedish commanders got into the habit of sending home everything precious upon which they laid their hands. Even Gustavus made a present of the library of Mainz to Oxenstiern, and the result was that the ship which carried it foundered in the Baltic.

A whole month the Swedish army rested at Würzburg, while detachments were employed to take in the small surrounding places, which were either abandoned by their feeble garrisons or stormed without difficulty. The Bishop of Bamberg alone was clever enough to outwit the King. He kept on negotiating, in the hope of the advance of Tilly to his rescue, until Gustavus turned his arms in another direction. Tilly meanwhile would willingly have led his troops into Franconia. The Duke of Lorraine, ever a free lance in the politics of Europe, one of whom it might be said, as it was of Savoy, that "his geographical position was the measure of his honesty," reinforced the Imperialists with 12,000 men; Tilly was thus again at the head of an army 40,000 strong, larger by several thousands than that he had led at Breitenfeld. But they were not the same men—the flower of his troops had fallen on that field; and Maximilian was so well aware of this, and in such a state of trepidation for Bavaria that he sent positive orders to Tilly not to risk a battle. Tilly, who in his professional ardour eagerly longed

to retrieve his laurels, was bitterly vexed; and Pappenheim in a rage left the army and retired to raise new forces of a more independent character on the Weser; but Maximilian was now to all intents and purposes the League itself; most of the other members were either "groaning under the oppression of the Antichrist from the North," or in such a state of fear before the said Antichrist, that they dared not send a penny nor a recruit to Tilly. Even from his own point of view Maximilian here acted, I think, a mean part, unworthy of the rest of his career, which contains much that is worthy of our admiration. He kept moving Tilly and his army about from Franconia to Westphalia, and Westphalia again to Bavaria, while his enemy got free hand to strengthen himself on the Main and the Rhine. There were, as was natural, some smart skirmishes between the armies during the last three months of the year; for instance, the Swedish general, Baudissin (whom *Monro* calls *BAWTISH*), surprised and took prisoners four thousand Lorrainers about the middle of October, a little to the south of Asschaffenburg, and soon after the King himself destroyed four Imperial regiments in the neighbourhood of Wertheim. But on the whole the Swedes took possession of Franconia more with the spade and shovel than with the sword.

Not that the King was by any means at his ease on the subject of Tilly. His army was decidedly inferior in numbers; the Catholic population if cowed was by no means friendly, and the attitude of France seemed to him uncertain. "I never did see," says *Monro*, "his Majesty so much troubled in mind and

resolution as at this time, not knowing well himself what to resolve, the enemy being behind him and before him; able to pursue Würzburg and Oxenford" (Ochsenfurt, one of the small Main fortresses taken by Gustavus) "alike: and to my mind if he had, he might have carried both at that time, for our army was not only scattered and dispersed but also we were weak, and, which was worse, we were all of us discontented; being too much toyled with marching, watching, and working without any pay or gaines for honest men." That this last piece of information was not merely a grumble from our worthy Scot, we have evidence from the fact that the King was compelled to coin base money at this very time, though he took good care that it should not spread to Sweden. There were probably large arrears owing, for we find Monro telling us a little further on that the King "gave them some moneys in hand, and, to content them, hand-writ with assignations for more moneys to be paid unto them out of Nuremberg within six months afterwards. Moreover, two letters to Baner, who had been left behind to take in the country round Magdeburg, bear witness to Gustavus's lively anxiety. "The enemy," he writes in the beginning of December, "has so strengthened himself in these parts, that I am not in proportionate strength to risk a battle. He has spread himself out towards Schweinfurt, and looks like coming between us and Thuringia, and so cutting off our communications with Saxony. Look well before you! Keep well in touch with the Duke of Weimar at Erfurt, and strengthen him if

he is in danger of a siege. Mind that you get hold of Magdeburg, and, in order that you may be strong enough to hold the lines of the Elbe and the Havel, go on enrolling troops and appoint your rendez-vous. . . . If you are driven back retire upon Werben; keep in touch too with Tott" (Tott was finishing off Rostock and Wismar in Mecklenburg). "Do not let me come to any harm owing to your jealousies; help one another without other thought than the good of our Fatherland. Amend your lazy ways, and send me a messenger at least once a week."

This, however, is rather anticipating. The alliance of Duke George of Lüneburg, of the House of Brunswick (October 14th), was of less importance to Gustavus than that of the mighty city of Nuremberg, which concluded a treaty with him before the end of October. As early as from Halle he had sent messages thither, but the city was under pressure from an imperial commission at the time, and the greater merchants were extremely anxious to preserve their neutrality. The populace however manifested enthusiastically Swedish sympathies. The Nurembergers were almost the only town population in the Empire who had kept up military exercises, and who were ready to make sacrifices for their defence. They now, October (11th), accepted the King's terms, and agreed to raise a regiment of 3,000 men for defence; and, without receiving a Swedish garrison, put all their warlike resources at Gustavus's disposal, and agreed to stand by him to the last drop of their blood. He on his side promised to succour them in all danger, and to relieve them whenever they should

be besieged. He did not forget the promise, and Nuremberg remained to the last his firmest ally, and the object of his special protection. Anspach and Baireuth joined him in the same month.

From Würzburg too he sent a threatening message to the three Ecclesiastical Electors on the Rhine, Mainz, Trier, and Cologne. Of neutrality he would not hear a word: they must either pay him the monthly contribution, which before had gone to the League, give him free pass and provision, and allow the Protestant faith to be tolerated in their territories, or else ———.

The Elector of Mainz had already run away, and, as Tilly was nearer to the other two than Gustavus was, they, not unnaturally, refused this somewhat imperious demand; whereupon the King resolved to let Bamberg alone for the time and advance down the Main towards the Electorates. And the Palatinate! To deliver that would indeed be a deed worthy of him. For ten years it had groaned under Catholic oppression, that was once the head centre of German Protestantism. But it was a serious matter and would probably involve him in a breach with Spain, with whom, for the sake of Swedish commerce, he was anxious to avoid open hostilities. Still he would see what could be done. At the end of October, therefore, he sent his blue brigade to take Hanau. Hanau surrendered, and, leaving Horn at Würzburg to complete the subjection of Franconia, the King advanced in two lines down the Main as far as Frankfort. The Frankforters sent to request that they might be allowed to consult the Elector of

Mainz before treating for surrender. The King replied that inasmuch as he already possessed the greater part of that prince's dominions he himself was, as far as they were concerned, the Elector of Mainz, and they had better consult him.

On the 18th November, after much hesitation on the part of the town council, and some threats from the other side, Frankfort surrendered, and Gustavus entered the ancient capital of Germany. It was in Frankfort that the German crown was still voted to, and still placed on the head of, the Holy Roman Emperor. Had Gustavus been a Revolutionist, it might then and there have been placed upon his own.

There he was joined by the Landgraf of Hesse, whom the southward march, which Tilly undertook about this time, freed for action; he brought 14,000 men and the King felt himself sufficiently strong to advance towards the city of Mainz itself. The whole Electorate on the right bank of the Rhine had already been overrun. Bernard of Weimar was at this time preparing to throw his troops over at Bingen; all looked for a decisive attack on Mainz, when the news arrived that Tilly on November 18th, the day of Gustavus's entry into Frankfort, had made a sudden dash at Nuremberg. Gustavus did not forget his promise. "The old Devil" he wrote to John Casimir in Sweden, "with all his young ones, Lorraine, Pappenheim, Furstenburg, Gallas, Ossa, is now lying before Nuremberg. By God's help, I march to-morrow to relieve the city. The enemy is strong, but God is my aid and I have 17,000 foot and 9,000

horse." It was the readiness with which Nuremberg had received Gustavus that attracted Tilly's vengeance ; he threatened the city as usual with the fate of Magdeburg, but to his surprise was received with a heavy fire and some vigorous sorties, which destroyed his first siege works. When a sudden explosion blew up part of his ammunition waggons, he resolved to retreat (November 24th). It was then that Pappenheim left him in disgust.

Gustavus had just completed his preparations for the relief of Nuremberg when the news came that Tilly was gone. He therefore crossed the Rhine a little above Oppenheim, where he met the first Spanish garrison. One of the outworks had to be stormed and some of the defenders were killed in the fight. "Is this a breach with Spain?" he wrote to the Council in Sweden. "Shall I declare war on the King of Spain? Or shall I seek peace with him, in order to have my hands free *in case I should have to do with France*, whose King is drawing this way with a large army, and is even now at Metz?"

How far, and into what strange adventures had Gustavus's fortune led him! He had sent an ambassador to Louis, XIII., to explain how willingly he would have kept peace with the League, if only they would have separated their cause from that of the Emperor, and how careful he had been not to persecute Catholics; also to complain of the hostility of Louis's restless neighbour, the Duke of Lorraine. In the letter above quoted he continues: "But on the other hand, Spain will not consent to give up what he possesses in the Palatinate without a struggle,

and without a full restoration of the Palatinate there can be no secure peace. Against Spain I am sure that England and Holland would assist me. *I think anyhow you had better look to the defences of Gothenburg.*"* The Swedish Council, anxious to avoid the responsibility, "left it to his Majesty, advising him at the same time to put off a declaration of war on Spain as long as possible." As for France, Richelieu was not seriously hostile; Gustavus did not understand Richelieu; no one really did.

The Spanish garrison made but a feeble show of defending Mainz. On December 12th, after two days' siege, they marched out with the honours of war, but left all their ammunition to the King of Sweden, by whom a provisional government was set up, and a heavy imposition demanded—80,000 dollars from the city itself and another 80,000 dollars from the Catholic clergy, of whom there were great numbers; the Jesuits to pay half of the latter tax. Mainz was the richest ecclesiastical province in Germany, but this was a heavy sum considering that the Spanish garrison had taken care to plunder, before evacuating the city. There was, however, no forcible restoration of Protestantism, and the Jesuits alone were expelled. In Mainz, Gustavus determined to take up his winter quarters, in order to prepare for the ensuing campaign.

There, then, we must leave him for a moment, to consider the fortune of the war in the other parts of Germany. In the Palatinate Bernard of Weimar,

* The port of Sweden that was most open to a Spanish naval attack, as being on the North Sea.

was already busy; before the end of the year he had occupied Worms, Speyer, and Mannheim, and had got even as far south as Germersheim. Speyer, being a free city surrounded by a bishopric, received him with enthusiasm, and everywhere the emigrants of 1621 began to return to their homes. In Mecklenburg Tott had reduced Rostock soon after the defeat of Tilly at Leipzig, and was laying vigorous siege to Wismar, which capitulated on the 12th of January in the following year. Banèr had succeeded just about the same time in possessing himself of the ruins of Magdeburg.

And how fared it with the Elector of Saxony? The Emperor had, as we have seen, about ten thousand men in Silesia under Tiefenbach, and was also raising troops in Bohemia for the defence of the hereditary countries. Aldringer and Gallas were to take the command of this new army. In the face of these two armies, the Elector of Saxony, after reducing Leipzig and overrunning the province of Lusatia, marched straight into Bohemia and placed himself between them. This, as we now know, was in direct contravention of the orders of Gustavus, who had enjoined him to march first into Silesia and drive out Tiefenbach's men. Almost without a blow the Saxons occupied the northern and western places like Teschen, Eger, and Leitmeritz, and on November 1st entered Prague, the Imperialists everywhere retreating before them. As in the Palatinate, so in Bohemia, back came the emigrants of 1620. The mouldering heads and limbs of their companions of that fatal year, which still decorated the Moldau

Bridge, were taken down and laid to rest. Meanwhile the Imperialists held fast on to the southern fortresses, Budweis, Pilsen, and Tabor; and Gallas arrived to organise the Catholic resistance. The Elector of Saxony, whose habits of body ill fitted him to endure the fatigues of a winter campaign, retired to Dresden, and he and Arnim set to work to excuse themselves as best they could to their commander-in-chief (for such Gustavus was, by the treaty of September 5th), for disobedience to orders. Arnim boldly lied, and said he was invited to enter Bohemia—by *Wallenstein himself*.

It was a very prudent lie, and no doubt really deceived the King. For it must now be stated that Gustavus had been, throughout a considerable portion of his late campaign, in correspondence with Wallenstein. Although the letter is now lost, it is known, from a state paper of Oxenstiern's, that as early as October 30, 1630, the King wrote to him from Stralsund—that is, very soon after Wallenstein had laid down his command. This letter was probably a merely complimentary one, but either the idea of making use of Wallenstein's anger at his own dismissal to get him to enter the Swedish service, or at least to act in Bohemia for Sweden, or the King's anxiety lest Wallenstein should be reinstated in his post by the Emperor, induced him, in the following year, to make several distinct offers. In February, 1631, Tilly writes to Maximilian that he knows Wallenstein has been tampered with by the Kings of Sweden and *England*, to induce him to take up arms against the Emperor in Bohemia: "he has


answered that he thanks their Majesties for the great honour they have done him, and when he sees their armies in the field—and especially those of the King of England in the Palatinate—he will not lose the opportunity." The ubiquitous Arnim had a hand in the matter, hoping, no doubt, to get Wallenstein to appear at the head of his third party; and it seems to have been a great blunder on Gustavus's part that Arnim was allowed in any way to be privy to the negotiations. Gustavus, however, did not know Arnim as well at the beginning of 1631 as he did at the end; he was also employing a much more honest agent, Count Thurn, formerly the leader of the Bohemian Revolution, and now the head of the emigrant party. One of the best things to be said for Wallenstein is his steady friendship with Thurn, and the way in which the Bohemian emigrés always looked upon him, both as a patriot and a possible restorer. In June, 1631—that is, when things looked bad for Gustavus after the fall of Magdeburg, the first definite demands of Wallenstein were laid before the King. They were high. Gustavus must first complete the reduction of the sea-coasts, ally himself with Saxony and attack Tilly, and then send him, Wallenstein, 12,000 men under Count Thurn. With this nucleus he would soon raise 50,000. Gustavus, in his then situation, agreed to these terms, and further promised to make Wallenstein Viceroy of Bohemia. So matters stood until September. Wallenstein, whose whole soul revelled in secret intrigue, may or may not have been honest in the matter; it is certain that he was at the same time in correspondence with the Emperor, who

never had a suspicion of his uprightness, and continued to be advised by him until the time he was reinstated in the command. With cynical frankness and with a view of raising his price, Wallenstein, in his letters to Gustavus, told the latter that the Emperor was seeking to put him again at the head of his armies; and cursed the Jesuits and Father Lämmermann. As a matter of fact he knew which way the wind blew, and thought—after Breitenfeld, at least—that he was more likely to secure his own interests by an alliance with the victorious King of Sweden than with the Emperor, who, after Breitenfeld, was reported to be meditating a flight to Gratz. Wallenstein told Gustavus, while congratulating him on the victory, that he would soon chase the Emperor out of his Empire.

This then was the commander of the eastern expedition whom the King of Sweden had in his mind. Wallenstein and Thurn should raise Bohemia, while John George cleared Silesia. All three might in the following year meet Gustavus, after the successful conclusion of his campaign in Swabia and Bavaria, under the walls of Vienna. It was a splendid prospect, but the burden of its fulfilment rested upon a man who knew neither faith nor honour. Well enough the King of Sweden knew how shiftY his ally was; and after his own unexpected success in the month of October he gradually came to the resolution to do without him. Rightly indeed, when the whole cause was at stake, he had resolved to make use of such a powerful agent as Wallenstein would undoubtedly have been; now that the sky was clear, there was no need to avail himself of such

means. A feeling of the incongruity of such an alliance gradually came over Gustavus; he excused himself diplomatically from sending the 12,000 troops to Wallenstein: "Wismar was not yet down," or "he could not spare so many troops at present." In the following year, when he was again in imminent danger in the camp before Nuremberg, Gustavus tried to tempt Wallenstein to take up the negotiation at the place where it had dropped, but this time without effect. Of the blackness of Wallenstein's treachery towards the Emperor in the summer of 1631 there can be no two opinions; it will not even do to say that he, a prince of the Empire, had as much right to negotiate with Gustavus as other princes. They were princes by the grace of God; he had no one's grace but Ferdinand's to thank for his position.

It was, however, as I said a great stroke of policy on Arnim's part to tell Gustavus that Wallenstein had invited the Saxons to Bohemia. As a matter of fact it was the unwillingness of the Elector to fight even Tiefenbach that turned him aside from Silesia; on his way eastward he heard that Prague was defenceless, and the march from Dresden up the valleys of the Elbe and Moldau was about the easiest that he could under the circumstance perform. Thus it may be said that the Elector of Saxony practically effected nothing. Probably Gustavus, when he began to abandon the idea of Wallenstein, expected even less results. As we shall soon see, it was speedily proved that the Saxons had no sort of hold on Bohemia, and that whenever force should be applied they would be rapidly driven out.



CHAPTER XIII.

DIPLOMACY.

N Mainz Gustavus held a splendid winter court. Thither came his queen and thither came Oxenstiern. Thither came the German princes of the southwest, and the deputies from towns, to pay their respects to him, and to determine or complete the terms of their alliance. Thither came Sir Henry Vane, the English ambassador, and our old friend Charnacé, besides two other agents of Richelieu. Thither, too, came the unlucky Frederick of the Palatinate, still clad with the empty title of King of Bohemia. It was indeed a position of great European influence in which this king of a million and a half of people, hitherto regarded as almost outside the limits of European courtesy, now found himself. His latest admirer, Weibull, has compared it with the position of Napoleon at Erfurt in 1808. It would be in my opinion as much to the honour of Gustavus

to liken him to Attila. He had not come to destroy, but to save.

The splendour of it all, as the philosophical historian of Sweden, Geijer, sees clearly, was more in appearance than in reality. In reality there was one fatally weak place in Gustavus's armour, the uncertainty of his own life. If that life dropped, as it might at any moment, in the siege of some obscure town, by the dagger of some obscure assassin (and of such an actual dagger, with which such an attempt was made at Frankfort about this time, Weibull gives a picture—an ugly-looking tool), there was absolutely no one to take up the reins. His own crown would pass to an infant daughter, and if the crown of a renovated German Empire should be placed with acclamation on *his* head, that Empire would fall to pieces on his death. Even if he lived out the allotted span as king of this new country, would he be able to teach religious toleration to men who had been tearing each other in pieces for ten years for the sake of religion? And still more, would not his northern heart be ever turning back to Stockholm and the winter glories of the Mälars lake? Would he, a Swede, be altogether pleased to recreate a strong power in an united Germany? Would he not thereby only give Sweden a dangerous neighbour to the South?

Yet, without becoming King of Germany in some shape or other, he could hardly fulfil his allotted work. Had he lived, I think he would have found, as Cromwell found, all other means impracticable. For the present he put the idea resolutely aside.



AXEL OXENSTIERN,
Chancellor of Sweden.

His main aim, in this little respite at Mainz and Frankfort (for he spent some days there also), was to lay the foundation of a less simple but a less revolutionary scheme: a confederacy namely of German Protestants with Sweden at their head, with the King of Sweden as *ex-officio* commander-in-chief of their forces, charged with the right and duty of protecting them against the Emperor or any other power. For this purpose Sweden should become a member of the Empire, with a regular seat in the Diet in respect of the Duchy of Pomerania, which she claimed as her reward for past services. It was not a very *German* scheme, for it distinctly recognised the impossibility of uniting Germany, but it was essentially a Protestant scheme, and that it was essentially practicable is proved not so much from Oxenstiern's successfully carrying it into execution, among the smaller states at least, in the league of Heilbronn, but even more from the great success that similar confederations, on bases other than religious, afterwards enjoyed under the protection of France. I have only to instance Mazarin's league of the Rhenish princes of 1659, and the confederation of the Rhine, 1806. The peculiar history, as well as the independent character, of the German princes had fitted them far more for such separate confederations than for submission to a central and ordered government. The only two princes who were not likely to come in to such a scheme were the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, and it was upon their opposition that the scheme was finally wrecked. That this scheme was, during the period of his stay at Mainz, the sole

thought of Gustavus's mind I do not imagine, but what I wish to make clear is that it was this and not, as has generally been believed, his own elevation to the Empire to which he was looking as a final settlement.

Final settlement, however, there could be none as yet. The question of "universal peace," as it is called in the contemporary records, or "general peace" as we should call it, had been in view for some time past, and continued in view for some time longer; but at the present moment the more pressing questions were, what was to be done with the Catholic League, and what was to be done with the ex-King of Bohemia? It will be convenient if I am allowed to touch upon each of these three questions separately. And, first, with regard to Frederick. He had more or less given up hope of restoration to the Palatinate, much more to Bohemia, before the appearance of Gustavus on the scene. He now hastened to the court of the deliverer at Mainz. Before the end of January the greater part of the Lower Palatinate, but with the important exception of Heidelberg, was in the hands of the Swedish troops, and Gustavus had expressly declared that he intended to restore Frederick to his electorate. But the attack on Heidelberg involved a certain breach with Spain, and the King of Sweden was anxious to see what the powers more nearly interested in the Palatinate question than himself would do towards assisting him in the event of such a breach. Those powers were undoubtedly England and Holland. Nothing more clearly indicates the foolish policy of Charles I. and

his utter disregard of the interests of foreign Protestantism, than the manner in which he played with the question. Vane, whom he now sent to Gustavus, brought words, words, *et præterea nihil*. "England," says Droysen, "clothed her inactivity with a sort of pride that she alone remembered the original cause of the war, and cared for the interests of the Palatinate house," but she avoided any thing that could lead her into a declaration of war in alliance with the Protestant powers. Nay, she went so far at this very time as to offer Ferdinand direct armed help *against the Swedes* if Ferdinand would restore Frederick to his dominions. Gustavus found this out, and it not unnaturally embittered him against England and the wretched Frederick. Therefore, when the latter presented himself at Mainz, the King treated him with the utmost courtesy, but said frankly he would make no promises until he saw King Charles's fleets and armadas in motion.

Worse, however, than a breach with Spain, the restoration of Frederick, before the conclusion of a general peace (in which event, as we shall see, Gustavus always made that restoration a leading stipulation), would involve a breach with France. Maximilian, clothed with Frederick's title and in possession of one-half of Frederick's lands (the Upper Palatinate), had taken care to secure Richelieu as his friend. In May, 1631, a treaty had been concluded between France and Bavaria, in which the former had promised to maintain Maximilian as Elector. It was, indeed, always the wish of Richelieu to substitute Maximilian for Ferdinand on the Imperial throne, but neither

that wish nor the treaty would be allowed to count for much if a more promising way for crushing the House of Austria offered itself. Therefore I think we may take it for granted that, though Richelieu would undoubtedly withdraw from direct assistance to Gustavus, if he at once replaced Frederick at Heidelberg, he would not let that restoration stand in the way of a general peace, if such a peace should express the full humiliation of the Hapsburgs.

But for the time it was most important for Sweden not to quarrel with France. France alone could settle satisfactorily the second of the questions under consideration—namely, the fate of the Catholic League. The League was in an awkward position. Bavaria, it was true, was still untouched by hostile arms; so were Cologne and Trier; but the rest of its territories were in the hands of Gustavus, and its princes were at his mercy. Their only hope was in Richelieu. Richelieu, as we have seen, was extremely hampered by the march of the King into the League country, but he could not but acknowledge that even from a military point of view there was something to be said for such a march. The League had not separated, and would not have separated their cause from that of the Emperor, unless their territories had been overrun. All Richelieu's diplomacy had failed to divorce them. But he now hoped to reconcile them with Sweden, at least so far as to free the hands of the latter for the long-deferred march upon Vienna. He failed, and failed just where he thought that his influence would be strongest—namely, with Bavaria.

It would be tedious to my readers if I were to go into all the diplomatic correspondence that passed between the League, Gustavus, and Richelieu at the beginning of 1632. The main points are these: Richelieu tried to get the League to agree to perfect neutrality, and allow Ferdinand and Gustavus to fight out the quarrel. The League as a whole were not altogether unwilling. But such a neutrality must depend upon the consent of Gustavus, and Gustavus would only consent to it upon conditions. The conditions he offered to the League were such that all eventually accepted them except Bavaria. And Bavaria, after long hesitation and fierce accusations of treachery against Richelieu, decided to refuse the conditions, throw over his alliance with France, and throw himself into the arms of Ferdinand, and thus enable that monarch, who was in altogether desperate straits, to continue the war. One cannot help admiring Maximilian for thus refusing to make himself the tool of Richelieu.

When Richelieu first approached Maximilian on the subject, the battle of Breitenfeld had just been fought. Maximilian said that France ought to send him troops for the defence of his territories in compliance with the treaty of the previous May. Richelieu pointed out that the treaty had spoken only of defence, whereas he, Maximilian, and the League had been the aggressors by the invasion of Saxony. This failing, Maximilian at the end of the year, professed himself not unwilling to be neutral, if the Catholic bishops were restored in the Priests' Alley. "And the Protestants all over Germany as before

1629?" asked Richelieu's ambassador. No, Maximilian did not mean that. Meanwhile France worked upon the trembling and enraged Ecclesiastical Electors to induce their consent to the neutrality, and with much better success. She also tried to work upon Gustavus to grant moderate conditions to these neutrals.

But Gustavus, who meant the neutrality to be but a prelude to a general peace, refused to restore the possessions of the League merely as the basis of a neutrality. He wanted them, he said, as pledges to hand back in return for the Palatinate and other territories of which Protestants had been dispossessed. Richelieu was not the man to stick at trifles—if the practical neutrality of the League could be gained, only for a time sufficient to enable Gustavus to get at the throat of his and Richelieu's arch enemy, Ferdinand, he cared not how it was gained; he would force the League to accept any conditions. So it came about on the 9th of January, 1632, Gustavus propounded to Charnacé and De Brézé his ultimatum on the subject.

1. The reduction of the army of the League to twelve thousand men, and its quartering upon the territories of the League only.
2. The complete withdrawal of all assistance of the League from Ferdinand.
3. The restoration of all territories in Lower Saxony, taken from the Protestants since the beginning of the war.

In return for the acceptance of which Gustavus would consent to restore to the Electors of Trier and

Cologne all of their territories (not much) which he had occupied, and to Maximilian all that the latter had possessed before the war (not much) in the Lower Palatinate ; also to leave the Upper Palatinate in his hands till the peace.

"Rudes Conditions," says Richelieu in his memoirs. So rude that the French plenipotentiaries hesitated to sign them. "Sign," said Gustavus, "or get you home to your King, and tell him to turn back from the path which he has opened into Germany." The conditions were signed.

The League were of course very angry when they found that France had thus deserted them in their distress, but one by one they came round to see that it was the best way out of the difficulty, and all eventually accepted the terms. All but one. Maximilian utterly refused, and concluded a new alliance with the Emperor, to stand or fall together for the defence of the Catholic faith. Therewith the League may be said to have been dissolved, but therewith the King of Sweden was no nearer to the solution of the last of the problems which occupied his mind in the winter of 1631-32—the general peace. Properly speaking, this question has no special relation to the time of his sojourn at Mainz, for the negotiations for it began considerably before and lasted for a long time after that period ; but it is convenient to treat of it now, so that we may be able afterwards to take a less interrupted view of his campaigns.

It must be observed in the first place that, whereas the negotiations for neutrality were actively pursued by the Catholic powers, those for a general peace

owe their history chiefly to the exertions of the Elector of Saxony; and that they proceeded more from his hatred of that Swedish alliance, which had saved him, than from any desire for the permanent settlement of Germany. One must preface any account of them by saying at once that John George was not, perhaps, quite as black as he has been painted. He was a man of passing impulses; one day he would sell his soul to Gustavus, the next to Wallenstein; but as both of these claimants to the valuable possession were usually absent, Arnim, who was usually present, managed, as a rule, to dominate his thoughts and wishes in the long run. Gustavus gradually came to have a well-founded distrust of Arnim; he had at one time thought of making it a stipulation in the treaty with Saxony that Arnim should be dismissed. Now Arnim's whole desire was to create the third party—in itself a laudable end. What means he employed for that end he did not in the least care. One result of his complete absence of scruple has been that the character of John George, which was quite unpleasant enough before, has been loaded with a weight of treachery, which should more properly have been laid at the door of his adviser.

A more favourable moment, however, for a general peace could hardly have been offered than this very winter. Ferdinand was confessedly reduced to great straits. He had sent an embassy to Poland to beg for troops, and had been told that they could not be spared, for a war with Russia might at any moment take place. It is one of those doubts, with

which the history of the period abounds, what Gustavus had said to a certain Russian ambassador who visited him in Stettin in the early days of 1631. All record of more than the fact of this visit is lost, but we know that the King hurried back to Stettin for a day or two just before the storm of Frankfort-on-Oder. It would not be an extravagant conjecture that he got Russia to promise that she would keep the Poles quiet. A more bitter repulse to Ferdinand was that which came from the Pope. Urban VIII., one of the greatest of the long line, if greatness is to be measured by toleration and wisdom rather than by oppression, told the Imperial ambassador that the war was no religious war, but a war for the extension of Hapsburg influence, to the advance of which he refused to contribute a penny. It has been one of the most curious paradoxes in history that the monarch, who is posing for the time being as champion of the Catholic faith, has very frequently found himself snubbed and browbeaten, if not absolutely opposed, by the head of the Catholic world. We have only to instance the strained relations of Philip II. and Mary of England with Paul IV.; of Louis XIV. and James II. with Innocent XI. So it was now. Urban was an open Gustavite. From Spain, from Denmark Ferdinand had nothing active to hope for in the way of help. The Porte was threatening to take advantage of his distress, and to anticipate by half a century its last attempt to plant the Crescent at Vienna.

In such circumstances it might be expected that Ferdinand would not be unfavourable to any reason-

able conditions that might be offered him. But as a matter of fact, he had been approached on the subject before. It was in October, 1631, not so long after Breitenfeld, that there came to the Swedish camp at Würzburg an ambassador from the Landgraf of Hesse *Darmstadt* (not to be confused with our brave William of Hesse *Cassel*—this was a very different sort of prince), to ask Gustavus to allow his master to remain neutral. Gustavus was astonished at the request, for the Landgraf had been one of his hottest opponents before his expedition to Germany. People even said he was secretly a Catholic and a member of the League. Consequently he was now treated very contemptuously, until something suggested to Gustavus the idea of asking the question: "Has your master any thing to say to me on the question of Peace?" This was just the subject which Landgraf George had wished to open. He had in fact been quite recently in communication with the Elector of Mainz, and they had agreed to hold a meeting of Catholic and Protestant princes at Mulhausen in December. At first it was proposed to exclude Gustavus from being represented there, on the trivial ground that he was not a Prince of the Empire. Gustavus laughed at the idea and said he must be represented. Meanwhile came his extraordinary successes on the Main and Rhine, and the question had obviously shifted its ground; it was no more a question of whether the princes should allow Sweden, but whether Sweden should allow them to be represented. Gustavus knew enough of the methods of such conferences to be sure that little

would come of it, if he was not in a position to enforce his views. The Mulhausen meeting was deferred, and the King declared that he must consult first with Saxony and Brandenburg, and that he would decide on nothing without their advice. As for an armistice to allow time for such a conference to assemble, a proposal for which Landgraf George presented to him in January, 1632, he distinctly answered that he would only grant it, if the Emperor would clear his troops out of all places in the valleys of the Elbe and Weser. In fact Gustavus knew that it was not upon the Landgraf or the Elector of Mainz, but upon the more powerful Protestant Princes, and especially upon Saxony that the question of peace would turn. But, before breaking off with the Landgraf altogether, he put forward a series of demands, upon which he would insist in conditions of peace, and which it is very interesting to compare with the exact results obtained at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. They include, in matters spiritual, withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution, restoration to Protestants of all churches and ecclesiastical property they have *at any time* held, inclusion of the Calvinists in toleration, *bag and baggage departure of the Jesuits from the Empire*. As regards the territorial and other arrangements, the King demanded that all Spanish troops should be dismissed, that *Chambres mi-parties* * should be established in the Imperial

* "Half-party Chambers"—that is, an equal number of Protestant and Catholic judges in the Imperial law courts. This was copied from the Edict of Nantes, whereby the same system was instituted in France.

courts, and all outstanding processes against Protestants be cancelled; that there should be "satisfaction" for the King of Sweden, such as he should think equitable. In a word, all that the Catholics gained by fighting it out for sixteen years more, was the maintenance of the Jesuits, and of the Upper Palatinate for Maximilian of Bavaria. For in the peace of Westphalia, the year 1624, instead of 1618, was taken as the model year, and to the existing conditions of that year every thing was to be reduced, with the exception of the Lower Palatinate, which was restored to the Protestants. Gustavus was undoubtedly wiser than the statesmen of Westphalia in thus taking his stand on the year immediately before the war.

These demands were dated January 2, 1632. Other plans, other demands poured in during these months, some of them including practical reconstruction of the Imperial Constitution. Landgraf William particularly wanted to sweep away the Ecclesiastical Electors, perhaps—for even heroes are human—not without an eye to some of that Westphalian property of the Elector of Cologne, which bordered on Hesse Cassel. But such sweeping reforms were not likely to commend themselves to Saxony. John George appears to have become jealous of Gustavus, partly out of sheer puerile spite at the idea of receiving military orders from him (as by the terms of his treaty he was bound to do); partly because he intensely disliked the errand on which he was sent—namely, to make active war on the Emperor; but mostly because he saw Gustavus gradually stepping,


and stepping effectively, into the position which it had been the boast of his ancestors, if not of himself, to occupy, that of protector of the Protestant states of Germany. This jealousy increased tenfold when the negotiations for the neutrality of the League began. The comings and goings of French ambassadors—"The Devil brought them in to spoil all," he said—revolted his inordinate pride. He was already in a fair way to succumb to the temptation of breaking with his ally, when the tempter appeared in the person of Wallenstein. Arnim had indeed gladly embraced the idea of the expedition to Bohemia, as being likely to bring him nearer to Wallenstein, with whom it is probable he never ceased to communicate, and on whom he always relied as being a valuable ingredient in the third party. And the idea of concluding a general peace through Wallenstein's means—a peace in which Gustavus might appear in a very secondary position,—seems to have dawned upon John George, about the time at which Gustavus communicated to him the demands which he would put forward in the event of such a peace. Wallenstein's position was becoming a much stronger one in January, 1632, when he began to negotiate with Arnim, than in November, 1631, when Gustavus finally abandoned the idea of employing him. For in December he again became Imperial Generalissimo, at first provisionally for three months, it is, true, but at the end of that time for life, as Dictator, Independent, Omnipotent.


His diplomacy was almost more useful to Ferdinand than his sword, for he set himself at once to

detach Saxony from the Swedish side, and he effectually succeeded. How he spun his wiles, and how he entangled the unhappy John George in them, must be reserved for a later chapter. Meanwhile, it must be noticed that early in 1632 the two Protestant Electors held a meeting, in which they both agreed that the satisfaction for their Swedish ally should be *in money and not in land*, and that he should not acquire the position of a prince of the Empire. In other words, Brandenburg and Saxony, whose territories Gustavus had freed from Tilly's plundering hordes, whose bishoprics he had won back for them with Swedish blood and treasure, and whom he was now preparing to place in the forefront in the negotiations for peace, agreed that when his work was done he should be sent back to his own land, proclaimed to all Europe as a hireling. Then they would resume that position, which they had so nobly filled before he came, of Defenders of the Faith. The King of Sweden, on hearing of this decision, deserves much praise for controlling his temper. But it put an end to his hopes of using *them* as agents for a general peace.

One more event in connection with this peace-movement, although of somewhat later date, it will be convenient to group with the above. In May, 1632, an agent of the Duke of Orleans, called de Hayes, came to Gustavus, who was then at Munich, and brought him word that Ferdinand himself was more inclined towards peace than before (it was no wonder if he was, for Gustavus was half-way across Bavaria), because Wallenstein's demands were so ex-

orbitant that he could not satisfy them. We know little of the circumstances of the negotiation except that de Hayes passed twice or thrice between Vienna and Munich, and, from a letter of Wallenstein's, that an armistice of three months had been proposed ; but Arnim did not lose the opportunity to point out to his Electoral master that his ally was negotiating behind his back, and it may have been this that finally led John George into the trap which Wallenstein had been so carefully preparing for him. We do not know why this negotiation came to an end without leaving further traces of itself, but from this time forward Gustavus seems to have concluded that only after a decisive overthrow of the Imperial armies could any peace be hoped for. That he made approaches to Wallenstein when he lay before Nuremberg in August, is less important than that he was preparing to make a renewed offer of his old conditions either to Wallenstein or to the Emperor himself at the very time of his death.





CHAPTER XIV.

BAVARIA.

HE plans of the King of Sweden for the campaign of 1632 are nowhere clearly stated. That they were extensive, and that they included a final march upon Vienna, we cannot doubt. But from the very beginning of the year, and partly in consequence of the very great extension of the theatre of the war, there is a haphazard look about all the operations. The war becomes disconnected, it breaks up into little bits. The most sanguine commander could hardly have expected eight armies to combine and work perfectly together in different parts of Germany without a hitch somewhere. Yet Gustavus actually had eight armies on foot at the end of the year 1631, with an effective strength of some 100,000 men, which he expected to double in the course of the next year. He had 18,000 men under his own command on the Rhine; Horn had 20,000 men on the Main; William of Hesse, 8,000 in his own country; Banèr, at



MAXIMILIAN OF BAVARIA.

Magdeburg, 13,000; Tott, who was just finishing the Mecklenburg business, and was ordered to advance into Lower Saxony, had 13,000. In Mecklenburg itself the ungrateful Dukes were raising 4,000. William of Weimar had 3,000. The Saxons in Bohemia were 20,000, and another 12,000 may be allowed for garrisons.

It is obvious, however, in the first place, that many of these were new levies, and, like the troops raised in the various counties of England during the civil war, would not be of much use except for defence of their own particular territories. It seems to me that Gustavus, who should have known the German soldiers better by this time, did not sufficiently consider how difficult any combination of these armies, especially if requiring great rapidity of movement, would be. If all these armies had been capable of real mobilisation, it surely could not have been necessary for him to draw off at once to the support of any part of his line of operations which happened to be temporarily weakened. Yet this was what he did in 1632. *He* was the indispensable man, flying hither and thither with his own comparatively small "Royal army." Now it is Horn who is in danger, now Nuremberg, now Saxony. On each occasion the King has to stop in a career of victory in order to strengthen the weak link in his chain. Not that I should venture to criticise his action on each of these occasions; he probably knew that only he could be of use. But I think it proves how weak was the foundation upon which were based his great hopes of delivering Germany, and how unready Germany was to

take the necessary steps for delivering herself. And again: in his own utmost need before Nuremberg he could not gather together an effective force of much over 50,000, although he waited two months, and sent for all the troops that could possibly be gathered. The task was too hard for him. None the less does he deserve immortal honour for attempting it.

“ That low man seeks a little thing to do,
Sees it and does it ;
This high man, with a great thing to pursue,
Dies ere he knows it.”

Gustavus had got a firm foot in the Palatinate, in which very few places were left over to the Spaniards,* and, after the expiring of the armistice, which he had granted, for the purpose of the negotiation, to Maximilian of Bavaria, had just stormed Kreutznach, when he received news that Horn was in danger. Horn had been left in Würzburg with orders to overrun the whole of the bishopric of Bamberg, which adjoins Würzburg and forms the eastern end of the Priests' Alley. Horn had accordingly advanced up the Main, had laid the whole of the two bishoprics under contribution, and had at last got possession of the town of Bamberg. Then, on February 28th, he heard that Tilly had broken up from his quarters in Bavaria, and was advancing against the Swedish position on the Main, 40,000 strong. Before Horn could in any way

*It must be understood that these Spaniards were in the pay of Maximilian of Bavaria, not of the King of Spain, who was still nominally at peace with Sweden.

fortify Bamberg, whose bishop, as we saw, had trusted rather to diplomatic wiles than to entrenchments, the enemy was upon him. The Field Marshal, though himself the bravest of the brave, as he proved at Breitenfeld, and, long afterwards at Nordlingen, remembered the King's orders to hazard nothing rashly. Bamberg was as good as an open town, and he therefore decided, after one day's stout resistance, to make an orderly retreat on Würzburg. Tilly, after occupying Bamberg, followed him for a little while, and then turned aside to besiege Schweinfurt. Horn's forces, so far from being the 20,000 which they shew in the calculation made at the end of 1631, were little over half that number, owing to the exigencies of the Franconian garrisons; and from a military point of view he did right to retreat. Gustavus, however, to whom a retreat was a thing of abhorrence, gently reproved his trusted friend when they met, and said that he had construed his words rather too literally. "We must not let the enemy get any courage whatever against us," said the King.

The King had abandoned for a time the enterprise of the reduction of Heidelberg, which was to come next after Kreutznach, and had advanced to meet Horn, with the intention of advancing at once into Bavaria. He left Oxenstiern in command on the Rhine, with Bernard of Weimar under him, but shortly after, finding that the fiery Duke and the prudent Chancellor did not get on very well together, called the former to his side; not, however, until he, Bernard, had almost cleared the Palatinate

of the enemy. Horn and the King joined at Schweinfurt, the siege of which Tilly raised at their approach on the 11th of March, and resolved to force the old commander to a battle. But Tilly retired before them, in obedience to the instructions of Maximilian, in the direction of the Bavarian frontier. This gave him time to gather all the available forces of the Bavarian army—as we must now call it, for the League had ceased to exist—behind the river Lech. But it also gave Gustavus time to call up Baner from Magdeburg, and also William of Weimar, whose reinforcements together brought the Swedish army up to a good 40,000 men. A small corps of observation was left in Franconia, as well as the garrisons; and with the rest Gustavus advanced in high spirits due southwards. Right in his path lay Nuremberg, where he met with a most splendid reception on the 21st of March. The patricians of Nuremberg, which is still perhaps the most perfect specimen of a mediæval city that time has spared, and which was then probably the richest city in Central Europe, rode out to meet him before the gates. There was short time to spend upon processions, for he marched again the same evening; but Monro saw the “eyes of the Nurembergers streaming with tears of joy to see two such Kings” (the ex-King of Bohemia was with Gustavus, and stuck to him, indeed, like a leech, as having no hope but in him) “sent by the king of kings for their deliverance. They gifted unto the king of Sweden four half-Cartowes,* with all furni-

* Cannons.

ture belonging unto them, together with two silver globes, one celestial, the other terrestrial; there were also presented unto him drinking credences many," etc. The silver globes were supported by figures of Atlas and Hercules respectively, and are still to be seen in the museum at Stockholm; but Gustavus no doubt found the half-cartowes the most acceptable part of the present. Swiftly southwards the march went on. Sending a party to secure Ulm, the King directed all his forces upon Donauwörth, and, as he himself says, drove the garrison out of it "almost under the eyes of Tilly," after a hot resistance, in which a few Jesuits and monks who had got mixed up with the flying soldiers were killed. Those of the garrison who remained took service with the King; but, "being papists of Bavaria," says Monro, "as soon as they smelt the smell of their fathers' homes in ten days they were all gone." One more Protestant town delivered, one more original *casus belli* avenged. Since 1609 Donauwörth had groaned under restored Catholicism, having been put to the ban of the Empire in that year for an insult to a Catholic procession in the streets.

And now the King of Sweden was over the Danube—in a genuinely hostile country, where the peasants rose upon him and surprised his stragglers, "cutting off their noses and ears, hands and feet, pulling out their eyes, with sundry other cruelties, which they used, being justly repaid by the soldiers in burning of many Dorpes on the march, leaving also the boores dead where they were found." The

war had assumed a sharper character, for the deliverer had now driven the oppressor to his lair. That lair was defended by the little river Lech, in spring a swollen torrent from the melting snows. Behind it lay Tilly with 30,000 men. Between Rain and Augsburg the country is intersected on the right bank of the Lech with wooded defiles. At the bottom of one of these Tilly had posted himself, intending to wait till Wallenstein could advance to his assistance. He never expected that Gustavus would try to force a passage, and indeed it seemed a desperate undertaking. Nearly all his generals urged the King to make a long southward detour, and to come round upon Tilly's rear. He has been blamed by historians for not doing so, and for wasting men uselessly at the passage of the river. But his object was in fact not so much the passage of the river as the destruction of Tilly's army. What he most dreaded was that very union of Tilly and Wallenstein, to which the former looked forward, for the blocking of the passage to Vienna. This quite explains and justifies the daring step which Gustavus now took. While he was preparing for the attack he gradually took in the whole of the upper Danube country, and all the passages over that river between Ulm and Donauwörth. Tilly meanwhile was strengthening his position. Marshy meadows in front and a woody hill behind, strong entrenchments well furnished with cannon, a plentiful supply of cavalry to scour the banks of the river,—all seemed in favour of the defence. Maximilian was present in person—no general it is true, but eager to fight in defence of his own

country, of which this was evidently the key. Gustavus pitched his main camp right opposite the enemy's, at a little town called Nordheim. A letter from that camp says, "we are getting hold of more booty than we know what to do with—a horse will sell for four dollars, a cow for a florin, geese and hens for next to nothing." Bavaria was feeling the stress of the war indeed; but the same letter says that much of the booty comes in presents from the towns like Ulm and Hochstett, which were friendly to the cause. All the bridges over the Lech had been broken, right down to its juncture with the Danube. Yet without some sort of bridge it would be impossible for Gustavus to cross.

The armies were within speaking distance of each other. On the night of the 3d of April the King went out alone on a reconnaissance. He called to a sentinel on the opposite bank, "Good morning, sir, where is old Tilly?" "Praise God, he is in his quarters at Rain," said the man; "where is the king, comrade?" "He 's in his quarters too," answered Gustavus. "What! you don't mean to say he has got any quarters do you?" "Oh, yes, come over here and you shall have excellent quarters." It was a mild joke, but exactly one of the things which made Gustavus followed and beloved by his soldiers. In the night of the 4th, a pontoon bridge was thrown across the river right under the fire of the enemy, but the operations of the carpenters were concealed by setting light to damp straw, which smoked so as to make accuracy of aim impossible to the Imperialists. Under the same cover 300 Finlanders were

sent across the river to make a *tête-du-pont*. Then the cavalry and artillery were brought over, and the latter opened a murderous fire about midday on the 5th. In fact the whole battle was little but a cannonade on both sides. But it raged fiercely for over six hours until Tilly fell mortally wounded in the thigh. Aldringer then took command, but was badly hurt a moment afterwards. Night fell without decisive advantage on either side, but the Swedes had lost 2,000 men, the Bavarians 3,000. On the morning of the 6th Gustavus was amazed to find that his prey had after all escaped him. Maximilian, with great prudence, resolved to quit the pass rather than expose his army to total ruin. He had retreated silently in the night, to Ingolstadt, carrying the dying Tilly with him in a litter. It is pleasing to record that when Tilly sent a message to the King, that he would permit the "court barber of Anspach, a good and famous chirurgeon," to come to him, Gustavus at once gave permission. But, perhaps not unhappily for the dying man (for the tender mercies of even court chirurgeons were in those days very cruel), the medico arrived too late. The thigh was completely shattered, and the old hero only lingered 14 days, and died advising Maximilian to secure Regensburg at all hazards. It was the place of the greatest importance for keeping communications open with Wallenstein.

Much as Maximilian hated Wallenstein, and the idea of having to depend on him, whom three years before he had compelled the Emperor to dismiss, he was prudent enough to follow Tilly's advice. But it

meant the complete surrender of Bavaria into the clutches of Gustavus. From the passages of the Lech, the latter pressed on to Augsburg, defended only by a feeble garrison, hostile to the inhabitants, which was quickly driven out. Augsburg, the cradle of the Lutheran faith, received the King with open arms, a Protestant council replaced a Catholic; a Swedish garrison was introduced, and a monthly contribution levied (14th April). The city was nearly as rich as Nuremberg, and was renowned for the splendid banking and mercantile business of the Fuggers. Since the Catholic reaction it had become, much against the will of its inhabitants, "a lesser Rome" and the centre of South German propaganda. Now this was all reversed, and "*Gustava et Augusta*," as a medal struck on the occasion declared, was once more "*Caput religionis et regionis*."

A great deal has been made of the "Oath of Augsburg," in order to prove that Gustavus had ulterior designs, such as the incorporation of the city with the Swedish monarchy. As a matter of fact the oath seems to be the same as that which was administered to the town councils of nearly all the cities in which Gustavus placed garrisons, whether they had been Protestant or Catholic before he came. Such an oath certainly implies the relation of subject and sovereign, but was, and this was the view of both the Swedish diplomat Camerarius, and of the syndic of Augsburg himself, intended to be merely temporary. The King's idea, no doubt, was the retention of these towns, into which he threw garrisons, until the general peace, a very different idea from that represented

by his treaty with Boguslav in the matter of Pomerania, which we have seen he from the beginning intended to serve as a bastion for the Swedish monarchy. After the King's death the Augsburg deputies expressly declared, at a meeting held at Ulm for the deputies of the various Swabian allies of Sweden, that their city had never bound itself to the Swedish crown in any more express way than the other cities had done. It would have been easy for Oxenstiern, in forming the League of Heilbronn, to assert the contrary, and possibly to make it good; yet we hear of no such attempts.

But if Augsburg was Protestant, it was an island in a Catholic sea. As Gustavus advanced further into Bavaria, his march became more difficult. The next destination was Ingolstadt, the situation of the celebrated Jesuit University. There first he met with a severe repulse. He appeared before the town on the 18th of April. It was a maiden fortress, and its defences were in excellent condition. A strong garrison under Tilly's nephew was inside, and the Bavarian army in the immediate neighbourhood, but, after the Swedes had been driven back with great slaughter from a first attack on the outworks, Maximilian, confiding in the strength of Ingolstadt, drew off to Regensburg. On the 4th of May the King abandoned the siege. Even Monro found the service before Ingolstadt hotter than to his liking. "At one shot," he says, "I lost twelve men of my own company; and he that was not that night in that stand afraid of a cannon bullet, might, in my opinion, the next night be made gunpowder of without paine." To fail be

fore Ingolstadt, was no doubt a severe check to his victorious career, but if he could draw Wallenstein to fight him before his junction with the Bavarians, or crush the latter before their junction with Wallenstein, the resistance of Ingolstadt could matter little. For this purpose his best plan was to overrun Bavaria from end to end. Surely one or other of the two armies would risk a battle to deliver Munich.

But they did not. Gustavus marched through Landshut, Mosburg, and Freising, and found no organised resistance. On the 7th of May the magistrates of Munich brought him the keys of their city. To one person in his train at least the entry into the Bavarian capital must have afforded exquisite pleasure. Frederick of the Palatinate felt himself avenged for the loss of Heidelberg. And so thought Protestant Europe. Bernard of Weimar had penetrated far into the Tyrol, and recruited troops from the Swiss cantons. There were oppressed Protestant peasants even in the hereditary counties of Austria, who woke to life at the news, and sent to beg Gustavus to march to their aid. Louis XIII. hesitated to support him longer, and delayed the payment of his subsidies in spite of Richelieu. There is a story, which looks decidedly apocryphal, to the effect that Richelieu sent to know when the King intended to stop, and that the King haughtily replied: "When my interests demand it." I say apocryphal, because Richelieu's whole wish was that he should not stop, but go on—straight to Vienna. That the conquest of Bavaria was a necessary prelude to that, since Maximilian had refused to agree to the neutrality, Richelieu well knew.

But Gustavus had other things to do than send haughty messages to allies, or aid insurrectionary Austrian peasants. None knew better than he how the ground was crumbling from under his feet, how much might rest upon the prompt use of a few hours, or the resolute defence of an isolated fortress. While he remained at Munich for twenty-one days, hoping against hope to draw one of the opposing forces southwards, he won golden opinions from every one. As Ranke says, he was in the *best* sense of the word a "popular" man. He loved to make friends with all classes of people. He walked about the streets of Munich as familiarly and fearlessly as in the streets of Stockholm. Children thronged round him, and he patted their heads and flung pennies to them. The strictest discipline was preserved among his soldiers (who were nearly all quartered outside the town); the Catholic religion was respected everywhere, and the King himself attended high mass on Ascension Day and was there two hours. One enthusiastic monk was so pleased with him, that he fell on his knees before him and implored him to turn Catholic. The only thing he carried away from Munich was a heavy contribution for the expenses of his army, levied on the town by the magistrates, and a lot of cannons which he had found buried, together with all the military stores that could be discovered. It was a rare example of moderation in that age. From other towns in Bavaria, we have Monro's evidence, that the Swedes carried away considerable plunder in the way of works of art; "and which was worse

(wherein his Majesty had neither hand nor direction), many of their houses, dorpes, and castles were burnt to the ground by evil and wicked instruments, that repaid burning with burning, using the Papists at home as they had used the Protestants abroad."

The toils were fast closing round the Lion of the North. The helpless Frederick began to think it was time to shift for himself before the hard knocks came. He asked Gustavus to restore him at once to his Palatinate, but as Frederick refused to grant toleration to the Lutherans when he should be restored, the King determined to retain that country in his own hands as a pledge until the peace. At the end of May he heard that Ulm was threatened by a detached corps of Wallenstein's soldiers under Ossa. He left Banèr with a strong garrison in Munich, and, with an army now again reduced by garrisons and losses to twenty thousand, he marched backwards through Bavaria to the relief of Ulm. On his way he touched his southernmost point at Memmingen. There he heard still worse news.

It was from Saxony. The Saxons were running away. There was nothing unusual in that, and Gustavus had expected nothing else. But the Elector of Saxony was negotiating also. That was more serious. If John George and Wallenstein came to terms, they could bar his passage to the north. At first the King would not believe that his ally could have played him so false; he knew of Arnim's treachery before he knew of John George's, and indeed the one considerably preceded the other. We must retrace our steps for a while in order to see


how things had come to such a pass with the Elector of Saxony. A more perfect example of the way in which a good cause can be betrayed by a fool as well as by a knave has seldom been exhibited. I do not think the Elector of Saxony deliberately wished to destroy Gustavus, much less to destroy Protestantism; but, as I have said, he found his secondary position intensely galling. He had a firm conviction that his ancestors had gained great advantages by adhering to the Emperor—on one occasion at the expense of their consciences; and so they had. He forgot the second act of the drama of 1550, namely, that Maurice of Saxony had known when to desert the Emperor as well as when to support him. Side by side with this came the “third party movement,” on which Arnim was for ever insisting. We have seen that John George left his troops in Prague in December and retired to Dresden. That was one distinctly backward step. The next was the meeting at Torgau with the Elector of Brandenburg, which also has been already mentioned (February 16, 1632). There John George urged on George William the advantage to themselves of a separate peace with Ferdinand. One feels quite a tenderness for George William, because he refused to be drawn into this negotiation, and, while expressing the opinion that Gustavus ought to go away and think himself happy with a round sum of money, would still not conclude any alliance to his prejudice.


Gustavus knew of all this, for he kept a resident at the court of Dresden, but when Wallenstein took

command (definitely in April) of the Imperial army matters got much worse than this. All the three months of his provisional command Wallenstein had spent in working upon Arnim ; by April the latter was fully at his devotion. In those three months too the new Generalissimo had got together an army of forty thousand men, one of the worst and wickedest armies that have ever disgraced Europe—an army of men of all nations, all classes, all religious opinions, drawn together simply by the promise of plunder. It was notorious that the Imperial treasury was empty—pay was therefore out of the question. But Wallenstein was the prince of plunderers. As to the pay, as Dalgetty said, “an experienced cavalier might get out of the country the pay whilk he could not obtain from the Emperor.” The men who sacked Magdeburg were lambs compared to the men of whom Wallenstein was now at the head. It is therefore an immense tribute to his severity that he was able to keep them in order during their two months of hardship in the leaguer before Nuremberg. It was done simply by terror. When he now undertook the campaign, as the Emperor’s general, he stipulated that the Emperor should never appear in the army ; that he, Wallenstein, should have full power of confiscating lands ; and that the Emperor’s pardon should have no avail unless confirmed by him. Ferdinand must have been reduced indeed before he accepted such terms. They were terms that inevitably led to the overthrow and death of the General as soon as the Emperor thought that he could dispense with him.

Fortified with this power, and with the treachery of Arnim ready to his hand, Wallenstein advanced against the Saxon posts at Prague and Eger at the beginning of May. Whether he eventually meant to spare Saxony or not, it is not easy to say. All the time the Elector was writing to Gustavus that he hoped to join him in Southern Bohemia in the summer. But the Saxons were soon in full flight northwards to their own country; and it became a question not of the Elector meeting Gustavus half-way, but of whether Gustavus should not at once march northwards to succour the Elector, or to terrify him into remaining firm to the alliance. On the 11th of May, Wallenstein made direct but secret offers to Arnim. He would take off the Edict of Restitution, as far as regarded Saxony, and the two powers united should make war before Gustavus, as soon as the Emperor should have ratified the terms. For the present, however, Wallenstein declared that he would make a feint of war upon Saxony in order to lull the suspicion of the Jesuits at Vienna. For a feint of war, his measures were somewhat strong. He took Prague and pressed on into Saxony, plundering and burning. This was in order to shew the Elector what to expect if he did not come to instant terms. The Elector hesitated, and thought of the strict discipline which his Swedish ally had maintained on his march through Saxony. "How far it was a spark of honour, how far a dread of the Swedish weapons, that made him hesitate to conclude with Wallenstein, is hard to say," adds Droysen. To the terror of Arnim, who even went so far as to offer

to resign his command, John George refused for the present to commit himself. Wallenstein, to whom war was, as an even more high-handed robber than himself once said, "a matter of psychology," left his victim to revolve a while on his uneasy bed, and marched southwards at the end of May. It was just at the time at which Gustavus had resolved to march northwards. On the 9th of June the King of Sweden reached Nuremberg. Bad news met him from every side. His Bavarian conquests were falling away. Pappenheim was preparing to swoop down upon Franconia. Last of all, he learnt that Wallenstein was coming south to join Maximilian. That was not quite such bad news, after all. He would prevent that junction. The Viking's heart rose within the man at the prospect of battle.





CHAPTER XV.

NUREMBERG.

HE story draws towards a close, melancholy indeed, but not in any degree less glorious than when Europe first stood amazed at the King's success a year before. For the first time in his life Gustavus seems to have been undecided how to act. He had won his battles and all his successes hitherto by always taking the initiative. Now he seemed unable to do so. He turned hither and thither, uncertain to what point he should direct his forces. He sent orders to all his different *corps d'armée* to join him, and then allowed them to waste time in taking towns on their journey. If one might be permitted the use of such an expression, he seems to "have lost his head."

The Bavarian army lay along the northern bank of the Danube close to Regensburg at the beginning of June, when Wallenstein broke up from his first inroad into Saxony. Gustavus saw at once the importance of preventing a junction between his foes. He made a rapid dash out of the Nuremberg country into the Upper Palatinate, and cut off all the direct roads

between the two armies. But Maximilian had displayed unwonted swiftness, and had by a flank movement brought his advanced guard as far as Weiben on the 14th of June. There the advanced guard of Wallenstein was ready to join him. "All in thunder and light, all in fire and tempest, he takes and destroys the Prince Palatine's dominions, and the poor Protestant towns before him," says the *Swedish Intelligencer*. Onwards straight upon Nuremberg. It was not to save the Duke of Bavaria, who could have been but ill pleased at Wallenstein's ravages in a country which for ten years he had held and believed to be his own, but to fight Gustavus, or to drive him out of Germany, that the Generalissimo was coming. He had now sixty-five thousand troops at his back—troops, it is true, little used as yet to the serious operations of war, but admirably officered, and well in hand where actual business was likely to be going forward. Before such an army as this the King of Sweden, who had yet but eighteen thousand men at the most, retired again upon Nuremberg. There he finally resolved to take his stand.

The odds seemed almost hopeless, but Nuremberg was a splendidly fortified city, and thoroughly devoted to the cause. Gustavus had solemnly pledged his word to stand or fall with it. Now the destroyer had come, breathing terrible threats against the Nurembergers for the active assistance they had rendered to the "enemy of Germany." Whatever were the cost the King of Sweden must abide the fate of his faithful ally.

One can see in a moment that, from a military

point of view, his really best course would have been to fall back upon Würzburg or Mainz, or the Lower Main and Upper Rhine. With Bernard of Weimar in Swabia on his right, and Oxenstiern in the Palatinate on his left, he might himself have formed the apex of an irresistible triangle at Würzburg, and drawn supplies from his two bases. The only army that could have in any way troubled him, except Wallenstein's, would then have been the small one which Pappenheim was collecting in Lower Saxony, where a desultory war was going on on the Weser between that general and Tott. For once Gustavus had quitted Bavaria, and sacrificed Nuremberg to his enemies, it was not likely that Maximilian would be very forward to hurl himself against Franconia. His was mainly a local patriotism. And of Wallenstein without Maximilian, Gustavus could not have doubted to render a good account, as soon as he could draw all his forces to a head from Swabia and the Palatinate. Wallenstein's army once annihilated, it would take the Emperor a long time to get another, and he would probably prefer to listen to conditions of peace.

But victory crowned with peace would have been purchased all too dearly by the surrender of such a city, the sacrifice of such an ally as Nuremberg. As soon as he knew that Wallenstein was advancing against it, Gustavus's hesitation was gone. He called at once all his reinforcements, Oxenstiern from the Rhine, Bernard from Swabia, Baner from Donauwörth, William of Hesse, and William of Weimar. Then he prepared to make the defence of Nurem-

berg an epoch in the war. He had already sent his chief engineer to the city to begin additional fortifications. On June 19th he visited the town in person, and arranged that his camp should be supplied with 14,000 pounds of bread per diem. On the 23d the whole of his army was ready to take up the work of fortification, which they found already half done. The Nurembergers were indeed most forward in the matter; within fourteen days the whole city was surrounded with an entirely new ring of earthworks on the most approved Swedish pattern. Soldiers, burghers, peasants, and even women vied with each other in the good work. The city of Nuremberg is of an oval shape, with the river Pegnitz—a tributary of a tributary of the Main—running through it from east to west. The principal situation of the Swedish camp was towards the south and west; and the works were strongest upon the south, for the King suspected (as turned out to be the truth) that the enemy was likely to encamp upon the hills, which face that side of the city, and which are divided from it by a plain of about four miles across. At the bottom of the hills the little river Rednitz flows to join the Pegnitz some way below Fürth. The moat round the whole of the Swedish entrenchments was twelve feet wide and eight deep. Over 300 cannon, partly Swedish, partly out of the arsenal of Nuremberg, and not a few from the arsenal at Munich, defended the whole circuit. The spirits of the Nurembergers were high; all men between eighteen and fifty were enrolled in the new army, which, though of little use in open field, was of great service in defending the

entrenchments, and which reached the respectable total of 7,800 men.

Provisions were at first in plenty, though a fearful strain soon fell upon the resources of the city, owing to the number of peasants who had fled in from the country. The greatest anxiety was about the deficiency of forage for the horses.

The fortifications were not quite finished when Wallenstein's gigantic army appeared, somewhere about 65,000 to 70,000 strong. Gallas and Aldringer, Holck and Sparre, Piccolomini, and almost all the officers of his former army were in his train. He advanced to the south-western end of the hills, which I have just mentioned, and began to take up his position on them between Stein and Fürth. Had he listened to Maximilian he would have attacked Gustavus at once, and indeed the latter expected and hoped that he would. But Wallenstein knew that his troops were not yet of a calibre to cope with the veterans of the King, and he told Maximilian plainly that he meant to shew Gustavus a different fashion of making war. At first Wallenstein's idea seems to have been to compel his enemy not to make war at all, but to make peace. Gradually this changed into a design to starve him out. By creating a great entrenched camp to the south-west of Nuremberg he would cut the King off from his bases of supplies in the upper Danube and Rhine, while his Croats would be able to scour all the roads leading into Franconia. The camp that he now laid out could not compare in regularity or skilful fortification with that of the Swedes; but of this



THE SWEDISH POSITION AT NUREMBERG.


there was no need, as the hills themselves formed the best possible natural entrenchment. "He is none of the best spademen," says the *Swedish Intelligencer*, "nor had he any good engineers with him. Some of his quarters were but slight ones, a little earth cast up, and barricadoed with wagons, trees, and other encumbrments." Such as it was this vast camp was nearly eight miles round, and took in two or three whole villages. It was divided into two halves by the stream of the Bibert flowing to join the Rednitz at the foot of the hills. On the northernmost point, where the hill is at its highest, the outwork was an old ruined château, called the "Burgstall," or "Alte Veste," hidden in a deep wood, through which avenues were now cut for the passage of the defenders. The whole of the front was lined with cannon. Vainly did the Swedes try to hinder the fortification of this commanding eminence; Wallenstein had broken down all the bridges over the Rednitz, and his cannons were too near for any attempt to repair them.

There the Imperial general sat—affecting great privacy and retirement in his pavilion when he pleased, and making very little of any advice which Maximilian thought fit to give him. The strictest severity reigned within the camp. "*Hang the beast* (that is his word) that obeys not with a servile celerity," says the *Intelligencer*. He had one immense advantage over Gustavus in the possession of an effective light cavalry in the Croats.* "That

* It may be remembered what an immense advantage Austria enjoyed over Frederick the Great in the later Seven Years' War from the possession of this same light horse.

which most troubled both armies was want of straw and horse-meat," and at procuring this and all other kind of provisions the Croats were famous. "They are the ranke riders and common harryers of the Imperial army, they are not troubled with an eighth commandment"; and Gustavus had nothing to oppose to their nocturnal raids. Hence throughout most of the two months during which these two famous generals sat glaring at each other, with the eyes of Europe fixed upon them, Wallenstein's success in skirmishes and in the collection of forage was the greater. Soon the pinch of hunger began to be felt: first in the city of Nuremberg, then in the Swedish, lastly in the Imperial camp. The city bakers, of whom there were one hundred and thirty-eight, were unable to supply bread fast enough. The mills (outside the town for the most part) were unable to grind fast enough. Men fought in the streets outside the bakers' shops for their pittance. The town council adopted the expedient of fixing the price of provisions—all to no purpose. The horses starved first, and dying, infected the air. Pestilence always follows on hunger, and pestilence in July in a mediæval town, crowded for the nonce with double its normal population, is a fearful thing to contemplate. Every hospital and lazar-house was full: the graves could hardly be made fast enough to hold the dead. Altogether 29,000 human beings died in Nuremberg and in the two camps in the year 1632.

In the camps too the dead horses proved a serious inconvenience. Monro tells of many "cavaliers that were fain to go afoot." Even the King of Bohemia



ALBERT VON WALLENSTEIN.
Duke of Friedland and Mecklenburg

was "troubled of a flux." And worse than famine or pestilence, came breaches of discipline in the Swedish camp. The King's oration to his soldiers is famous. It was on the occasion of a complaint of the citizens that pillage was becoming the order of the day with his men. "It is rumoured," he said, "that the Swedes are as bad as the Imperialists, but I know better. They are no Swedes that commit these crimes," (and Monro was witness to this also), "but you Germans yourselves. Had I known that you had been a people so wanting in natural affection for your own country, I would never have saddled a horse for your sakes, much less imperilled my life and my crown and my brave Swedes and Finns. I came but to restore every man to his own, but this most accursed and devilish robbing of yours doth much abate my purpose. I have not enriched myself so much as by one pair of boots, since my coming to Germany, though I have had forty tons of gold passing through my hands. By such means as you are now employing, victory will never be won." This speech he followed up by some executions of ringleaders, and a proclamation, "That if, as he heard was rumoured, the Germans should mutiny against his just severity, he with his Swedes and Finlanders would 'undertake to rattle them so that the very shivers of their staves should fly about their ears.'"

A peasant complained that a soldier had stolen his cow: "My son," said the King, as the soldier pleaded for life, "it is better that I should now punish thee, than that the wrath of God for thy misdeeds,

and his Judgments should fall on me and thee and all of us here present."

Wallenstein's contempt of human life and human suffering stood him in good stead during that awful time. It was well known in the Swedish camp that the Imperialists were no better off than themselves. It gradually became a contest, who should endure starvation the longest. Gustavus at last fully resolved, that as soon as his entire reinforcements should arrive, he would try and storm the camp on the hills. These reinforcements yet tarried. It seemed to Oxenstiern a great pity to have to leave the Rhenish campaign, and probably lose all its fruits. He had penetrated far into Alsace, while Gustavus was in Bavaria, but fortune had not been altogether favourable to the Swedes. Speyer in the Palatinate had capitulated shamefully, and Gustavus had the commandant beheaded for cowardice. Horn, who had come from the Main to join Oxenstiern at the end of June, had somewhat restored the state of things, and had pressed northwards as far as Coblenz, which he took. But then came the King's order to hurry on with all available speed to Nuremberg.

During the terrible tedium of these two months Gustavus's restless brain had not been idle. It was from the Nuremberg patricians that he had first learnt to set a true value upon the South German Protestants and their constancy. It was upon his second, and (this) his third visit to Nuremberg, that he sketched out in common with them his great plan for the future defence of German Protestant-

ism. The scheme of a "Corpus Evangelicorum" was to be presented to the Emperor as one of the necessary articles of a general peace. In form it was to be a great evangelical confederation—of both confessions—under the presidency of the King of Sweden, who would be bound to come to help them in time of need. For this purpose, and as security for Sweden herself, she was to possess, as a full member of the Empire, the port of Wismar and the duchy of Pomerania. Brandenburg was to be indemnified for its claims upon the latter with a portion of Silesia, Saxony was to have Bohemia or Lusatia, Hesse Cassel and Weimar were also to share in the spoils of the Hapsburgs, upon whom—and justly—all the cost of the war was to fall. It was a statesmanlike scheme, but, as I have said before in speaking of a very similar proposal, it took no account of German patriotism. It is true there was no need to take account of such a thing at the time, for it hardly existed. But it might come into existence, and, if it ever should, Sweden would be the first object of its vengeance. What if it should arise in the now despised and sleepy house of Hohenzollern?

Gradually from the three principal sources of reinforcement, Oxenstiern, Baner, and Duke Bernard drew together towards Nuremberg, and Hesse and William of Weimar approached from the north towards the end of July. Not till the 12th of August was the conjunction of all the troops effected; Gustavus then found himself at the head of fifty thousand men. Vainly he hoped that Wallenstein


would have attempted to hinder the junction, but Wallenstein sat still. It seemed to be against all the rules of warfare to do so ; the Swedes began to think that the man was bewitched.

In one respect the addition of thirty-five thousand men made Gustavus's position still more difficult than before. How he contrived to feed them for fourteen days more remains a mystery. He found himself obliged to force on an action for sheer want of food. On August 21st he rose from his camp under the walls, and, advancing northwards by Fürth, crossed the Rednitz. Under the very eyes of Wallenstein's northern outposts, under the Alte Veste itself, he began to form another camp. Wallenstein let him form it unhindered, but drew all his own forces together into the northern corner of his entrenchments. The movement in the Imperialist camp made Gustavus think that Wallenstein had thrown up the game and was retiring. On the 22d "spying in the morning with his perspective from one of his new batteries a gallant cavalier mounted and prancing before his comrades,—'that surely,' said the King, 'should be either Wallenstein or Aldringer, and have at him.' Causing a piece to be traversed and bent full upon him, the King took his level and bade give fire to it. Up into the air flew the Cavalier, horse and man, but it proved to be but a colonell." Thus disappointed of his man the King on the 24th ordered a general assault upon the Alte Veste, and all along the northern side of the camp. It was obviously to be an infantry battle, for no cavalry could charge up that rough and broken hill. Aldrin-

ger and Wallenstein himself were in command upon that corner of the position. Twelve hours long the Swedes stormed with undaunted courage against fearful odds and with fearful losses. Bernard, on the extreme right, made good his hold upon one little sconce, and held it all night. On the left Gustavus himself was in the thickest of the fight, dragging the cannon to convenient spots, and pointing them with his own hands. Three times the Swedes got actual footing in the Burgstall itself. Three times Aldringer hurled them out again. Had they once held that spot for a few hours and been able to bring their cannon up, they could have raked Wallenstein's position from end to end. All night long the cannon had roared on both sides. With the early August dawn it began to rain, and the slippery turf could no longer afford foothold for the attack. At ten o'clock Wallenstein with a last charge drove out the gallant Duke of Weimar, and the battle was lost. The Swedes had left over four thousand dead upon the slopes. Torstenson was taken prisoner, Banèr wounded, the King had his boot sole shot away, Bernard's horse had been killed under him. Even the icy Wallenstein confessed to the Emperor that there had been a hot battle. The prisoners assured the King of Sweden that Wallenstein's ammunition must have failed, could the cannonade from below have been kept up but another two hours.

In truth, to anyone who examines the ground, it would seem to have been a well-nigh impossible enterprise. It was only sheer necessity that compelled Gustavus to attempt it. Hepburn, the bravest

of the Scots leaders, told the King he would follow or lead wherever he was ordered, but that he held it to be impossible. The King had no doubt relied too much upon the reports that Wallenstein was breaking up, but his adversary seemed as unmoved after the battle as before it : he courteously parleyed for an exchange of prisoners, and Torstenson was able to return to the command of the Swedish artillery. For a few days Gustavus seemed determined to stay and see the matter out beside his faithful Nuremberg. But knowing that Wallenstein was now in no condition to attempt a siege, he at last decided with a heavy heart to draw away. On the 8th of September, leaving Oxenstiern with the direction of the war and old General Kniphausen with a strong garrison of four thousand picked troops to defend the city, he marched off with drums beating and colours flying, right under his adversaries' camp. His adversary never moved. But on the 12th a row of blazing villages round Nuremberg told the famished citizens that their enemy was gone. The fight round the Alte Veste had probably been little less disastrous to him than to the Swedes. But in the contest of starvation Wallenstein had been the victor, because he had starved for three days longer than the King. And this victory had put the game into his hands.



CHAPTER XVI.

LÜTZEN.

ALLENSTEIN'S letters are not, as a rule, authorities to which one can trust, but his despatch to the Emperor dated the 8th September, the day of Gustavus's retreat, fairly expresses his view of the situation. "The King lay 14 days at Fürth, and now having lost nearly one-third of his army from hunger and discomfort, has to-day departed, whither I cannot learn. For military reasons I should imagine that he would betake himself to the Main. I mean at all events to follow him, and again fix my camp close to his, until I have fully consumed him. I hear that Pappenheim is coming this way too, so that we shall probably enclose the King from both sides. . . . I did not follow him, first because my cavalry was too scattered to do so, secondly because he is sure to beset all the passes in his rear, thirdly because I did not wish to risk the fruits I have won. For I believe that the King's course is already downwards, that he has completely lost credit, and that he will be utterly done for as soon as Pappenheim arrives."

It was then Wallenstein's intention to follow up the King, whom he rightly believed to be anxious to make for the north, both to shield Saxony and to get nearer to the sea-coasts. But the King's courage returned when he found himself free ; once more the initiative was open to him, and for a moment he conceived the brilliant plan of dividing his army so that while sending a strong detachment under Bernard to protect John George, he could himself advance into the hereditary countries. This was Oxenstiern's advice and Bernard's too. It would probably have the effect of drawing Wallenstein to Austria, and this time the King would find some means of attacking him in the open field. Moreover, it would certainly have the effect of dividing Maximilian from the Imperial army, for the former would hasten back for the defence of Bavaria, through which Gustavus's way would first lie.

Part of this plan the King did actually carry out. He had, after breaking up from Nuremberg, advanced some few days' march towards the north-west. He now left Bernard with some 8,000 men in Franconia, with orders to advance northwards parallel with the enemy and observe his motions. He sent the rest of the troops back to their garrisons, and with not more than 10,000 himself, recrossed the Danube and the Lech and proceeded towards Ingolstadt. Wallenstein, rejoiced to find his hands free, gave up his plan of following Gustavus, and, laughing at the request of Maximilian that he would accompany him to help in the defence of Bavaria, determined to carry out his deferred plan of attack on Saxony.

Maximilian, with an army reduced by the privations of the camp to some 14,000, hastened to secure Regensburg. Thus both armies were divided.

It must be remembered that, although a decisive check had been put to Gustavus's victorious career, the Swedish arms were still everywhere on the advance—nothing had as yet been actually lost. Arnim was still in command of a good 20,000 men on the north-east, and Arnim's master still nominally in alliance with the King of Sweden. Horn, who had been left behind in command of a very small force on the Rhine, when Oxenstiern came to Nuremberg in July, had done wonders all up the left bank of the river and in Alsace, and had even possessed himself of Strasburg, then a free Imperial city. The Spaniards and Lorrainers had fled before him, and were nearly driven out of Germany. Pappenheim and Tott were carrying on a war on about equal terms on the Weser, but the Swedes had got fast foot in the Archbishopric of Bremen. If once Gustavus could beat Wallenstein in the open field, the reaction which both of them saw approaching would be stopped.

When Wallenstein marched upon Schweinfurt after the separation from Maximilian, Bernard with his little army hurried to the defence of the city, and Wallenstein retired before a corps of half his own numbers. Bernard rendered inestimable service to Gustavus by besetting all the passes through the Thuringian forests, and thus saving Erfurt, for Wallenstein would probably have preferred to direct his main body that way, in order to cut off Gustavus

from being able to follow him. But, finding this now impossible, Wallenstein, who, if not a great general in battle, was at least a complete master of the waiting game, prepared the way into Saxony by sending forward by a more eastern route Colonel Holck with the wildest of the Croats, and, while writing hypocritical instructions to spare the peasantry, made no secret that it was his pleasure that the land should be thoroughly destroyed and wasted. His maxim ever was not to commit himself on paper. He wrote also urgently to Pappenheim to join him in Franconia, or at least in Saxony. Pappenheim, though closely *lié* with Wallenstein, was unwilling, after having been for some time under no command but his own, to come; but perceiving the importance of the crisis, he did eventually effect a junction with the Generalissimo at Merseburg a few days before Gustavus arrived in Saxony (Oct. 21st).

All this came upon Gustavus quite suddenly. He had reckoned that Wallenstein would surely detach at least part of his troops for the probable event of the defence of Austria. He was just preparing to advance to the siege of Ingolstadt (Oct. 8th), when a courier from Oxenstiern brought the news that the Imperialist main army, twenty thousand strong, had crossed the Saxon frontier on the 5th. His resolution was instantly taken. He would retire from Bavaria and Franconia, leaving strong garrisons everywhere, cross Thuringia and concentrate at Erfurt. This was no sooner resolved than the execution of it began. He left Bavaria on the 8th, on the 10th he was at Nordlingen, on the 12th he turned aside with

a small detachment of guards to Naumburg, where he picked up Kniphausen and Oxenstiern, sending the army on in advance. On their march through the Thuringian forest (22d and 23d) he communicated to his trusted chancellor, as if with a presentiment of approaching death, his plans for the continuance of the war, in which he, Oxenstiern, was to be the legate of the crown of Sweden, and to bind faster the bonds between it and the South German Protestants. But even more than with the great cause, in these last days, the King's thoughts were with his dear native land, and the little helpless maid who was to inherit the burden of his crown. It was now that he sketched out the form of government which he wished to have established during her minority, which form, practically unmodified, Oxenstiern afterwards presented to the Swedish Estates as the constitution of 1634. On the 23d Bernard joined the King. Each had about six thousand foot, and between them they had about seven thousand five hundred horse. These numbers were only afterwards diminished by small garrisons, left at Naumburg and Weissenfels, and this may therefore be taken to have been the King's effective strength at the battle of Lützen. On October 28th the army was at Erfurt, having marched from Bavaria in eighteen days. Wallenstein was amazed when he heard of such speed. "The Swedes came as if they had flown." Bernard, who had not been pleased that Gustavus had not left him the honour of attempting the deliverance of Saxony, was fully reconciled before they left Erfurt. At Erfurt he met his Queen, and after

a hasty supper spent the night in writing despatches, and prepared to start for the Saale the next morning. The market-place was thronged with crowds of people, who hailed him with cries of joy and triumph. But he felt that his days of triumph were over. "Think not of me," he replied to them, "for I am nothing but a weak and dying man. Think only of the cause." After a tender adieu to his Queen and to Oxenstiern, and a charge to the garrison of Erfurt to stand by them in case of his defeat, he rode after his troops, who were already on the march. On October 31st he reached the Saale, and began to entrench himself at the little town of Naumburg, on the right bank of the river. From thence he wrote urgent letters to the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg and the Elector of Saxony bidding them hasten to join him.

In the meantime Wallenstein had advanced in more leisurely fashion by the valley of the Mulde as far as Leipzig. He had taken Merseburg and Weissenfels and effected his junction with Pappenheim. On the same day, October 21st, he sent to summon the city of Leipzig to surrender. Leipzig, as in September of the previous year, was inclined to hold out, but gave way before a day's bombardment. In the last ten days of the month of October the Imperialists spread over the whole country between the Elbe and the Saale. Vainly, however, had they attempted to possess themselves of Naumburg; Gustavus had been too quick for them. The inhabitants of the town came out and flung themselves on their knees before their deliverer, for the ravages of the

Croats had barely left a village standing wherever they had come. "Ah," said the King to the Naumburgers, "now you honour me like a God, and God will surely punish me for receiving such adoration. Yet I hope that He, who knows that I take no delight in such honour, will not suffer my work to fail whatever becomes of me, seeing it is for the glory of His Holy Name."

Wallenstein was preparing to march upon Dresden when he learnt the news that Gustavus was at Erfurt. He determined to repeat the proceedings of the summer, and entrench himself over against the King. At first he selected Weissenfels, at a distance of about ten miles from Naumburg, for this purpose. Everything seemed to promise the Imperialists that no further attack would be made by the Swedes that winter. The first days of November were suddenly and surprisingly cold, so cold that Gustavus even moved some of his troops out of their camp into nightly billets in the town of Naumburg. This confirmed Wallenstein's idea that he did not mean fighting this year. Consequently he allowed Pappenheim, at the latter's urgent request, to march away again to the Weser and Lower Rhine, where his presence was indispensably necessary for the preservation of the Electorate of Cologne, which was threatened by the Swedish general, Baudissin. Pappenheim was to take some eight thousand troops with him, and to possess himself of Halle on the way. This left Wallenstein with about twenty-five thousand men, and he was determined to shift his quarters a few miles further down the Saale. Leaving Colloredo

with five thousand men to watch the enemy he slowly withdrew toward Lützen. On the 4th* of November news was brought to Gustavus of these events, the departure of Pappenheim, and the retrograde movement of the main body of the enemy. The King called for Bernard of Weimar and Kniphausen. "Fight," said the gallant Bernard—it was always his advice—"Wait," said Kniphausen, an equally valiant but rather unlucky old general, in whom however the King reposed the greatest confidence, as is witnessed by the long series of letters which he addressed to him during the campaign,—“Wait until Brunswick and Saxony come up.” The King might have waited long for such an event. How Duke George of Brunswick-Lüneburg excused himself we do not know; we know that the Elector replied that he was “so deeply sensible of the importance of the occasion, that he would send two regiments to join the King at once. The rest he wanted for the maintenance of his own fortresses.” So wrote John George on the 6th. Fifteen hundred Saxons; that was to be his contribution to the army of the man who had thrown up the fairest prospects of victory and peace, and who was now risking his own troops and his own life against considerable odds for the defence of Saxony. But before the letter of the Elector—much more before the fifteen hundred men—had left the Saxon camp, all was over on the plain of Lützen. On the evening of that council the news that Wallenstein’s new cantonments were even more dispersed than was at first believed decided the King, who had rather leant to Kniphausen’s view, to adopt

* Old style.

Bernard's in preference. To wait for the Saxons was to let Wallenstein wait for Pappenheim; it was better to attack at once, for the absence of Pappenheim was worth more than the presence of many thousand Saxons. At four o'clock on the morning of the 5th, therefore, the King's army advanced towards Weissenfels, still hoping that the Saxons, who were no further off than Torgau, might come to his assistance. Colloredo from the lofty castle at Weissenfels perceived that there was something moving through the November mist. At ten o'clock Wallenstein was amazed to hear three cannon shots, which had been Colloredo's preconcerted signal that the enemy was advancing, booming from the southwards. In the greatest haste he wrote off to Pappenheim, who was but two days' march away: "The enemy is advancing. Sir, let everything else be, and hurry with all your forces and artillery back to me. You must be here by to-morrow morning—he is already over the pass." This letter, drenched in Pappenheim's blood is still to be seen at Vienna—he had carried it into the battle in his breast. The pass referred to is the pass over the Rippach, a little tributary of the Saale between Weissenfels and Lützen, which was beset by Croats, whom the Swedes had hurled back without much difficulty. But the distance was greater than the King had been led to believe, and the darkness fell before the Swedes could get far enough to do more than skirmish with Wallenstein's outposts. Two hours more daylight would indeed have delivered the enemy into Gustavus's hands. It was not till late at night that all Wallenstein's regiments

could be gathered together; man by man they fell into their places in order of battle as they arrived. And so both armies passed the bitter winter night facing each other, "every regiment lying down in the same order that they had marched, with their arms by them." The King of Sweden slept in his field coach with Bernard and Kniphausen.

Between the armies lay a flat plain, one of the flattest in Northern Saxony. The road from Lützen to Leipzig divided it in two, and this road is still bordered on both sides by ditches, which do not then seem to have contained much water. Wallenstein's spademen were labouring all night at deepening these ditches, and they were then lined with musketeers. These ditches communicate with a canal called the Flossgraben, which sweeps round the eastern side of Lützen to the south, and there joins another canal, called the Muhlgraben, which runs north and south through the town itself. These canals connect the Saale with its own tributary, the Elster. Probably all the *ditches* were small enough for cavalry to jump and for infantry to scramble through, for the Swedes crossed and recrossed them many times on that bloody day. Even the Flossgraben was easily wadeable. But it is obvious that irregularities like these afforded the greatest advantage to the slow-moving, heavy-armed troops of the Imperialists, and a corresponding disadvantage to the Swedes—the attacking party,—the essence of whose attack lay in its swiftness. Just as the hedge at Naseby, lined with Okey's dragoons, enabled Fairfax to break the Royalist charge, so the Leipzig-

road ditches, lined with musketeers, enabled Wallenstein to keep in check the left wing and centre of the Swedish advance. Wallenstein's position was northwards of this high-road to Leipzig, his right resting on the town of Lützen, where a slight rise and some windmills afforded him a good natural position for nine pieces of heavy ordnance, and his left was towards the Flossgraben. The general arrangement of the "battle" and wings of the two armies was the same as at Breitenfeld in the previous year.* Weight and mobility were again arrayed against each other, the one-line system against the two-line-and-reserve system. But this time the relative numbers of the two armies were reversed. Gustavus had about 18,000 men, Wallenstein 25,000; and the latter expected other 8,000 or 10,000 to arrive, with Pappenheim, at every moment. When

*I follow the *Swedish Intelligencer*, Droysen, Arkenholtz, and Geijer in representing Wallenstein as having only one line, in preference to Gualdo, the French writers, and Förster, whose account is apparently based upon a plan for ordering the battle (in three lines) drawn in Wallenstein's own hand, but perhaps not carried out. There is, however, great diversity of evidence and greater discrepancies in the account of this battle than in that of any other of the battles of the war. For instance, it is impossible to determine whether or no Pappenheim was killed before the King, or whether he even reached the battle-field before the King's death. One of the most interesting accounts of the battle is a letter from George Fleetwood to his father in England, written at Stettin on November 22d. It was published in the first volume of the "Camden Miscellany." He adds fresh doubts by saying that it was the heavy guns by the windmills, not the seven pieces in front of the Imperialist line, that were so often taken and retaken. He says that Gustavus was killed between 11 and 12 o'clock, and that the battle lasted till 5 o'clock. He hints at the treason of the Duke of Saxe Lauenburg, and says

Pappenheim should come he was to take command of the cuirassiers on the left wing, Holck and Piccolomini being temporarily placed at their head. Wallenstein himself—carried in a litter, for he could not ride, owing to the gout—was in command of the centre. On the right it is admitted that Wallenstein had taken a leaf out of the Swedish book, and interspersed his cavalry with parties of musketeers. This was probably owing to the nature of the ground, intersected with low garden walls, which afforded good cover for sharpshooters. This wing was commanded by Colloredo. On the extremity of both wings were large parties of Croats. In the first line of the Swedish centre were four half brigades of infantry under Count Nils Brahe, the only Swede besides the King who filled a prominent post that day. Bernard had the left wing of horse,

that the King had false intelligence the day before the battle. The best case made out for Wallenstein's having two lines is in a pamphlet published in 1832, at Berlin, by von Vincke. Droysen, who, in the Munich "*Forschungen zur Deutsche Geschichte*," V., wrote an article about the battle, concludes finally that all the contemporary records and broadsheets about the arrangement of the two armies are worthless. Battles in those days were fought absolutely independently of "terrain." Neither Wallenstein's plan nor Gustavus's own, which is preserved in the archives at Stockholm, give the least indication that they were more than suggestions, and Wallenstein's he inclines to think, is a mere catalogue of regiments. That Wallenstein had some sort of a reserve appears more from the account of one of his officers, Diodati, who was present, than from any satisfactory plan of the battle which we possess. This has led Droysen to say, in his large work, that the arrangement of the two armies was apparently not substantially different from that adopted at Breitenfeld. In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, I have based my account of the battle on this view.

the King himself, with whom were Stålhanske and his Finlanders, the right. Henderson with the Scots brigade (but, unfortunately for us, without Monro, who was not present at this battle) formed the reserve of foot between the lines. Kniphausen led the other four half brigades of foot in the centre of the second line, the right and left wings of which were composed of horse under Balach and Hoffkirch, respectively. The final reserve of cavalry, behind Kniphausen, was led by Colonel Ohm. Gustavus had twenty pieces of heavy cannon before his centre and about forty "regimental pieces" in front of the commanded musketeers, who were interspersed among the horse.

"The Bride never longed for the wedding morning," says the *Swedish Intelligencer*, "as the King longed for the day to break." But when dawn came a thick mist overspread the field, and "the sun, as if his great eye had beforehand overread the fatality of the day, seemed very loath to begin it. . . . But the martial King, ever forcing himself to awaken time and hasten on mortality, would needs make his drums beat two hours before daylight."

Prayers were then read at the head of each regiment and Luther's Psalm, "Eine feste Burg ist unser Gott," and the King's own battle hymn, "Versage nicht du Hauflein klein," were sung as the men stood to their arms. The King went into the battle without armour as his custom was, and on his usual white charger, and without having tasted food. He made a short speech to his soldiers. To the Swedes he said: "There you have the enemy in front of you.

He is not on a mountain or behind entrenchments this time, but on the open plain. You know well how eagerly he has sought to avoid fighting, and that he is only fighting now because he cannot escape us. Fight then, my dear countrymen and friends, for God, your country, and your King. I will reward you all, and bravely : but if you flinch from the fight, you know well that not a man of you will ever see Sweden again." And to the Germans he spoke in a similar strain. Then he waved his sword over his head, crying : " Forward in God's name ; Jesu ! Jesu ! Jesu ! help us to strive to-day to the honour of thy Holy Name."

The first object of the Swedish attack was to drive the Imperialists westwards back upon Lützen, and the road to Halle—at all events to cut them off from the road to Leipzig, so that the junction with the Saxon army, which Gustavus still continued to expect, might be the easier. Towards ten o'clock the mist lifted, and what sun and wind there was appeared to be in favour of the King. Lützen was already in flames burnt by Wallenstein, either in order to cut his own men off from the hopes of retreat by the road through it, or to prevent the Swedish left from sweeping round his flank. The day began with artillery fire from both sides, which lasted for about an hour, until the Swedes had pressed forward to the very edge of the Leipzig road. Then the charges began, horse and foot at once all along the lines. From that moment (eleven o'clock) for nine hours the battle raged so wildly and so densely, that no connected or intelligible account

of it is left to us. The King hurled his right wing over the ditches at the edge of the Flossgraben, drove the Croats in wild flight from the field, and charged pell-mell on Piccolomini's cuirassiers. Stålhanske afterwards related how he had heard him say, "Never mind the Croats, have at those black fellows, for they are the men that will else undo us," (meaning the cuirassiers in their black armour). The black fellows fought like demons. Piccolomini, who led them, was wounded several times, but would not leave the field. Gradually they were driven back. Meanwhile in the centre the Swedes had won the road, cleared the ditches, seized the first battery of the enemy, when a fearful charge from the cavalry of the Imperialist left and right centres drove them back again and recovered the guns. In the endeavour to withstand this charge, in one of the Swedish regiments every captain had fallen; the Yellows, the Blues, one after the other, hurled themselves forward, but were repulsed and almost annihilated.

A little after midday, Pappenheim arrived with the foremost squadron of his cuirassiers. "Where is the King commanding?" he cried. The King was the adversary, whom of all others, the fiery cavalry leader deemed worthy of his steel. But it was not to be. Pappenheim fell mortally wounded but a few minutes before Gustavus fell asleep on the bed of honour. Hearing of the disaster to his centre, the King had put himself at the head of the Småland regiment of cavalry, and flung off to the rally; far ahead of his men as usual. Just behind him rode

Duke Francis Albert of Saxe Lauenburg and two pages, one a boy of eighteen named Leubelfing. A sudden wreath of mist came down as the party galloped to the left, and hid them from the sight of their following troops—hid from them also a body of cuirassiers who approached. A pistol-shot struck the white charger in the neck, another broke the King's bridle arm. The noble beast began to plunge. "Cousin," says the King to Duke Francis, half fainting, "help me out of the battle, for I am sore hurt." They turned, and a musket-ball struck the King in the back. He fell from the saddle. The Duke rode off with his life, Leubelfing stayed with his master. Up rode the cuirassiers and demanded the name of the fallen man. "I am the King of Sweden," he replied, "who do seal the Religion and Liberty of the German nation with my blood." The horsemen drove their swords again and again into the breast of the dying man, and mortally wounded the faithful page. Then they stripped and plundered the body, and rode off, before the first riders of the regiment that had followed the King could arrive. To them the news was communicated by the sight of the white horse, riderless and streaming with blood that was too red to be his own. He tore wildly along the Swedish lines. But the battle soon became too fierce even for the rescue of the body; when it was eventually recovered by Stålhanske it was put in an ammunition waggon and carried to the little village of Meuchen.

The news had quickly spread to Duke Bernard,

who had been up to this time successful in beating back the right wing of his enemies towards the blazing town of Lützen. Bernard had been specially designated by Gustavus to take command, in case he himself should fall. He now rode round to Kniphausen, who, looking ruefully on the debris of the first line of infantry, said that the battle was not so far lost but that they could make an orderly retreat. "Retreat!" cried the Duke, "the time for that is past. It is vengeance now!" And he slew with his own hands a lieutenant who refused to lead his men again to the charge. Brahe, who was still unwounded, went to Bernard's former post on the left, Bernard to the King's on the right, and Kniphausen, melting the first and second lines into one, led on the centre. Manœuvring there was none any longer, it was simply a death-grapple all along the lines. In the first charge the Swedes, maddened by their loss, carried everything before them; the body of their beloved leader was rescued, the hostile guns retaken, and Wallenstein's powder waggons blown into the air. But the arrival of the last detachment of Pappenheim's cavalry at about four o'clock turned the tide, and the cavalry battle rolled back over the same ground again. It was then that Nils Brahe fell. The Swedish footmen died where they stood. The flower of Gustavus's army was cut to pieces. The veterans from the Polish and Livonian wars were not used to running away. Nothing could induce Duke Bernard to retreat, and Torstenson's artillery could still be plied with deadly effect. The Imperialists could get no further than the high-road.

There with a last prodigious effort the whole remaining horse and foot of Sweden stood firm—advanced—charged—and won. Darkness had set in before Pappenheim's foot arrived, only in time to be borne away in the retreat of the whole Imperial army. Whither they retreated Bernard cared but little. The King was avenged. If his soul like those of his Norse ancestors could rejoice in the multitude of the slain, it would have goodly company on its road to Valhalla.

But it was not as a heathen Norseman that he had lived and died ; rather as a Christian gentleman. If I were asked to find a parallel to him among those who have controlled the destinies of the world, I should pitch upon Saint Louis, King of France—in whom also were combined the three greatest qualities of a ruler of men, Justice, Courage, and Devotion. Saint Louis, being born out of due time, lacked the fourth great quality which was so rarely displayed in Gustavus, a quality or virtue which is indeed in itself but a daughter of Justice—Tolerance. The true glory of the King of Sweden was that he was the champion of Protestantism. Protestantism, though here and there it has been intolerant, and has used its triumphs unmercifully, has always led to Freedom, and Freedom to Toleration. And Toleration has been the great—the only really great—achievement of the Modern World.

Before the altar of the little village church at Meuchen the corpse of the Hero was laid on the evening of the battle. Stålhanske's Finlanders, who

had recovered it, sat mute on their horses in full armour inside the building, while the village schoolmaster read the Lutheran service for the dead. Then it was carried to the schoolmaster's house—so covered with wounds it was, that the entrails had to be taken out there and then and buried in the Church. Then the schoolmaster, who was also the village carpenter, made a rude coffin in which the body was borne to Weissenfels, where it was embalmed, and thence to Wittenberg, accompanied by four hundred (the only survivors) of the Småland regiment, in leading which the King had fallen. From Wittenberg to Wolgast in Pomerania, and from thence in the following summer it was brought to Sweden. On June 21, 1634, the mortal remains of the Lion of the North were laid to rest in the Riddarholm church at Stockholm. There in a marble sarcophagus, under the tattered banners which tell of his earthly triumphs, lies the Hero of Sweden.

What was his character? If it has not been made clear by the description which I have endeavoured to give of his life, nothing that I could say in conclusion would make it any clearer. Simple, brave, passionate, truthful, devout; with the highest sense of his kingly dignity, and a yet higher sense of his great mission on earth, it is not unfair to say of him that he had a single eye to the work God had given him to do. More cannot be said of any man.

What were his aims? That has always been a great problem. But, if any one may be supposed to have known his mind, it surely was Axel Oxenstiern, with whom, during his whole reign, he lived upon

terms of intimacy so affectionate to be very uncommon between great men of equal rank, but rare indeed between a subject and his sovereign. And all Oxenstiern's utterances on the subject have the same ring: "A great Scandinavian Empire, if you will, The Baltic and the Baltic coasts for Sweden. But NOT the crown of the Holy Roman Empire."

Swede and Vasa to the backbone, it was his own country after all that had most to bewail his loss. But the passionate grief in the streets of Stockholm found more than echo in every Protestant town in Europe—and in many Catholic; but most in that down-trodden Germany, to which he had appeared like a deliverer from on high, and which a Swedish historian finely calls his "dear Fosterland." For that land his death had almost as great an effect as his living deeds. It sanctified a cause which the German princes themselves had only known how to betray. He had been the first to set a bound to the tyranny which Germany was powerless to resist, and which would, if not resisted, have spread far beyond Germany, even far beyond distant Sweden. And for that reason Germany, Sweden, and mankind count him among their heroes.





GRAVE OF GUSTAVUS IN RIDDARHOLM CHURCH.



IT will be perhaps useful if I am allowed to add a few words as to the subsequent connection of Sweden with the Thirty Years' War. Oxenstiern at once assumed the task for which Gustavus had designated him, and for which he was peculiarly fitted—that of creating a real union of South German Protestants, and disposing of their resources towards the prosecution of the war. The command of the Swedish armies passed at once, though not so naturally, to

Duke Bernard of Weimar, with Gustavus Horn in close conjunction. The French alliance was renewed, the league of Heilbronn concluded with the four Southern and Western circles of Germany, and the full direction of the war remained as before in the hands of the Swedes.

But the change which had come soon made itself felt—a regular scramble for pensions, places, and provinces set in. Bernard got himself invested with the Duchy of Franconia; even the righteous Chancellor tried to carve out a principality for himself at Mainz. Regensburg fell to the Duke before the end of the year 1633, as Wallenstein, whose army had been practically annihilated at Lützen, was in no condition to make head against him or anyone else. Yet in the spring of 1634 Bernard was driven back, and Horn, with far inferior forces, compelled to risk a battle for the defence of Swabia. The result was the crushing defeat of Nordlingen. More and more it became evident to Bernard that without active French help Sweden would not be able to finish the war. France, without any open declaration of war, had overrun all Lorraine, and stood already upon the frontiers of Alsace. And, on the other side, Ferdinand was inclined to lean more and more on Spain. He was weary of Wallenstein's exorbitant demands, and the last attempt at a nationalist, or third-party, movement ended when that general's negotiations with Saxony were cut short by his assassination in February, 1634. Then more Spanish troops poured into the Empire, especially upon the Upper Rhine. All this could have but one end, and in March, 1635,

France declared open war on Spain (though strangely enough she avoided until 1638 any avowed attack on the Emperor).

Two months after this the peace of Prague was signed between Ferdinand and John George of Saxony, who was to retain what ecclesiastical property he had held before the Edict of Restitution. Any other states that pleased to come in within the year were to be admitted to do so. Of religious freedom, or restorations in the Palatinate or elsewhere, the peace said not a word. John George had fully deserted the cause. Some few states did accept the terms, notably, Mecklenburg and poor George William of Brandenburg; but Hesse Cassel and the Swabian and Rhenish Protestants as a whole remained true to their allies and their memories.

But how disorganised! Nordlingen had broken up the league of Heilbronn for good. From this time onward the Swedish Government, and Oxenstiern particularly, eagerly sought peace, if it could be obtained with honour and security.

Sweden was growing poorer every year, in spite of the fact that the war was supposed to pay its own way. But she went boldly forward. The truce of 1629 with Poland, was turned into a lasting peace in 1635, not without some persuasion from a new army of 20,000 men which James de la Gardie managed to levy and to shew to the Poles in their own country. In the spring of that year, Oxenstiern had an interview with Richelieu at Compiègne, and learnt how very different were the latter's views from his own. France wanted war, Sweden peace; the real triumph

for French diplomacy was that war continued. The Emperor was ready enough to accord to Oxenstiern the terms of the peace of Prague. But to the peace of Prague Oxenstiern would not submit. It would not have given Sweden a foot of territory in the Empire, or the least security for the newly won European position.

It was Banèr who first really picked up the staff of Gustavus and restored the military prestige of the Swedes. Before the end of 1635, hapless Pomerania had been overrun by the Imperialists, with whom were now the Saxons. But in the following year these latter were annihilated by Banèr at the battle of Wittstock. This more than made up for Nordlingen and allowed the Swedes to take up winter quarters in Saxony. When driven out of his entrenched camp at Torgau, where after the model of his great master he had spent four months, Banèr conducted a masterly retreat back upon Pomerania, with 14,000 men opposed to 60,000; a retreat which Richelieu in his memoirs calls one of the most glorious in history. Yet in the autumn of 1637, the Swedes were driven again to fight for Pomerania, and had no garrisons worth speaking of elsewhere. Bernard was fighting away in Alsace, either wholly for his own hand, or partially in the interest of the Most Christian King. Thus the war in the east became a series of Swedish raids on Bohemia and Moravia, varied with an occasional dash, in concert with the French, upon Bavaria. Banèr also kept his men's hands in by falling upon Saxony in spare moments. Brandenburg was added as we have seen

to the numerous enemies of Sweden, though not actively until 1637, when the death of old Duke Boguslav of Pomerania opened unpleasant questions as to the succession to his territories. In 1637, too, the passions, the bigotry, and the undaunted courage, which had contributed so much to the *dcharnement* of the war, were buried in Ferdinand's grave.

The new Ferdinand, an altogether weaker man than his father, was even more entirely a tool of the Jesuits. He concluded a treaty with Brandenburg, which materially aided in keeping the Swedish arms confined to Pomerania during the year 1638. That and the following year saw the last of the mighty deeds of Bernard, who won the great battle of Rheinfelden and took the strong fortress of Breisach in the former of these years. On his death-bed he realised that he had only contributed to hand over a priceless strip of German territory—Alsace—to the worst foe of Germany.

In 1640, Swedish and French arms were seen for the first time in active co-operation,—the plan being then, as in each successive year of the war from that time, that the Swedes should penetrate through Bohemia, the French through Bavaria, until they joined hands with each other in the hereditary countries of the Emperor. This combination never actually came about, and the Swedes, having much the harder part of the business assigned to them, continually suffered at the hands of the Imperialists much more heavily than did the French. In 1641, when Baner died (he had practically had complete command since 1636, when Oxenstiern returned to

Sweden), the noble Torstenson, the best of all Gustavus's generals, though in body a helpless invalid, succeeded to the command in a more favourable state of affairs. The young Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William, afterwards called the Great, was anxious to marry the Queen of Sweden, and at once cleared his court of the Austrian influences, to which his father had latterly leaned, and though not willing to throw in his lot actively with the Swedes, until he could be sure of Pomerania for a dowry, he allowed them free passage through his territories. Torstenson made an end of the Saxons at the second battle of Breitenfeld in October, 1642, and Saxony thenceforward, until 1648, ceased to exist as an independent state. In fact the whole Saxon people looked upon their recent losses as a judgment of God for abandoning the cause of the Gospel, and only the Elector still continued to cling to an Imperial alliance. The annual raid into Bohemia of 1643, was less effective than usual, owing to the threatened Danish war which came to an outbreak in the following year. Old King Christian had at last resolved to try his luck once more against the new mistress of the Baltic. Causes of quarrel were never wanting, but I shall no doubt be suspected of prejudice in favour of Sweden, when I say that there had been sufficient provocation on the part of Denmark to justify a much earlier attack.

Anyhow, in the end of 1643, Torstenson made a tremendous dash north-westwards from Pomerania, and in *four weeks* was well up in Jutland. Gallas, the Imperial commander, would fain have followed

him, but was unable to do so, as there was nothing to eat in the land which would have to be traversed. The war was as much fought by sea as by land ; but while on the latter element the Swedes carried everything before them, the naval battles were hotly contested and were equally glorious to both sides. Christian himself was a fine sailor, and was wounded on the quarter-deck of his own ship at the age of seventy. There was no Richelieu now to negotiate a peace ; but Mazarin had begun to take his place, and it was chiefly owing to Mazarin that this short and sharp little war was terminated by the peace of Bromsebrö in August, 1645. The terms expressed the complete victory of the Swedes, for, besides large cessions of territory on the Norwegian frontier (Jemtland and Hjerдалen), Sweden got the isle of Gothland, and complete freedom from tolls in the Sound for all her own ships and those of her dependencies ; also she received the province of Halland in pawn for thirty years.

Even before this peace was negotiated, Torstenson had fallen back upon Gallas and cut his hungry army to pieces, at the beginning of 1645. Then, leaving the Danish war to be continued by the fleets, he advanced right through Saxony, and annihilated another Imperialist army at Jankow, near Prague, in February. From thence he pressed on almost to the walls of Vienna, where, however, the natural elasticity of the Austrian territories told heavily against his few (10,000) troops. In broken health he resigned his command, which was taken up by Wrangel. Torstenson's victories, however, had this

result—they led to the first serious negotiations for peace. I do not propose to follow the three-year-long discussions, which took place at Osnabrück and Münster; it is noteworthy, however, that Sweden at once stated her full demand, and hardly seriously gave way from it at all; she may therefore fairly be held somewhat less responsible for the continuance of the war than the other powers.

Wrangel operated in the last three years of the war upon the lines already laid down; and some interest attaches to the fact that his co-operator was Turenne, who, though not uniformly successful against the Austrians (witness his defeat by Mercy at Mergentheim in 1645), earned his solid fame as a great master of both tactics and of strategy in these campaigns. Not to Turenne or Wrangel, however, but to the Swedish general, Königsmarck, was to fall the questionable glory of the last feat of arms—the attack on Prague in August, 1648, in which part of the city was actually sacked. How completely the sympathies of Bohemia had been changed by thirty years of successful persecution, may be learnt from the story of the splendid defence that the city then made. The modern visitor to Prague may perhaps pass by unnoticed a rather glorious old red rag, which streams from the roof of the Jewish synagogue, which is situated in one of the dirtiest quarters of that city; it was presented by Ferdinand in memory of the assistance rendered by the Jews to the Catholic cause in the defence. But the modern visitor to the library at Upsala is not likely to pass by unnoticed the famous *Codex Argenteus*, a fifth-

century manuscript of the Gospels written by Bishop Ulfilas, which, containing as it does the only known fragments of the old Gothic language, has found in the land of the descendants of the Goths a more fitting home than in the Jesuit College of Prague, from which upon this occasion it was taken.


Meanwhile the month of October in the same year saw the end of the war. The peace of Westphalia gave to Queen Christina and her successors for ever, as members of the German Empire in respect thereof, all that part of the Duchy of Pomerania which lies west of the Oder, and so much of it to the east of that river as would give command of all its three mouths—*i.e.*, the districts of Damm, Golnau, and Stettin; further, the city and district of Wismar, the archbishopric of Bremen, and the bishopric of Verden; lastly, 1,800,000 dollars as compensation for the soldiers, whose occupation was obviously a thing of the past.

France obtained by the same treaty Alsace, together with recognition of her sovereignty over the three Lorraine bishoprics, which she had practically held since 1552. These territories, however, unlike the Swedish indemnifications, were fully separated from the Empire, and it has remained for the heroes of a later day to reclaim them.

For Germany most of the vexed questions were set at rest. The Calvinists were no longer excluded from toleration. The Lower Palatinate was restored to the worthless Charles Louis (Rupert's elder brother), the eldest son of the "King of Bohemia," for whom also an eighth electorate was


created ; while Bavaria kept her hold upon the Upper Palatinate. Most important of all, the northern "bishoprics" were saved for Protestantism, the year 1624 being taken as the test ; whatever was Protestant then was to be Protestant still ; and the principle of "chambres mi-parties," already suggested by Gustavus, was adopted by the Imperialist tribunals as a safeguard against religious bigotry in the judges of these courts.

It is hardly necessary for anyone who has followed the story to be told that, with the exception of the Palatinate these results might have been equally attained if peace had been concluded immediately after the first battle of Breitenfeld.





MINNESPINNING WITH DEATH OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII.

THE ARTICLES OF WAR.

THE celebrated Articles of War, which were first promulgated by Gustavus in the Polish campaign of 1625, appear to have been originally designed for the foreign soldiers in Swedish pay, but they bound all the army alike, and were strictly enforced throughout the King's lifetime. They appear to have been largely drafted by his own hand. They may be thus condensed :

I. For an army on service there was a separate court-martial for each regiment, over which the colonel presided, assisted by assessors elected from the various grades by the whole regiment. There was also an upper court presided over by the Marshal of Sweden, or his deputy, with the leading officers as assessors. The King to be a supreme court of appeal in himself.

II. The provost-marshal had power to arrest and imprison, and bring before court-martial, any person whom he suspected of being an offender, but might not "justify" (*i.e.*, hang) him on his own responsibility, except in the case of resistance to his own actual orders.

III. To the regimental court-martial belonged all crimes such as larceny, cowardice, insubordination, etc.

to the upper court, cases of high treason and all civil disputes.

IV. The punishment of death (loss of head and hand, or hanging) is decreed to every tenth man by lot if a regiment runs away during a battle. The other nine are to serve without their banner, lie outside the quarters, and have to clean out the camp, until they have wiped out their disgrace by a bold deed. Death is the penalty for plundering or outrage.

V. Other punishments were "riding the wooden horse" (a sharp bar of wood on which the victim sat with a musket tied to each foot), imprisonment in irons, bread and water, fines, etc. Flogging was not allowed.

VI. A man might have his own wife with him, if he pleased, but no loose women were allowed in the camp. In the German armies so common had their presence become, that there was (we know from other sources besides Captain Dalgetty, who calls him "Captain of the Queans") an officer called Huren-Weibler, charged with the duty of keeping them in order.

VII. Morning and evening prayer in every regiment. Full service and a sermon on Sundays.

VIII. No duelling is allowed. Mr. Chapman quotes an excellent story of the King on this subject. Two officers obtained with difficulty his permission to fight a duel. He said he would come and see it. Arrived on the ground, he addressed the combatants as follows: "Now gentlemen, fight away—fight till one of you falls, and I have brought the provost-marshal with me to behead the survivor."

That these articles were rigorously observed on such a stage as that of the Thirty Years' War is perhaps too much to hope. But we shall find many instances in

which Monro's evidence, as well as that of other contemporaries, tends to prove the King's great zeal for their enforcement, and the punishments, which he meted out impartially for all violations of them which came under his knowledge.





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